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ABSTRACT

The Coherence of Left-Libertarianism: A New Approach to Reconciling Libertarianism and
Socialism
by
Jesse Spafford

Advisor: Carol Gould
The past twenty-five years have witnessed the emergence and development of what has become
known as left-libertarianism—a philosophical position that seeks to show that certain moral
principles traditionally associated with libertarianism are compatible with egalitarian views about
the distribution of resources. However, this position has also come under fire from various critics
who argue that the position lacks coherence. For example, Barbara Fried argues that, even if leftlibertarians show that one can simultaneously hold some combination of ethical principles, it
doesn’t follow that one should. In my dissertation, I argue that there is a suitably coherent version
of left-libertarianism wherein an egalitarian conclusion is shown to actually follow from core
libertarian premises. Further, I argue that both the conclusion and the premises are independently
plausible; thus, my contention that libertarian principles imply luck egalitarianism can be seen as
part of a modus ponens argument contending that one should first accept the libertarian principles
and then the luck egalitarian position that follows as a matter of logical consequence.
The libertarian principles in question are the self-ownership thesis and the consent theory
of legitimacy. The former maintains that each person has all the rights over their own self that she
would have over a fully owned object including the right to use her body and talents and exclude
others from using her body (and, more controversially, transfer these rights). I argue that this thesis
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has been widely misconstrued. Specifically, most interpreters of the thesis understand the right to
use one’s body as a right to do what one likes with one’s self so long as one does not interfere with
others. However, I argue that a right to use one’s body is better understood as a right to have one’s
body be a part of one’s actions, even when those actions interfere with others. This alternative
understanding of a use right, I argue, resolves a number of prominent objections to the selfownership thesis, thereby enhancing its plausibility.
Similarly, I attempt to defend the plausibility of the libertarian consent theory of legitimacy
which holds that people are only obligated to obey the laws of a state if they have consented to its
rule. Specifically, I provide a novel version of a popular argument from moral equality wherein it
is argued that persons are moral equals with this status entailing that they cannot impose
obligations upon one another without consent. Given this argument, any state that wants the power
to oblige its citizens via the enactment of laws—i.e., that wants to be legitimate—must, first,
acquire the consent of all the subjects it seeks to govern. I then reply to objections made by a
number of philosophers who argue that either (a) there is nothing problematic about the nonconsensual imposition of obligations or (b) human action merely changes the practical
requirements of already-existing obligations without ever imposing new obligations.
In addition to defending these libertarian principles, I also attempt to bolster the plausibility
of the egalitarian principle of justice I take them to entail. Specifically, I introduce a refined version
of luck egalitarianism that is designed to avoid a number of prominent objections in the literature.
Unlike strict egalitarians, luck egalitarians are willing to declare that inequality can be just if—and
only if—those inequalities result from some choice for which the worse-off parties are responsible.
However, a popular worry emerges from the fact that the results of one’s choices are often partially
a function of the choices of others. For example, suppose that a motorcyclist crashes due to reckless
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driving. In this case, the extent to which she ends up worse off than others will depend on how
others respond to the crash: she will be worse off if she is left on the side of the road than if she is
rescued—and will be worse off still if an angry commuter comes over and starts kicking her. Many
have worried that luck egalitarianism entails that any of these outcomes would be just, as the
motorcyclist is responsible for the outcome in each case. However, this seems like an unacceptable
result, as it renders the motorcyclists’ just share inappropriately contingent on the arbitrary choices
of others. I attempt to rescue luck egalitarianism from this worry by presenting an alternative
account of what people should be held responsible for, namely, acting in ways that can reasonably
be expected to produce less appropriately distributed well-being than some alternative choice they
could have made. I argue that this account avoids the above worry as well as two other prominent
objections that have been raised against luck egalitarianism in the literature.
Having introduced and defended all of the relevant principles, I argue that the two
libertarian principles, together, entail the luck egalitarian one. Specifically, I note that libertarians
typically reject egalitarian principles of justice in favor of an entitlement theory of justice
according to which the justice of some arrangement of holdings depends on what property rights
people have vis-à-vis their respective holdings. However, I argue that the kind of property rights
posited by libertarians amount to a form of legitimacy of the kind claimed by states. Thus, if one
accepts the consent theory of legitimacy described above, one should concede that such rights can
be established only if all other persons consent to their establishment. However, given that this
necessary condition is never met in practice, it follows that there are no existing property rights.
Finally, I argue that absent any existing property rights, libertarians should accept some nonentitlement theory of justice. Specifically, I argue that libertarians are committed to a single metanormative principle that (a) grounds the self-ownership thesis and (b) is entailed by the argument
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that grounds the consent theory of legitimacy. Further, the chapter argues that, when this metaprinciple is applied to question of distributive justice, it yields a luck egalitarian principle of justice
of the kind already defended. Given that libertarians need either the meta-principle or the argument
that entails it to ground their positions, I conclude that they are also committed to the luck
egalitarian position entailed by that meta-principle.
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Chapter One
I. Libertarianism, Socialism, and Distributive Justice
Central to the long-running debate over distributive justice is the question of how equal holdings
must be if they are to be just. This question has been a particular point of contention between
libertarian and socialist philosophers, with each respective group staking out positions at opposite
ends of the egalitarian spectrum. While socialist philosophers appeal to a number of distinct
normative values to ground their economic prescriptions,1 a popular view—particularly among
prominent Analytical Marxists—is that holdings should conform with a luck egalitarian principle
of justice. For example, G. A. Cohen suggests that a core socialist commitment is that there should
be no “unchosen disadvantages, disadvantages, that is, for which the agent cannot herself be
reasonably held responsible, whether they be disadvantages that reflect social misfortune or
disadvantages that reflect natural misfortune” (2009, 18). Similarly, John Roemer has endorsed
Cohen’s luck egalitarianism and attempted to develop a practical procedure for choosing policies
that best realize luck egalitarian goals (1993; 1998; 2017, 300-303). And Erik Olin Wright argues
that one of capitalism’s flaws is that it runs afoul of the proposition that things are just “if all
inequalities are the result of individual choice and… ‘option luck’” (2010, 52). Thus, it is popular
among socialists to insist that egalitarian redistribution is demanded by justice to counteract the
effects of bad luck.2
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These values include freedom as self-development (Gould 1978; 1990), solidarity (Gould 2007), community (Gould
1978; Cohen 2009; Roemer 2017, 306-208; Spafford 2019), human rights (Gilabert 2018), democracy in the
workplace (Schweickart 2011; Arneson 1993), meaningful work and/or unalienated labor (Ollman 1976; Elster 1986;
Arneson 1987), goods being distributed “from ability to need” (Carens 2003; Gilabert 2015) and opposition to
exploitation (Holmstrom 1977; Vrousalis 2013; Warren 2015; Vrousalis 2018), among others.
2
It is also arguable that Marx, himself, held something like a luck egalitarian view about justice. Specifically, some
have read his contention that, in a communist society, goods would be distributed from each according to their ability
to each according to their need to be a proto-luck egalitarian position (see: Gilabert 2015). However, this interpretation
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By contrast, libertarians—at least those who ground their libertarianism in natural rights as
opposed to utilitarian considerations—tend to affirm a collection of moral principles that
seemingly preclude egalitarian redistribution. First, libertarians are widely attracted to the thesis
of full self-ownership, which holds that each person has the strongest possible bundle of ownership
rights over herself (e.g., use rights, exclusion rights, alienation rights, etc.) that are compatible with
everyone having the same set of rights.3 This thesis is generally taken to entail that persons have
no natural duty to assist others, where such duties are, to use John Simmons’ description, “moral
requirements which apply to all [persons] irrespective of status or of acts performed” and that are
“owed by all persons to all others” (Simmons 1979, 13).4 Thus, the self-ownership thesis would
negate one basis that could ground the permissibility of the redistribution of people’s labor (and
its fruits).
Second, many libertarians also maintain that states are legitimate—i.e., have the power to
oblige their subjects by issuing edicts—only if they have received the consent of those they claim
to govern.5 Given that people have not ever actually consented to be governed, they have no
obligation to comply with the laws of their respective states, including tax laws. 6 Thus, this
endorsement of the consent theory of legitimacy entails that persons also do not have any
involuntary, state-imposed special obligations to redistribute their holdings (where such

is controversial, particularly given that there is dispute about whether Marx even recognizes justice as a reason-giving
normative concept (See: Geras 1985).
3
Some prominent endorsements of this thesis include Robert Nozick (1979, 172), Murray Rothbard (1982, 29-32),
Eric Mack (2002b), Daniel Russell (2018), and Brennan and van der Vossen (2018), among others.
4
Additionally, given that the duties are owed to all others, their content must be general, making no reference to
particular persons or institutions (Simmons 2001a, 47).
5
Some authors prefer to use the phrase “having authority” to as the correlate of persons having political obligations
to comply the law. However, others have used the term “authority” to describe both the right to be obeyed and the
right to enforce the law (e.g., Huemer 2013, 10). Thus, here the term will merely be used as the correlative power of
people with political obligations.
6
This view is most explicitly defended by Simmons (1979; 1993; 1996; and 2001a) and Huemer (2013). Additionally,
as Bas van der Vossen (2019) notes, something like a consent theory of legitimacy is widely accepted by libertarians
given their commitment to the view that people are equal and not subordinate to one another.
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obligations contrast with natural duties in that they are owed by particular people to other particular
people and arise from the actions of individuals).
Finally, natural rights libertarians typically endorse an entitlement theory of justice.7 An
entitlement theory maintains that the justice of holdings is a historical matter, where individuals
acquire robust property rights over holdings either through acts of initial appropriation or voluntary
transfers from the prior owners of those holdings. Importantly, these rights include the right to
exclude others from the use of those holdings, meaning that property owners would be wronged
by any involuntary taking of their holdings via taxation. Thus, libertarians who endorse these three
positions—namely, the self-ownership thesis, the consent theory of legitimacy, and an entitlement
theory of justice—can insist that not only are property owners free from any requirement to
redistribute their holdings (as either a matter of natural duty or political obligation) but also they
are wronged if others try to redistribute their holdings without their consent.
Admittedly, this paints the state of the debate with a bit of a broad brush, with some denying
that luck egalitarianism is either a socialist principle or a plausible one.8 Alternatively, some
libertarians either limit or reject one or multiple of the aforementioned principles. 9 However, the
two positions described are, at the very least, accepted by influential factions of the socialist and
libertarian camps, and helpfully frame the present debate over distributive justice by stating the
egalitarian and anti-egalitarian positions in their strongest terms.

The paradigmatic description of this theory being Nozick’s (1979).
See, e.g., Arneson (2011a).
9
For example, Chris Freiman has argued against self-ownership as part of a project of defending a version of
libertarianism grounded in utilitarian considerations. See Freiman and Lerner (2015).
7
8
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II. Left-libertarianism and Coherence
While the libertarian and socialist positions described above seem to be diametrically opposed,
there has been a notable recent effort to reconcile these two views. Specifically, the past twentyfive years have witnessed the emergence and development of what has become known as leftlibertarianism—a philosophical position that endorses certain normative principles traditionally
associated with libertarianism as well as principles promoted by various egalitarians, including the
luck egalitarian socialists. Left-libertarians seek to demonstrate that, contrary to what one might
expect, certain libertarian and egalitarian principles are compatible such that the demands of both
can be met simultaneously. Typically, this demonstration takes the form of showing that the selfownership thesis is compatible with egalitarian redistribution. For example, Peter Vallentyne
(1998) argues that, even if one endorses this thesis, a society can justly tax away the full benefit
that a person receives from natural resources without violating her right to self-ownership.
Similarly, Michael Otsuka (1998) argues that one might endorse a particular version of the selfownership thesis while still insisting that justice obtains iff goods are distributed in such a way that
each person has an equal opportunity to attain welfare. Hillel Steiner (2000) defends a position
wherein he accepts the libertarian right to self-ownership while simultaneously affirming the
egalitarian position that each person is entitled an equal share of external natural resources. And,
Philippe Van Parijs (2000) posits that self-ownership can be balanced with an egalitarian maximin
principle whereby resource ownership is structured so as to maximize the opportunities available
to the worst-off.
However, left-libertarianism has also come under fire from various critics who argue that
the position lacks coherence. This suggestion was perhaps most prominently made by Barbara
Fried in her review of Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics—a compilation wherein most of the
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above-mentioned positions are presented (2004, 89). While Fried suggests that left-libertarians
might have demonstrated the compatibility of libertarian and egalitarian principles, she suggests
that a coherent position is one where the adoption of any additional principles beyond one’s
starting principle is “motivated” by that starting principle. However, she contends that the
egalitarian commitments of left-libertarianism are not adequately motivated by the relevant
libertarian principles (e.g., self-ownership) in this way (2004; 87fn50, 89).10
In their joint response to Fried’s complaint, Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka largely
concede the charge, admitting that “left-libertarians do not all hold that the egalitarian ownership
of natural resources follows from their non-egalitarian libertarian commitments,” with leftlibertarians instead invoking “egalitarian ownership of natural resources as an independent
principle” (2005, 208). However, they argue that this is of little consequence, for, if “coherence
requires that the justification for each of one’s principles appeal to the same set of considerations,
[the claim that left-libertarianism is incoherent] may be correct, but then there is little reason to
require coherence so understood” (2005, 209).
Unfortunately the notion of coherence upon which this exchange rests is never fully
analyzed by any of the involved parties. However, the idea might be developed as follows. Suppose
that one embraces some libertarian principle L; should one build a political philosophy that takes
not only L as its starting premise but also adopts some egalitarian principle S? There are two
reasons one might have doubts about the wisdom of such a project—each of which might be
understood as a kind of coherence worry.
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Mathias Risse (2004) has raised a related worry about the coherence of left-libertarianism, while conceding that
left-libertarians succeed in demonstrating the compatibility of various libertarian and egalitarian principles. The notion
of coherence is developed in greater detail below.
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First, the worry about coherence can be understood as a worry about arbitrariness. Note
that there are numerous alternative principles and combinations of principles that might be adopted
as a supplement to L. Why, then, build a political philosophy around the conjunction of L and S
rather than L and some other principle T—or L and S and T? While it may be an interesting exercise
to demonstrate the compatibility of any two arbitrary normative principles, the fact these principles
can be jointly held doesn’t mean that they should be so held. Thus, one might take a coherent
political position to provide a justification for the particular principles chosen.
In response to this suggestion, one might note that left-libertarians do often give
freestanding justifications of their preferred libertarian and egalitarian principles, providing
various reasons why they take them to be attractive. Thus, one might think that this first demand
for coherence has been met. However, in response to this suggestion, note that a given principle
might be compatible with many other independently plausible principles that are, themselves,
incompatible. For example, it might be the case that L is compatible with S and is similarly
compatible with T, and there is something attractive about both S and T; however, it also turns out
that S and T contradict one another. Thus, to embrace L & S requires that one reject L & T, even
though all three principles are equally plausible. Given this possibility, one might worry that a
theoretical position composed of independently attractive principles bound together only by the
very weak compatibility relation is at risk of being unacceptably arbitrary. At the very least, one
might ask of the person who endorses L and S whether she is confident that she has found the
optimal combination of moral principles, or if there might be superior combinations of compatible
principles available to her.
More importantly for these purposes, one might take the worry about coherence to be a
worry about how the political position will hold up in the context of debate with adherents to
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various rival positions. Specifically, consider the ideologue who endorses L as a core principle but
rejects S. In response to such an ideologue, demonstrating that L and S are compatible will do
nothing to push her away from her position, as she can admit such compatibility while denying
that there is any need for her to append S to her already accepted principle. Of course, one might
appeal to various intuitive considerations that favor the adoption of S, but a steadfast ideologue
can simply deny that she feels the force of the presented intuition pumps.
This worry about the coherence of a joint position that endorses both L and S, then, is a
worry that L and S fail to adequately hang together in way that gives the position a dialectical
advantage over a position that endorses L but not S (or S but not L). In other words, were the joint
position coherent, then there would be some sort of logical relation between L and S such that one
who merely embraced L or S alone would be rationally pressured to accept the joint position.
Specifically, it would have to be the case that either L—when coupled with uncontroversial
premises U—entails S, or that the most plausible grounds of L (i.e., the most plausible premise
that, together with U, entails L) also entails S when conjoined with U.
Once a lack of coherence is understood in the above way(s), then the dismissal of Fried’s
concern by Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka seems a bit too hasty. However, this thesis will argue
that there is at least one coherent version of left-libertarianism that integrates the libertarian and
socialist principles described above in a way that renders the position coherent. Specifically, it will
argue that there is a direct relation of logical entailment that connects the two positions: the three
libertarian principles—when coupled with the presuppositions that ground them—entail a luck
egalitarian principle of distributive justice. Further, it will contribute to the standard left-libertarian
project by arguing that both the libertarian and luck egalitarian positions are independently
plausible. Specifically, it will present novel arguments for these positions as well as revise them
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to avoid prominent objections that have been raised in the literature. While providing such defenses
has long been part of the left-libertarian research program, this effort becomes much more
important given this thesis’ claim that the libertarian positions actually entail the socialist principle
of luck egalitarianism. For, if it turns out that luck egalitarianism has serious problems that demand
its rejection, then one can infer via modus tollens that the libertarian premises that entail luck
egalitarianism must also be rejected, thereby throwing out the entire left-libertarian package of
views. To avoid this outcome, this thesis seeks to show that one should take the entailment
relationship between libertarian and socialist principles to be part of a modus ponens argument:
not only do the libertarian principles entail the socialist principle, but all of these principles are
also plausible, meaning that one should first accept the libertarian principles and then the luck
egalitarian position that follows as a matter of logical consequence.

III. The Argument
Chapters two and three take up the task of developing—and defending—the libertarian position
described above. Chapter two focuses on the self-ownership thesis, which contends that each
person has all the rights over their own self that she would have over a fully owned object including
the right to use her body and talents and exclude others from using her body (and, more
controversially, transfer these rights). This chapter argues that the thesis has been widely
misconstrued. Specifically, most interpreters of the thesis understand the right to use one’s body
as a right to do what one likes with one’s self so long as one does not interfere with others.
However, chapter two argue that a right to use one’s body is better understood as a right to have
one’s body be a part of one’s actions, even when those actions interfere with others. Briefly, the
idea here is that actions have both a composition and a form where the former refers to the objects
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that compose the action while the latter refers to the arrangement of those objects across time and
space. The chapter argues that an action might wrong others because of either its composition or
its form, with an agent thereby needing a right licensing both aspects of the action if it is to avoid
wronging others. For example, if one person creates a beautiful bit of artwork with stolen paint,
the composition of the action would wrong the owner of the paint, even though the form wrongs
no one. By contrast, if she uses her own paint to paint a degrading and offensive portrait of another
person, the form of the action might wrong that person even though the composition of the action
is fine, morally speaking. Thus, people might be understood as having two distinct sorts of rights
when it comes to actions, with one variety of right entailing no one is wronged by the action’s
form, while the possession of the other variety entailing that no one is wronged by its composition.
Chapter two contends that the use rights posited by the self-ownership thesis are the latter sort of
right rather than the former (as many philosophers have suggested). This alternative understanding
of a use right, it is argued, resolves a number of prominent objections to the self-ownership thesis,
thereby enhancing its plausibility.
Chapter three attempts to defend the libertarian consent theory of legitimacy by providing
a novel version of a popular argument from moral equality, which argues that persons are moral
equals—a status that entails that they cannot impose obligations upon one another without consent.
Given this argument, any state that wants the power to oblige its citizens via the enactment of laws
(i.e., that wants to be legitimate) must, first, acquire the consent of all the subjects it seeks to
govern. However, many philosophers have objected to an adjacent version of this argument.
Specifically, they contend that there is nothing problematic about the non-consensual imposition
of obligations because such imposition is a common feature of human activity. Alternatively, it
has been objected that all human action, including the issuing of edicts by legitimate authorities,
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merely changes the practical requirements of already-existing obligations without ever imposing
new obligations. Thus, on either view, there is nothing uniquely problematic about the legitimate
authority’s issuing of edicts that might make consent a necessary condition of such legitimacy.
This chapter replies to these objections by arguing that legitimate authorities have a special
normative power to alter others’ requirements that non-authorities lack. Thus, there is a basis for
sustaining the moral equality argument’s claim that legitimacy requires consent in a way that other
actions do not.
In addition to defending these libertarian principles, chapter four attempts to defend the
plausibility of the luck egalitarian principle of justice embraced by socialists. Specifically, this
chapter introduces a refined version of luck egalitarianism that is designed to avoid a number of
prominent objections that have been raised against the position. Unlike strict egalitarians, luck
egalitarians are often willing to declare that inequality can be just if—and only if—those
inequalities result from some choice for which the worse-off parties are responsible. However, a
popular worry emerges from the fact that the results of one’s choices are often partially a function
of the choices of others. For example, suppose that a motorcyclist crashes due to reckless driving.
In this case, the extent to which she ends up worse off than others will depend on how others
respond to the crash: she will be worse off if she is left on the side of the road than she would be
were she rescued—and would be worse off still if an angry commuter came over and started
kicking her. Many have worried that luck egalitarianism entails that any of these outcomes would
be just, as the motorcyclist is responsible for the outcome in each case. However, this seems like
an unacceptable result, as it renders the motorcyclist’s just share inappropriately contingent on the
arbitrary choices of others. Chapter four attempts to rescue luck egalitarianism from this worry by
presenting an alternative account of what people should be held responsible for, namely, acting in
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ways that can reasonably be expected to produce less appropriately distributed advantage than
some alternative choice they could have made. It then argues that this account avoids the above
worry as well as two other prominent objections that have been raised against luck egalitarianism
in the literature. Thus, it seeks to show that, like the libertarian positions described above, the
socialist position is independently plausible, even in the face of influential objections that have
been raised against it.
Having introduced and defended these relevant principles, chapters five and six argue that
these two libertarian positions, together with some of their presuppositions, entail the luck
egalitarian principle of distributive justice. But what about the libertarian entitlement theory of
justice described above? Typically, it is thought that this theory is incompatible with any sort of
non-entitlement theory such as luck egalitarianism. However, chapter five argues that libertarians
should be open to adopting one of two different hybrid positions that include both the entitlement
theory of justice and some non-entitlement principle of justice (such as luck egalitarianism).
Specifically, these positions make the non-entitlement theory subordinate to the entitlement theory
such that, whenever the two conflict, the prescriptions of the hybrid position are identical to what
the entitlement theory alone would prescribe. Thus, the non-entitlement theory only determines
the prescriptions of the hybrid theory when the entitlement theory yields no judgment about the
justice of holdings.
The chapter then argues that libertarians who endorse the consent theory of legitimacy
should also accept that, as a matter of contingent fact, no one is entitled to any holdings.
Specifically, the chapter maintains that to be entitled to some natural resource is to be legitimate
in the same sense as the legitimacy claimed by states. Thus, if one accepts the consent theory of
legitimacy described above, one should concede that entitlements can be established only if all
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other persons consent to their establishment. Given that this necessary condition is never met in
practice, it follows that there are no existing property rights—which, in turn, implies that the
entitlement component of the hybrid positions never yields a judgment about the justice of
holdings. Thus, the prescriptions of either of the hybrid positions will be coextensive with the
prescriptions of the non-entitlement theory of justice.
While chapter five remains neutral about which non-entitlement theory libertarians should
include in their hybrid positions, chapter six argues that libertarians should accept a luck egalitarian
principle of justice of the kind presented in chapter four. Specifically, this chapter argues that there
is a single meta-normative principle that (a) grounds the self-ownership thesis and (b) is entailed
by the argument that grounds the consent theory of legitimacy (presented in chapter three). Further,
the chapter argues that, when this meta-principle is applied to question of distributive justice, it
yields a luck egalitarian principle of justice of the kind defended in chapter four. Given that
libertarians need either the meta-principle or the argument that entails it to ground their positions,
it follows that they are also committed to the luck egalitarian position entailed by that metaprinciple. Thus, the dissertation will have demonstrated that there is a novel—and plausible—leftlibertarian position wherein the luck egalitarianism espoused by socialists is shown to actually
follow from the libertarian self-ownership thesis, the consent theory of legitimacy, and their
presuppositions (while avoiding contradiction with an entitlement theory of justice).

IV. Social Anarchism
Finally, while this point will not be pursued beyond this chapter, an additional benefit of the
position defended in this dissertation is that it might serve as a preliminary statement of social
anarchism qua political philosophy. Notably, social anarchists outside the world of analytic
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philosophy often characterize themselves as either “libertarian socialists” or “left-libertarians” as
a way of expressing their dual commitment to libertarian and socialist principles.11 However,
despite this self-identification, their views go almost entirely unmentioned by left-libertarian
philosophers and they are rarely recognized as philosophical compatriots.12 One possible
explanation of this exclusion is the fact that social anarchists generally reject private property
rights altogether, while almost all left-libertarian theories presuppose such rights (arguing, instead,
that the ability to acquire such rights is bounded by various egalitarian constraints).13 However,
this point of disagreement should not be disqualifying, as the standard anarchist position includes
both an endorsement of full self-ownership and a commitment to egalitarian distributions of
resources, thereby meeting the stated criterion of left-libertarianism (Vallentyne 2000, 1).
While there is an anarchist tradition within philosophy, it is generally composed of
philosophical anarchists focused exclusively on the denial of state legitimacy with no associated
commitment to the egalitarian views of the social anarchists. Indeed, many leading proponents of
philosophical anarchism fall in the right-libertarian camp rather than the left-libertarian one.14
Thus, there is a puzzling sociological phenomenon where the analytic philosophers who call
themselves anarchists do not share many of the views of the non-philosopher anarchists—who, in
turn, call themselves left-libertarians despite not being recognized as such by left-libertarian
philosophers.

Social anarchists also sometimes are described as “anarcho-communists” with prominent intellectual figures in this
tradition including William Godwin, Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, Murray Bookchin, and
Noam Chomsky (among many others).
12
For example, in Vallentyne and Steiner’s definitive two-volume compendium of past and present left-libertarian
thought, no left-wing anarchists are included. Indeed, in the second volume, the only left-wing anarchist mentioned in
the index appears to be Robert Paul Wolff.
13
An exception is James Grunebaum (2000) who rejects private property rights. However, as Vallentyne notes, he is
also not strictly a left-libertarian as he rejects full self-ownership (see Vallentyne’s editorial comment at the start of
the chapter (Grunebaum 2000, 48).
14
Prominent examples include A. John Simmons, Michael Huemer, and Eric Mack.
11
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The left-libertarian position advanced by this thesis can be understood as a way of unifying
these divergent groups. Specifically, it attempts to unify libertarianism and socialism in a way that
captures anarchists’ self-designation of “libertarians socialists.” Further, it does so by arguing that,
although most philosophical anarchists take their position to apply strictly to the state, the
philosophical anarchism they endorse additionally entails that no one has any private property
rights—a conclusion endorsed by most social anarchists. In this way, the paper brings together
philosophical positions whose labels match those adopted by participants in the anarchist
movement while demonstrating that those positions entail some of the philosophical conclusions
embraced by social anarchists. Further, it will have defended the plausibility of each of the
positions presented. Thus, the thesis can be read as suggesting that there is a coherent and plausible
philosophical position that might be fairly characterized as the social anarchist philosophical
position.
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Chapter Two
I. The Self-Ownership Thesis
The first step of demonstrating that core libertarian normative premises entail socialist conclusions
is to introduce the relevant libertarian principles. This chapter focuses on the self-ownership thesis,
which is endorsed by a number of prominent libertarians on both the left (see, e.g., Steiner (2000,
76); Otsuka (2003, 15); Vallentyne (2007, 190)) and right (e.g., Nozick (1979, 172); Rothbard
(1982, 29-32)). Specifically, this thesis maintains that each person has all of the same moral rights
over herself as she would have over some external object were she to fully own that object.15 Or,
alternatively, to use G. A. Cohen’s formulation, “to own oneself is to enjoy with respect to oneself
all those rights which a slaveowner has over a complete chattel slave” (1995, 214). While there is
disagreement over which moral rights count as ownership rights (as a conceptual matter), almost
all philosophers take the set of ownership rights to be some subset of the following set of rights
catalogued by Fabian Wendt:
A liberty to use, consume, modify or destroy the owned object, a claim that others do not
use, consume, modify or destroy the object without consent, a power to transfer the whole
property rights bundle or parts of it to other persons, a liberty to defend one’s rights (and
the rights of others) against aggressors, maybe a liberty to punish rights-violators, a claim
to receive redress from violators of one’s rights, a power to enforce these rights against
violators of one’s rights, claims against interference with the exercise of any of these
liberties and powers and finally immunities against non-consensual loss of any of these
claims. (2015, 318).
This chapter will sidestep the question of whether all of these rights should be characterized as
ownership rights, focusing, instead, on clarifying the first-mentioned right to use an owned object,
particularly in the context of self-ownership.
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It will be helpful at the outset to draw a distinction—one emphasized by G. A. Cohen (1995, 209)—between the
thesis and concept of self-ownership. Specifically, the thesis of self-ownership asserts that everyone has a particular
set of ownership rights over themselves while the concept of self-ownership will, for these purposes, be taken to refer
to the rights that people would have were the thesis of self-ownership true.
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For those attracted to the thesis of self-ownership, part of the appeal seems to be that this
entailed use right grants individuals moral protection against interference—paternalistic, or
otherwise—in the use of their bodies and selves more generally (if one thinks these things are
distinct). Specifically, the right to use is taken to imply that people have a right to engage in a wide
range of actions, so long as those actions don’t interfere with others in various ways. For example,
G. A. Cohen argues that each person’s ownership of her powers to think and act implies “that each
is free (morally speaking) to use those powers as [she] wishes, provided that [she] does not deploy
them aggressively against others” (1995, 67). Similarly, Richard Arneson argues that, if one owns
one’s body, “one has the right to use it as one chooses so long as one does not use it in ways that
violate other people’s rights not to be harmed” (2010, 170).16 Jeremy Waldron, while developing
what he takes to be Robert Nozick’s view of self-ownership, posits that the right to use one’s self
is a right to do things with that self only within the limits set by others’ rights: “I own myself… I
have rights to [direct my actions] (though I must not harm others in doing so…)” (1988, 398). And,
Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, and Michael Otsuka suggest that the owner of an object has “a
full liberty to use the object (i.e., she is permitted to use the owned object as long as she has the
permission of the owners of any other objects thereby used)” (2005, 206).17
Steiner and Otsuka expand upon this more general statement, with each suggesting that
this liberty to use one’s owned body protects a number of particular actions that paternalistic or
conservative intervention might attempt to block. For example, Steiner argues that people having
property rights over their bodies gives them “liberties to dispose of them and their parts as we
choose” (2000, 76). He continues:
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A similar statement can be found in Arneson (2000, 323).
There is some reason for thinking that this statement does not reflect their true position, which is much closer to the
one affirmed in this chapter. More will be said about this in footnote 24 below.
17
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So long as we retain these property rights, it’s impermissible for anyone (noncontractually) to prevent our suicides or our keeping our body tissues or our donating them
or our selling them. Our doing some of these things, in some circumstances, may be morally
wrong on other grounds and deserving of strong condemnation. But it’s not unjust. And
preventing it is. (2000, 76–7).18
Similarly, Otsuka endorses a right to “freedom of expression, of sexual relations of any sort
between consenting adults, of the possession of cannabis and other recreational drugs, of gambling,
and the like”—where this endorsement is grounded in his commitment to self-ownership and the
associated bodily use right (2003, 2).19
This chapter will argue that these statements of self-ownership all make a shared mistake
in their respective articulations of the use right associated with self-ownership. Specifically, it will
argue that the term “use” is ambiguous, with its two distinct senses yielding two distinct notions
of a use right. Further, the chapter will argue that one of these notions—specifically, the one
assumed by almost all prominent discussions of self-ownership (as represented by the quotations
immediately above)—renders the concept of self-ownership unacceptably indeterminate. Given
this, it contends that self-ownership must be reconceived, with an alternative understanding of use
rights replacing the dominant notion. It will then present some implications of this replacement,
arguing that a revised notion of self-ownership entails that self-ownership is theoretically
compatible with both a duty to rescue and a duty to refrain from using one’s body in self-
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For Steiner, this claim about justice follows definitionally, as he takes justice to be a matter of people respecting
one another’s rights. Thus, when he asserts that there is nothing unjust about committing suicide—even if there is
some moral reason not to do so—he is affirming that one has a right to do this to one’s self.
19
Granted, Otsuka never explicitly says that self-ownership is what grounds the permissibility of using drugs/engaging
in sexual relations/gambling/etc. However, given that he (a) takes the permissibility of these libertine activities to be
a paradigmatic libertarian commitment and (b) takes the thesis of self-ownership to be the core libertarian moral
principle, it seems reasonable to infer that the self-ownership thesis is what it is that grounds the permissibility of the
activities, with the associated right to use being the only obvious candidate right within the bundle of self-ownership
rights which might do the relevant moral work.
Vallentyne also individually affirms a more general statement of self-ownership along these lines, by contending that
self-ownership—and, while he is not explicit on this point, presumably the associated use right—gives agents the
“moral authority to decide how to live their lives (within the constraints of the rights of others)” (1997, 321).
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destructive or libertine ways. Finally, it will draw upon its discussion of use rights to argue that
Eric Mack’s influential “self-ownership proviso” is incoherent.

II. Two Senses of Use
While the proponents of self-ownership cited in the opening section have diverse views about the
plausibility of the self-ownership thesis, they all share a particular understanding of what it means
to use a thing, with that understanding yielding a corresponding account of what is protected by a
use right. However, this section will argue that the term “use” is ambiguous, with there being an
alternative notion of use that a use right might be understood to protect. Sections III and IV will
then argue that proponents of self-ownership must opt for this alternative, weaker kind of use right
to avoid having the concept of self-ownership—and ownership more generally—rendered fatally
indeterminate.
To begin, note that, for any given object, a distinction can be drawn between its
composition and its form. The composition of an object is the set of all the parts that compose it
(one might here imagine the illustrated parts list so often found in the opening pages of a furniture
assembly instruction booklet). By contrast, the form of the object is the spatial arrangement of
those parts, with the same set of compositional elements potentially taking on many forms. For
example, the heap created by the demolition of a sculpture will have the same composition as the
sculpture, but a novel form. Similarly, actions can be understood as having both composition and
form, as they are composed of parts arranged in particular ways across time (and, often, space). 20
For example, one might use a deck of cards to either play a game of solitaire or build a house of

Many actions will involve physical parts, such as the parts of the agent’s body and other external objects that she
incorporates into her action. However, insofar as one countenances non-physical actions, one might still identify
distinct parts that are included in it, such as particular thoughts or other discrete non-physical objects.
20
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cards, with these two actions have the same composition (the constructor/player plus fifty-two
cards) but different forms.
This metaphysical distinction allows for the introduction of a normative distinction
between two ways that the use of an object might be wrong. First, what one does with an object
might be wrong, e.g., if one uses the object to kill another person. In such an instance, the
wrongness of the action is grounded in its form, as it is the spatiotemporal arrangement of the
object that renders the action wrong. Call this the wrongful exercise of an object. Alternatively,
the fact that one uses an object at all might be wrong, even if what one does with the object is
completely benign, as in the case where one rides a stolen bicycle to the beach. Here, the action is
wrong in virtue of its composition: the mere fact that some object is a member of the compositional
set renders the action wrong. Call such an instance a wrongful inclusion of an object. Thus, if a
person uses a stolen hammer to smash another person’s window, her action is wrong in two ways,
as the smashing of the window makes her action an instance of wrongful exercise, while the
hammer’s being stolen makes the action an instance of wrongful inclusion.
What should be said about actions that involve wrongful inclusion but where the exercise
of the object in question is obligatory (i.e., any other exercise would be wrongful)? For example,
suppose that a person steals a boat and uses it to rescue a drowning swimmer. In this case, a few
things might be said. First, if the exercise in question does not have the inclusion of the object as
its necessary condition, then it would be a fairly straightforward case of wrongful inclusion that
renders the action impermissible. If, for example, the boat thief had her own boat readily available
but chooses to steal someone else’s boat instead, then her action would be impermissible in virtue
of its wrongful inclusion of the stolen boat.
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The more interesting cases are those where some obligatory exercise has wrongful
inclusion as its necessary condition—for example, in the case where the only way to rescue the
swimmer is to steal someone’s boat. In such cases, there are three things one might say, where
these options help to clarify the relation between inclusion, exercise, and action permissibility.
First, one might hold that the wrongful inclusion overrides the obligatory use to render the action
impermissible. This might be the hardline right-libertarian position. Alternatively, it might be
posited that the obligatory exercise renders the action permissible, even though the action involves
wrongful inclusion. This proposal might take two forms: wrongful inclusion is a pro tanto wrong
that is outweighed by the obligatory nature of the exercise or wrongful inclusion it is a prima facie
wrong where the wrongness of the inclusion is overridden by the obligatoriness of the exercise.
Finally, one might hold that people’s exclusion rights are only partial such that, in any case where
obligatory exercise seems to render some apparent wrongful inclusion permissible (e.g., in the case
of rescue), there is no right to exclude others from the good in question. Thus, one would maintain
that such cases are not cases of wrongful inclusion at all, as the inclusion of the object does not
run afoul of any property right.
The posited distinction between wrongful exercise and wrongful inclusion reveals an
ambiguity in the notion of a use right. On the one hand, “P’s use of O” might refer to the exercise
of O with P having a use right with respect to O iff P has no duty to refrain from exerting O in
certain ways. Corresponding with the notion of wrongful exercise above, this kind of use right can
be called an exercise right, with such a right entailing that there is no wrongful exercise of the
object by the holder (for at least certain kinds of exercises). By contrast, “P’s use of O” might refer
to merely P’s inclusion of O in her action. In this case, she would have a use right with respect to
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O iff she has no duty not to include O in her various actions. Such a use right can be called an
inclusion right.
Consider, now, the accounts of use rights presented in the introductory section. While each
account puts a slightly different gloss on what use rights amount to, what now becomes clear is
that they all share an understanding that these rights are exercise rights rather than inclusion rights.
Indeed, note that each account maintains that the right to use one’s body is limited to certain sorts
of uses—i.e., kinds of exercises—with a qualifier denying that there is a right to use one’s body to
harm or aggress against others, non-consensually interact with their owned items, etc. Such
qualifiers are needed to avoid the conclusion that there is nothing wrong with such actions, which
would conflict with strongly held pre-theoretical beliefs and intuitions.
By contrast, if the accounts of self-ownership took the concept to imply inclusion rights,
then the caveats excepting certain kinds of actions would not be necessary, as there is no
incompatibility between one having an inclusionary use right over an object and one’s use of the
object being wrong. For example, a person who uses a hammer over which she has an inclusionary
right to smash another’s windshield can be said to have wrongfully exerted the hammer, even if
she does nothing wrong by including the hammer (in virtue of her having an inclusion right over
that hammer). Thus, the reliance on exercise-based qualifiers by all of the accounts presented
above reveals a dominant tradition of taking use rights to be exercise rights rather than inclusion
rights.
However, it will now be argued that any account of self-ownership that involves exercise
rights is unacceptably indeterminate. Specifically, the subsequent sections will contend that such
an account lacks a principled way of determining which ownership rights are to be assigned to
persons, thereby rendering the concept either arbitrary or superfluous. It will then be argued that
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the concept can be rescued by recasting use rights as inclusion rights, with the concluding sections
discussing the implications and applications of this move.

III. The Indeterminacy Argument
One prominent objection to the thesis of self-ownership is that the concept on which it rests is
indeterminate. Specifically, this objection holds that, given that ownership of an object implies a
set of distinct ownership rights, there are a large number of possible sets that might all equally lay
claim to the label of “ownership.”21 The notion of ownership does narrow down the candidate sets,
as the included rights must be among the kinds of rights generally recognized as ownership rights
(e.g., a right to use a thing, to exclude others from it, etc.). However, it remains an open question
whether every right of each kind ought to be included in the set. Thus, one might worry that the
concept of self-ownership is indeterminate, as there are multiple sets of rights to which the term
might refer, with no obvious principled way of settling the referent.
One possible response to this problem is to simply stipulate which set of rights is the
referent of the concept. However, if one is to take this stipulative approach, one must specify the
set of rights in a way that does not render the notion of self-ownership unacceptably arbitrary. If
one were, for example, to pick out rights at random, one might reasonably be asked why selfowners possess those particular rights rather than a rival set. And, absent some principled answer,
one has seemingly failed to justify the chosen rights set, with this failure representing the
nonfulfillment of one of the primitive burdens of political philosophy. Thus, there must be at least
some principled basis for determining which rights are to go in the set whose members are
possessed by a self-owner.
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Ronald Dworkin informally advanced an argument along these lines, as cited by Cohen (1995, 213).
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However, the proponent of self-ownership must also be careful regarding which basis she
uses for determining the members of set of rights. For example, she cannot appeal to just any other
normative consideration to help settle which rights are afforded to which persons (e.g., by asking
what rights assignments are most conducive to promoting well-being). First, such an approach is
unlikely to yield the set of rights favored by most proponents of self-ownership, who generally
want all persons to have the same set of maximally strong rights that render uses of the body for
social benefit impermissible. More important, proponents of self-ownership would likely find that
deriving the rights of self-ownership in this way makes the concept unacceptably contingent on
empirical circumstances that might be subject to change. For example, to return to the parenthetical
example above where the set of self-ownership rights is declared to be that which is most
conducive to promoting well-being, suppose that some contingent circumstance changes such that
this set is no longer the most conducive to promoting well-being. Were that to occur, on what basis
could the proponent of self-ownership insist upon the original set of rights? Indeed, it would seem
that the set of self-ownership rights would have to be subject to change along with the contingent
circumstances that helps to determine the set of self-ownership rights. However, insofar as
proponents of the self-ownership thesis want the set of rights referred to by that thesis to be stable
in the face of changing circumstance, this result will be unacceptable. Thus, they will want some
other way of defining the concept of self-ownership that is not subject to caprice in this way.
There is, however, a way around this concern, namely, if one thinks that there is some value
that is necessarily realized by ownership-style control of the self, where the extent to which that
value is realized is directly proportionate to the degree of control exercised over the self. Indeed,
this seems to be the strategy of the various defenders of ownership over external objects, who
argue that there is a necessary connection between such control and (a) the pursuit of projects
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necessary to living a meaningful life (Lomasky 1987); (b) people acting purposively and, thereby,
“living their own lives in their own chosen ways” (Mack 2010, 62); (c) living with others “without
fear” (Schmidtz 2010, 82); and (d) feeling “at home” in the world (Brennan 2014, 81). While these
justifications are all presented as the grounds of rights of ownership-style control over external
objects, they would seem to apply even more directly to the self, while avoiding the contingency
worry described immediately above.
Further, these proposed grounds suggest a way of non-arbitrarily defining the set of selfownership rights. Specifically, one might think that the listed considerations are promoted in direct
proportion to the amount of control a person has over her self with greater control yielding greater
ability to pursue projects, live without fear, etc. Additionally, one might think that the correct
theory of rights assigns to each person all (and only) those rights that either license her—or
correlatively oblige others to allow her—to realize these valuable things to the greatest degree
compatible with all other persons having the same set of rights. Given that (a) control allows a
person to realize these things of value and (b) self-ownership rights both license that control and
oblige others to not thwart its exercise, one might follow G. A. Cohen who suggests that the selfownership thesis should be defined in terms of universality and maximality: each person should
have the strongest set of ownership rights compatible with all others having these rights—where
one set of rights is presumably stronger than another just in case the latter is a proper subset of the
former (1995, 213).22 Such an account allows one to determine which rights are to be included in
the set in a way that is theoretically and normatively attractive without relying on appeal to some
other moral notion: insofar as one takes there to be something valuable about ownership-style
control of the body, it seems plausible that such control should be as extensive as possible for all
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For another prominent endorsement of this approach to defining the concept of self-ownership, see Vallentyne,
Steiner, and Otsuka (2005, 204-205).
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persons. Thus, Cohen’s approach seems internally motivated, with the appeal of self-ownership
(informally conceived) suggesting its own precise boundaries without reliance on external
normative considerations. It thereby sidesteps the indeterminacy worries discussed above.

IV. Indeterminacy, Reanimated
This is, perhaps, a bit too quick. For, some have suggested that even Cohen’s approach still leaves
proponents of the self-ownership thesis with a concept that is indeterminate. To see why this might
be the case, consider the case raised by Cohen (1995, 215) where person P wants to punch person
Q in the nose. In such a case, one might assign to each person exclusion rights over her respective
body such that any non-consensual physical incursion on Q’s nose would be impermissible.
Alternatively, one might assign to each person the use right to move her respective fists where she
pleases, thereby granting to P the use right to permissibly move her fist to where Q’s nose happens
to be. However, one cannot include within the set of self-ownership rights both such an exclusion
right and such a use right, as to do so would entail a contradiction: P would have no duty not to
punch Q (because P’s use right implies there is no such duty) and would also have a duty not to
punch Q (because Q’s exclusion right implies such a duty).
If this is right, though, then there can be no single maximal set of self-ownership rights.
For, consider the set S that is the strongest set of universalizable ownership rights over the self that
excludes both the fist-related use right and nose-related exclusion right mentioned in the previous
paragraph. A set that is otherwise identical to S but also contains one of the two specified rights
would be stronger than S. However, there are then two distinct maximally strong sets of rights: the
set of rights that is identical to S but also includes the use right and the set of rights that is identical
to S but also includes the exclusion right. If some set could contain both rights in addition to all
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the members of S, then that would be a stronger set, still, yielding a singular maximal set of selfownership rights. However, because the two rights are incompatible, there is no single maximal
set, thereby rendering the concept of self-ownership to be indeterminate, with all the associated
problems discussed in the previous section.
Cohen attempts to defuse this problem by arguing that the right to punch someone in the
nose is not an ownership right (1995, 215). Thus, while the set that contains all the members of S
plus the exclusion right is not stronger than the set that contains all the members of S plus the
punching right, only the former is a set of ownership rights, meaning that there is still a single
maximal, universal of such rights (1995, 215). Given this, the concept of full self-ownership
remains determinate.
However, why think that only the nose-based right is an ownership right, with the right
over the fist being some other kind of right? After all, is the swinging of the fist not a use of the
kind that self-ownership is supposed to protect? Cohen’s only argument to the contrary is to present
an analogous case where people’s set of rights might include either the right to exclude others from
their land, or the right of way to walk across owned land, but not both (as that would entail the
contradiction that there is both a duty and no duty to not walk across owned land). In this case,
Cohen argues that, while there is no maximal right set, there is still a maximal set of property rights
with respect to land, namely the set where people have exclusion rights but no right of way, as the
latter does not qualify as a land-based property right. However, granting Cohen his assessment of
the case, it does not seem analogous to the punching case, as what is at issue there is a conflict
between a bodily exclusion right and a bodily use right while the land case represents a conflict
between a land-based exclusion right and a bodily movement right. Given that both a right to punch
and a right not to be punched are rights over “over a particular body, by the person whose body…
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it is,” Cohen cannot obviously use his analogy to support the dismissal that there is no ownershiprelated right to punch someone’s nose (Cohen 1995, 215). Thus, the concept of self-ownership
appears to still fall victim to the indeterminacy argument.23
Fortunately for the proponent of self-ownership, there is a solution to this problem.
Specifically, begin by noting that the conclusion that self-ownership is indeterminate rests on the
premise that there cannot be some set that contains both the exclusion right to not have one’s nose
touched and the right to use one’s fist to punch a nose, as these two rights entail a contradiction.
However, what may now be apparent is that this premise is true if and only if one understands use
rights as exercise rights. For, if they are exercise rights, then they are rights to use the body in the
various ways one wants, e.g., to punch someone in the nose. Thus, an exercise right to punch
someone in the nose would imply that there is no duty to refrain from such punching, thereby
contradicting the exclusion right’s implication that there is such a duty.
By contrast, if use rights are understood as inclusion rights, then there is no such
contradiction. For, an inclusionary right to use one’s fist to punch someone’s nose does not imply
that there is no duty to refrain from punching the person’s nose; rather, it merely implies that that
there is no duty to refrain from including one’s fist in that action. Indeed, as noted above, an
inclusion right merely asserts that the action is not wrong in a particular way without entailing that
it is not wrong tout court. Thus, an inclusionary use right to punch someone’s nose does not
conflict with the nose-owner’s exclusion right, as one can simultaneously have a duty to refrain
from punching the nose without having a duty to refrain from including one’s fist in that action.24
Similar skepticism about Cohen’s argument is briefly presented by Barbara Fried (2004, 79fn31).
Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka at one point suggest something very much along these lines (2005, 206). However,
as noted above, their own statement of use rights seems to presuppose that use rights are exercise rights. Thus, the
additional conceptual work done in this chapter seems like a necessary intervention and will hopefully help to clear
up the confusion surrounding this point as well as its implications. This is particularly true given that Fried, in her
reply to Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka, does not interpret their suggestion as advocating inclusionary rights (216217). As an interpretive matter, I take her to be misconstruing Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka suggestion; however,
23
24
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Some might worry that the former duty implies the latter duty, making this claim
incoherent. However, careful attention to the deontic logic here reveals that having the former duty
is compatible with not having the latter. To see this, begin by noting that, on the present account,
actions are individuated on the basis of their composition and their form: while two different
actions might have the same composition (because they involve the same objects) or the same form
(their component objects are arranged in the same way), they will remain distinct actions so long
as they differ in one of these two respects. By contrast, if two actions have the same composition
and form, they will be one and the same action. This claim about identity can then be represented
logically by assigning to “a” the proposition that person P engages in action A; assigning to “c”
the proposition that P engages in an action that has composition C; and assigning to “f” the
proposition that P engages in an action that has form F. It would then be the case that a  (c & f).
Now, suppose that A is the action of punching someone in the nose, F is the form of
punching, and C is the inclusion of P’s fist in that action. Further, stipulate that “OB” is the deontic
operator that has a truth value of “true” just in case it is obligatory that the proposition that is its
argument obtains. Given this, the claim that P has a duty to not punch someone while also having
no duty to refrain from including her fist in that action could be written as “OB~a & ~OB~c,”
where the truth of this sentence implies the above claim that it is possible for it to be the case that
OB~a & ~OB~c. The worry, then, is that it may seem as though OB~a → OB~c, in which case
the claim in question would be called into question, as it would seem to be impossible for one to
hold both duties without contradiction.

regardless of whether or not she is correct about their view—and, for the reason just stated, there is some ambiguity
with respect to how they understand use rights—this chapter should do much to resolve the indeterminacy worries she
presses against her interpretation of their view.
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The reason one might suspect this conditional obtains is because one might think that a
duty not to include one’s hand in the act of punching is derivative of—i.e., implied by—the duty
not to carry out the punching action. Specifically, the thought here is that if (a) it is obligatory that
p and (b) q is a necessary condition of p obtaining, then it is also obligatory that q. For example, if
it is obligatory that one rescue a drowning child and one can only save the drowning child by
throwing her a life preserver, it is obligatory that one throws her a life preserver. However, one
might also think that P not punching someone has as its necessary condition that P not include her
fist in the act of punching (i.e., ~a → ~c). Thus, one would conclude that P’s duty not to punch
(i.e., OB~a) implies a duty not to include her fist in the act of punching, which is to say, OB~a →
OB~c.
The mistake here is the supposition that ~a → ~c. Given the above-stated relation between
action, composition, and form, what would be true is that a  (c & f). But it does not follow from
this that ~a → ~c. To see this, note that, by negating both sides, one arrives at ~a  ~(c & f), from
which it follows that ~a → ~(c & f). And, by applying De Morgan’s law to the consequent, one
could then infer the proposition that ~a → (~c v ~f). But, this means that all that is entailed by
OB~a is that OB~c v ~f—or, to return to English, the fact that one has a duty not to punch someone
means only that one has a duty to either refrain from including one’s fist in that action or refrain
from imposing the particular form of punching on the action. Thus, it can, in fact, be the case that
OB~a and ~OB~c, i.e., one can simultaneously have a duty to refrain from punching another’s
nose without having a duty to refrain from including one’s fist in that action.
In other words, the apparent tension between use and exclusion right is just that: apparent.
One person’s exclusion right over her nose—which gives all others a duty to refrain from punching
said nose—is fully compatible with others having the right to use their fist (in an inclusionary
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sense) to punch her nose. Thus, in assembling a maximal set of ownership rights, one need not
choose between these exclusion and use rights, or, more generally, any use right and exclusion
right. While the indeterminacy argument presented at the start of this section worried that there
might be many equally-strong sets of self-ownership rights (as the existence of a single pair of
incompatible ownership rights would allow for two maximal sets where one set included one of
the incompatible rights while the second set included the other), it has now been shown that there
is no such incompatible pair of rights when it comes to use and exclusion. One, therefore, need not
choose between use rights and exclusion rights when assembling the maximal set of ownership
rights, thereby sidestepping the indeterminacy argument presented immediately above.
Given this result, there is strong reason to favor an inclusionary understanding of use rights
over one that treats them as exercise rights. While the latter account falls victim to the
indeterminacy argument, the former allows for the adoption of Cohen’s approach to defining the
concept—namely, by defining it in terms of maximality and universality—while avoiding
indeterminacy and all the associated problems discussed above.

V. Inclusion Rights, Paternalism, and Rescue
While an inclusionary understanding of use rights solves the indeterminacy problem, it has two
consequences which proponents of the thesis of self-ownership will be reluctant to accept. These
will be discussed in turn, with some reason as to why these consequences are not quite as
unfortunate as they might appear upon initial consideration.
The first consequence of use rights understood as inclusionary is that self-ownership can
no longer provide a moral basis for rejecting anti-libertine and paternalist claims, as its proponents
have maintained. Recall from the opening section the claims that self-ownership implies that
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people have a right to commit suicide, sell their organs, have whatever kind of sex they choose,
use drugs, etc. However, note that this claim presupposes that use rights are exercise rights, as it
is only this sort of right that exempts its possessor from a duty to refrain from engaging in particular
kinds of actions. By contrast, if use rights are inclusion rights, then it would not follow from the
fact that one has the right to use one’s body to commit suicide/engage in sex acts/use drugs that
one does not have a duty to refrain from such acts. Indeed, just as one has an inclusionary right to
punch someone else’s nose without this right implying one has no duty to refrain from acting in
this way, an inclusionary right to use one’s body in libertine and/or self-destructive ways does not
imply that one has no duty to refrain from engaging in such acts. Thus, the self-ownership thesis
can no longer ground a rejection of conservative moral prohibitions.
While this implication will likely dismay libertarian proponents of the self-ownership
thesis, it should not compel them to recast use rights as exercise rights and bite the bullet of
indeterminacy. After all, self-ownership need not ground every conclusion that its proponents find
attractive. Indeed, there might be many other reasons for maintaining that people have an exercise
right to engage in libertine/self-destructive actions, without insisting that this right is part of the
bundle assigned to people by the self-ownership thesis. Given this, it is not clear that there is any
real cost here to setting specific desirable exercise rights apart from the rights of self-ownership.
The second, related consequence of construing use rights as inclusion rights relates to the
relation between the thesis of self-ownership and a duty to rescue those in need. Typically, the
thesis has been taken negate any such duty to rescue. Specifically, the argument for this conclusion
would go something as follows. Suppose that a person is faced with two options: rescue a drowning
child or remain standing on the shore. Given the exhaustive nature of these options, the person
refraining from standing on the shore is a necessary condition of rescuing the child. Now, assume
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(for the sake of a reductio) that there is a duty to rescue to the child. Given such a duty, it would
then plausibly follow that the person has a duty to refrain from standing on the shore, as, if one
has a duty to —and -ing is a necessary condition of one -ing—then one also has a duty to .
However, the use rights granted by the thesis of self-ownership are generally taken to imply that
one has no duty to refrain from using one’s body as one pleases (at least, in ways that don’t aggress
against others). Thus, if the thesis of self-ownership is true, the hypothesis that there is a duty to
rescue generates a contradiction and must be rejected.
Again, though, this argument rests upon the assumption that use rights are exercise rights,
as it is only this construal of use right that implies that one has no duty to refrain from using one’s
body as one pleases. If this chapter is correct in maintaining that the use rights of self-ownership
should be understood as mere inclusion rights, then it would not follow that one has no duty to
refrain from standing on the shore. Rather, one merely has no duty to exclude one’s body from the
act of standing on the shore. It may well be the case that what one is doing with that body is
wrong—i.e., the form of the action is wrong—with this fact rendering the action of remaining on
the shore impermissible. But, this claim is fully compatible with the claim that there is nothing
wrong with the mere inclusion of the person’s body in the action, which is all that an inclusionary
right to use of the self entails. Thus, the reductio collapses, leaving no remaining support for claim
that the self-ownership thesis negates the duty to rescue others.
Again, this implication of taking use rights to be inclusion rights might tempt proponents
of the self-ownership to stick with the standard understanding of use rights and simply embrace
indeterminacy with all its associated costs. However, two things might be said to suppress this
temptation. First, one can make the same point as that made immediately above about the right to
engage in libertine and/or self-destructive actions, namely, that one need not ground a negation of
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the duty to rescue with the thesis of self-ownership; rather, one might posit some other basis for
rejecting a duty to rescue.
Alternatively, one might suggest that this implication of an inclusionary understanding of
use rights is an advantage of such an understanding rather than a cost. Indeed, a common claim by
critics of the self-ownership thesis is that one basis for its rejection is the fact that it entails that
there is no duty to rescue, even in cases where the cost to the agent of rescuing is negligible and
the gains would be highly significant.25 Thus, taking use rights to be inclusion rights actually
enhances the plausibility of the thesis of self-ownership, as such a move untethers the thesis from
the unsavory implication that there no duty to engage in easy rescue.26

VI. The Anti-Interference Principle
There is an additional advantage of adopting an inclusionary understanding of use rights, namely
that it allows proponents of self-ownership to preserve an important principle that would have to
be rejected if use rights were taken to be rights of exercise. Specifically, consider Steiner’s claim
(quoted in the opening section) that, in addition to there being nothing unjust about the various
uses of the body he describes, acts that prevent such uses are unjust (2000, 77). Assuming that the
injustice of such thwarting acts is grounded in the use right people have with respect to their body,
Steiner can be understood as endorsing the following anti-interference principle: if some selfowner P has the right to use her body to , then all others have a duty not to interfere with P -ing
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For more on this point, see Arneson (2010, 183–4). Some also take the vindication of self-destructive actions to
count against self-ownership (e.g., Attas 2000, 4–5; Arneson 2010, 185–6). However, because that is a more disputed
claim, the chapter will not assert that an inclusionary understanding of use rights gains an advantage from the fact that
it does not imply that there is a right to engage in such actions.
26
An account of self-ownership that takes use rights to be inclusion rights should particularly appeal to philosophers
such as John Simmons who are attracted to Lockean-style libertarianism but who also seem to endorse a duty to rescue
(1979, 179–80; 1999a, 754). Insofar as such philosophers are attracted to the thesis of self-ownership as an articulation
of neo-Lockean rights, they should be pleased to find that the thesis is compatible with a duty to rescue.
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(where interference includes acting in any way that prevents P from -ing if she wanted to ).
Indeed, such a principle would seem to give crucial teeth to the possession of a use right, as one
might doubt the value of a right to  that allowed others to permissibly prevent one from -ing.
However, if one takes use rights to be exercise rights, then the anti-interference premise
must ultimately be rejected to avoid contradiction. To see why, consider the case of two selfowning people, P and Q, who exist on an otherwise-uninhabited and unowned island. Presumably,
if P and Q have use rights over their respective bodies, then they have the right to occupy any
arbitrary bit of unoccupied, unowned space S at some time T, where the occupation of S at T can
be called an act of -ing. Thus, in virtue of their self-ownership, both P and Q would have a right
to . However, if P’s right to use her body gives her a right to , then, given the anti-interference
premise, it follows that Q has a duty not to act in a way that would prevent P from -ing. Further,
this would mean that Q has a duty not to , as her occupying S at T would prevent P from doing
so. However, given the above premise that Q has a right to , it follows that Q does not have a
duty not to . Thus, the anti-interference premise generates an apparent contradiction and must be
discarded.
Fortunately, if one adopts an inclusionary understanding of use rights, this reductio
argument against the anti-interference principle can be avoided. Note that the contradiction rests
on the premise that P has a use right to occupy S (with such occupation preventing Q from
exercising her use right to occupy S). However, what is hopefully now clear is that P having such
a right presupposes that use rights are exercise rights, as the occupation of S is a particular exercise
of her body. By contrast, an inclusionary understanding of use right would merely imply that P
has the right to include her body in the occupation of S without any associated commitment to P
having a right to occupy S. Thus, the reductio proves unsound and the anti-interference principle
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can be sustained. However, the principle would assert a weaker claim than has been previously
assumed: it is wrong to prevent a self-owner from including her body in some action (even if it
would not be wrong to prevent the action itself).

VII. The Self-Ownership Proviso
Finally, the foregoing discussion also allows for a critical reconsideration of Eric Mack’s
influential self-ownership proviso (1995, 2002a, 2002b).27 To provide a bit of context, many rightlibertarians including Robert Nozick (1974) and David Schmidtz (1990) have suggested that the
initial appropriation of unowned natural resources must be constrained by a Lockean proviso
whereby these resources can be converted into someone’s private property only if everyone else is
left with an adequate remaining share to use and/or appropriate. However, left-libertarians such as
Vallentyne (1998) and Otsuka (2003) have seized upon this proviso, arguing that is most plausibly
understood in egalitarian terms such that an appropriator can be said to leave others with an
adequate share just in case they are each able to appropriate a share that is in some sense equal to
that which has been appropriated (with different left-libertarians positing distinct views about what
counts as an equal share). Thus, the Lockean proviso constraining initial appropriation threatens
to open the door to the kind of radical egalitarian constraints on property ownership that rightlibertarians would very much like to reject.
By contrast, radical right-libertarians—or, alternatively, what might be called “no proviso”
libertarians—such as Murray Rothbard (1982) and Jan Narveson (1998), contend that there is no
proviso restricting the appropriation of property, with people being able to unilaterally appropriate

Other philosophers to embrace Mack’s self-ownership proviso include Edward Feser (2005) and Daniel Russell
(2010).
27
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natural resources, even if none are left for latecomers to appropriate. However, this alternative also
has unsavory implications for libertarian-minded persons. For example, suppose that one person
has exhaustively appropriated the entire planet. Absent any proviso, it would then be just for her
to deploy coercive force to deny latecomers access to the space and resources they need to
survive—and to offer them only the bare means of subsistence in exchange for them doing
unending brutal labor for her benefit. Given the resemblance such a situation bears to slavery, one
can see why right-libertarians have been motivated to build a proviso into their theory that
precludes such exhaustive appropriation. However, given the left-libertarian challenge, rightlibertarians face an apparent dilemma: constrain appropriation but risk a collapse into extreme
restrictions on ownership or forego such constraints at the cost of declaring slavery-resembling
social relations just.
In the shadow of this dilemma, Mack posits an alternative kind of proviso that, unlike a
standard Lockean proviso, does not constrain what counts as initial appropriation.28 Rather, Mack
proposes that this proviso constrains the deployment of private property such that one cannot use
one’s property in a way that unduly limits others from exercising their world-interactive powers
(2002, 246)). Such a deployment, he argues, negates others’ self-ownership, as such selfownership gives them the right to exercise their world-interactive powers to at least some degree
(1995, 186; 2002, 245–46).29
As an illustration of the self-ownership proviso, Mack presents the case of Adam who justly
appropriates a previously unowned island but then denies drowning swimmer Zelda access to that
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Mack additionally worries that the considerations that ground a Lockean proviso might imply that one should reject
an entitlements approach to distributive justice altogether (as opposed to merely limiting the share of natural resources
to which one might be entitled) (1995, 188–89).
29
Because the precise degree to which one has a right to use one’s powers isn’t relevant to the argument, a more
detailed explication of Mack’s view has been omitted here. For a persuasive critical discussion of Mack’s claim that
the right to exercise one’s powers—i.e., the right codified by the self-ownership proviso—follows from the right of
self-ownership, see Bornschein (2018).
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island (1995, 187–88). In such a case, proponents of a Lockean proviso would contend that a full
appropriation of the island would not have left “enough and as good” for Zelda, and, thus, would
deny that Adam could have appropriated the entire island as stipulated—with any effort by Adam
to block Zelda’s access to the beach thereby qualifying as an infringement of Zelda’s right to use
that unappropriated land. By contrast, on Mack’s account, Adam is still the full owner of the entire
island, as stipulated; however, because denying Zelda access to the island would violate her right
to self-ownership, Adam acts wrongly in exercising his property rights (1995, 188).
However, there is something a bit puzzling about the assertion that a person can act wrongly
in exercising her rights. After all, if a person has a right to do something, that would seem to entail
that by definition she does not act wrongly when she does that thing. To tailor this general claim
to the case at hand, note that one of the defining features of the exclusion right afforded by full
ownership is that it gives the rightholder a claim against others intruding upon the owned thing
such that others act wrongly if they so intrude. Further, it is generally held that rights are coercively
enforceable such that the deployment of such coercive force is permissible just in case such force
is needed to prevent, halt, or rectify some rights infringement.30 Thus, the fact that a person owns
some bit of land would imply that she acts permissibly when she forcibly excludes others from
non-consensually making use of that land. However, this would then contradict Mack’s claim that
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It is for this reason that entitlements are generally understood as being a matter of justice, where the defining feature
of justice (relative to other moral considerations) is its licensing of coercive enforcement. Admittedly, one might draw
a distinction between kinds of ownership rights such that one might take Adam’s exclusion right to merely imply that
Zelda does something wrong when she steps onto the island without it also being permissible for Adam to forcibly
exclude her from the island (see, e.g., Vallentyne 1998, 611). However, even this weaker conception of ownership
would generate a contradiction if the self-ownership proviso is understood as implying that Zelda has a moral right to
access the island (vs. holding merely that it would be wrong to force her off the island). And, this would seem to be
the proper way to understand the proviso, as it is unclear how Mack’s analogical argument would provide support for
a proviso whose contention is that it is impermissible to coercively enforce an exclusion right under certain
circumstances. Note that the wrongness of stabbing someone with an owned knife has nothing to do with the
permissibility of coercively enforcing ownership rights over the knife.
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Adam wrongs Zelda by excluding her from his land. Given this, the self-ownership proviso appears
to be incoherent.
Why does Mack think that a person can act wrongly in exercising her right to exclude? His
argument for this claim rests upon an analogy with the use rights conferred by ownership.
Specifically, he cites the case where a person stabs a non-consenting other person with a fullyowned knife. In this situation, he argues that there is no contradiction in simultaneously positing
that (a) the stabber acted wrongly and (b) the stabber has full ownership rights over her knife, as
these ownership rights are constrained by the victim’s just claim over her body (1995, 191; 2002a,
98). By analogy, then, he argues that there is no contradiction in positing that Adam acts wrongly
despite having full ownership of the island—and, thus, there is no need to posit some limitation
on his ownership as proponents of a Lockean proviso would contend.
Given that Mack’s argument rests upon a claim about use rights and their relation to
supplemental moral constraints, the discussion of sections II–IV can now be employed to assess
its soundness. To begin, note that an inclusionary understanding of use rights helps to make sense
of Mack’s claim that there is no conflict between someone fully owning a knife and it being wrong
to stab someone with that knife. If use rights were exercise rights, then there would be a conflict,
as it would be simultaneously wrong and not wrong for the owner to use the knife to stab a person.
Indeed, it is this incompatibility of rights that generates the indeterminacy problem discussed
above. However, given an inclusionary understanding of use rights, Mack’s claim becomes
coherent: while there is nothing wrong with the composition of the stabbing action, it is wrong in
virtue of its form.
However, while this analysis vindicates Mack’s characterization of the knife case, it calls
into question the analogy he draws between the exercise of the use right in this case and Adam’s
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exercise of his exclusion right in the island case. Mack can, without contradiction, posit both a
right to use the knife to stab and a right of the victim to not be stabbed by trading on the ambiguity
inherent in the notion of a use right: while the victim is granted a right against a particular exercise
of the knife, the attacker has only the right to include the knife in that exercise. However, when it
comes to exclusion rights, there is no such ambiguity. Adam’s right in the island case is a right
against Zelda including the island in her action, which runs directly contrary to Mack’s claim that
the self-ownership proviso makes it wrong for Adam to deny her access. If there were some second
variety of exclusion right that did not entail permissible enforcement, then the analogy might be
sustained by claiming that it was this form of exclusion right that self-ownership implies. However,
given the absence of such ambiguity in the notion of an exclusion right, there is no apparent way
of avoiding the contradiction between Adam’s exclusion right and the right against exclusion
granted to Zelda by the self-ownership proviso. Thus, the proviso ultimately appears incoherent,
removing this way out of the proviso dilemma described above.

VIII. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to further clarify the concept of self-ownership by focusing on the
associated use rights implied by self-ownership. It has attempted to show that such rights fail to
support a number of normative propositions generally taken to follow from the self-ownership
thesis. Not only does P’s right to use her body to  not imply that it is wrong to prevent P from ing, but it also does not imply that P does not act wrongly when she -s. Finally, it has argued that,
while an inclusionary understanding of use rights helps to make sense of Mack’s knife analogy, it
also undermines his effort to draw an analogy between wrongful action when one has a use right
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and wrongful action when one has an exclusion right—and, thus, reveals the incoherence of his
posited self-ownership proviso.
Admittedly, the chapter calls for a fairly radical reevaluation of the concept of selfownership; however the hope has been to show that this revision enhances the plausibility of the
self-ownership thesis without weakening it so much as to render it trivial. The former point has
received more discussion above, with the chapter attempting to show that understanding use rights
as inclusionary rescues the concept from indeterminacy, allows for the preservation of the antiinterference principle, and avoids having the thesis of self-ownership entail intuitively
unacceptable conclusions in cases of rescue. However, given that some might worry that these
results are only achieved by rendering the concept toothless, a few additional comments are
warranted regarding the continued import of self-ownership given an inclusionary understanding
of use rights.
First, note that a thesis of self-ownership that adopts an inclusionary understanding of use
right over one’s body would still entail the important conclusion that self-owners are not slaves or
the subjects of tyrants. Note that the claim of monarchs and slaveholders is that they have the right
to determine the actions into which the bodies of their slaves/subjects are incorporated, with it
being denied that the slaves/subjects have any such right to choose what actions make use of their
own bodies. Indeed, the slaveowner takes a slave to act impermissibly when the latter does
anything contrary to the former’s wishes, as the slave lacks the right to include the body she
inhabits—but that belongs to the slaveowner—in unapproved actions (in just the way one acts
impermissibly when one uses someone else’s owned item without the owner’s permission). Thus,
the thesis that persons have inclusionary use rights, far from being trivial, is a radical repudiation
of many authoritarian moral positions (albeit ones that, today, seem somewhat antiquated).
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Second, even if one feels that this reinterpretation of use rights still saps them of much of
their force, note that the right to use one’s self amounts to but one item in the broader bundle of
self-ownership rights. Thus, even if the revised notion of use rights is weaker in certain respects
than the standard understanding of such rights, the existence of other self-ownership rights can
help to take up the slack. For example, while this chapter has maintained that a person having use
rights over her body does not give her the right to carry out particular actions such as walking to
the park, if anyone attempted to forcibly interfere with her as she walks to the park, that would,
ceteris paribus, violate her right to exclude others from her body. Thus, a revised understanding
of use rights does not entail that self-owners lack the moral protections associated with the standard
conception of use rights. Further, the existence of these other rights helps to sustain the moral
import of the self-ownership thesis, which remains far from trivial even with an inclusionary
understanding of the associated use rights. For example, the thesis will still deny the permissibility
of forced organ donation, making it an important denial of various sorts of consequentialism or
other theories of distributive justice that treat individuals’ bodies as one more resource to be
distributed.
Finally, to those concerned about moral protections foregone by the revised interpretation
of use rights—e.g., those who want to affirm the permissibility of libertine uses of the body—it
should be noted that there is no obvious reason why all such protections should be shoehorned into
the thesis of self-ownership. After all, if such moral protections are so intuitively plausible, why
not codify them with some supplemental moral principle that stands independent of the selfownership thesis? For example, principles of liberty or something akin to John Stuart Mill’s harm
principle (Mill 2003, 80) might equally suffice to affirm the permissibility of libertine actions.
Thus, given the significant theoretical advantages of the inclusionary understanding of use rights—
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and the apparent absence of any serious theoretical cost—it seems the concept of use rights should
be revised in the way suggested above.
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Chapter Three
I. The Consent Theory of Legitimacy
In the previous chapter, a core normative principle of libertarianism was introduced, where this
principle is taken to ultimately imply a luck egalitarian principle of justice of the kind more
commonly associated with the socialist left. That chapter also attempted to bolster the plausibility
of the libertarian thesis of self-ownership by clarifying the associated concept of self-ownership in
such a way as to demonstrate that it avoids at least some of the more serious objections that have
been leveled against it (namely, the problem of indeterminacy and the reductio that it unacceptably
implies there is no duty to rescue). By defending the thesis of full self-ownership in this way, the
chapter attempted to thereby strengthen the significance of the dissertation’s claim below that the
thesis entails a luck egalitarian principle of justice; after all, insofar as one cares about uncovering
true normative propositions, it matters much more that a possibly true premise entails some
conclusion than if a most-likely false premise entails that same conclusion.
However, as noted above, the thesis of full self-ownership alone is not sufficient to
establish the luck egalitarian conclusion; rather, a second libertarian normative premise is required
to help push libertarians away from their standard views of distributive justice and into the arms
of luck egalitarianism. Specifically, this premise is the endorsement of the consent theory of
legitimacy—a theory embraced by a number of libertarian thinkers, including, most prominently,
John Locke (2005, §§ 95–7, 119), as well as more contemporary thinkers such as Michael Otsuka
(2003), John Simmons (2005), and seemingly Michael Huemer (2013), though he is less explicit
on this point.31 Again, because it matters more if a plausible premise entails a conclusion than if

31

For more on Locke’s embrace of consent theory, see Simmons (1999b).
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an implausible premise has that implication, the chapter will then introduce an original argument
defending the plausibility of consent theory that has been surprisingly underdiscussed by its
proponents. While this argument will help to bolster the second libertarian premise’s endorsement
of consent theory, the general species of argument that it instantiates has been called in question
by a number of critics, with a particularly sharp challenge raised by Bas van der Vossen (2015).
Thus, after presenting the argument for consent theory, the chapter will turn to fending off these
objections.
Before presenting the argument in defense of consent theory, however, it will be helpful to
articulate exactly what this theory involves. To begin, some agent P can be said to be a legitimate
authority with respect to another agent Q when P has the power to determine Q’s obligations.
More specifically, it will here be maintained that P is legitimate with respect to Q just in case Q is
obligated to obey P’s edicts, where “P’s edicts” designates non-rigidly. Thus, if a state (here taken
to be a group agent) is legitimate with respect to person Q and has some law L on the books where
L mandates that Q , then Q is obligated to . However, if, instead of L, the state had instituted
law M mandating that Q , then Q would have been obligated to  rather than . Finally, on such
an account, one’s political obligations are the set of obligations imposed by a legitimate
authority.32
A consent theory of legitimacy, then, holds that P is legitimate with respect to Q only if Q
has actually consented to P’s authority (as opposed to various hypothetical consent theories that
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This statement of legitimacy is somewhat narrower than other accounts. Specifically, it makes legitimacy to be
strictly a matter of compliance with the edicts of the legitimate authority (typically the laws of a state). By contrast,
legitimacy might be taken to entail not only correlative obligations to comply, but also obligations to support one’s
state in various ways (Simmons 1979, 29). So, for example, one might think that citizens of a legitimate state might
be obligated to fight to defend that state from invasion, even if they were not presently residing in that country and no
law was made mandating that action. However, given that the argument of this chapter is concerned only with political
obligations—where such obligations are only those obligations imposed by the edicts of the legitimate authority (i.e.,
the specific obligations entailed by the general obligation to comply with that authority)—it will focus on the narrower
notion of legitimacy.
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give authority to P if Q would have consented under certain specified conditions).33 This consent
may be tacit in the sense that it is expressed via omission rather than via a standard vocalization,
signing, or inscription.34 However, it must be expressed via some sort of voluntary choice on the
part of Q that functions to communicate Q’s consent to P acquiring authority over her.
Of course, however one fills in the details of what such a voluntary expression of consent
involves, one would then have to ask whether the people in existing states have, in fact, voluntarily
expressed consent. While some tacit consent views answer this question in the affirmative (see the
previous footnote), the dominant view among contemporary philosophers is that, when it comes
to the vast majority of the population, no such consent has been given (Dagger and Lefkowitz
2014). Many who hold this view take this claim to be part of a reductio argument that concludes
with the rejection of consent theories of legitimacy, as they begin with the assumed premise that
most citizens are morally bound to comply with the edicts of the state. However, there is a consentbased species of philosophical anarchism which takes the absence of consent to be part of a modus
ponens argument whose conclusion is that there are no existing legitimate states. It is this latter
view that will be bolstered by the following argument in defense of the premise that legitimacy
has consent as its necessary condition.
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For a discussion of hypothetical consent, see Huemer (2013, 36–58).
There is much debate regarding what counts as genuine tacit consent and whether existing states have received such
consent from their respective citizens (e.g., by the citizens choosing to remain within their state’s territory). Simmons
(1979), for example, posits a number of necessary conditions of genuine tacit consent that are not met by continued
residence. For example, he argues that an omission can count as tacit consent only if (a) the agent intends to consent
via that omission, (b) it is relatively easy for the agent to act so as to refuse consent, with no seriously detrimental
consequences following from that act, and (c) the agent is presented with an explicit choice situation—where supposed
consent by residence fails to meet all three of these conditions (Simmons 1979; 81, 91, 95, 98-100). Similarly, Huemer
(2013) maintains that citizens have not genuinely consented via residence because some omission qualifies as tacit
consent only if the refusing action does not entail giving up something to which the agent has a right, but maintains
that citizens do have a right to continued residence in a state (2013, 25-30). By contrast, Peter Steinberger suggests
that citizens have consented by participating in elections and utilizing various state-provided services (2004, 218–20).
Otsuka stakes out the moderate position that citizens could tacitly consent through residence under the right conditions,
namely, if there is either a sufficiently attractive and variegated array of alternative societies citizens could choose to
live in, or the citizens are appropriately satisfied with their current society (even absent alternative options) (2003,
102–107).
34
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Before presenting the argument, it is worth quickly situating it in the landscape of current
arguments for consent theory. Specifically, one popular approach is to adopt a negative strategy
whereby a purportedly exhaustive list of all proposed (or, at least, all plausible) grounds for
legitimacy is compiled, with arguments then being presented to demonstrate the inadequacy of
each of these potential sufficient conditions until only consent remains.35 However, this strategy
can only succeed insofar as one thinks that the list of proposed non-consent grounds for legitimacy
is, in fact, exhaustive. Thus, the negative strategy has the shortcoming of being vulnerable to
skepticism that all plausible justifications for legitimacy have been defeated.
Alternatively, proponents of the consent theory of legitimacy have pursued a positive
strategy involving the provision of an affirmative case for thinking that consent is a necessary
condition of legitimacy. For example, Simmons suggests that part of the appeal of the consent
theory of legitimacy is its “emphatic denial of the legitimacy of force and conquest as a source of
political authority” (1993, 73). While Simmons doesn’t elaborate on this point, his core insight
could be expanded into a more formal positive argument for consent theory. For example,
beginning with the premise that force and conquest do not give rise to legitimate states, one might
then ask why such practices fail to establish legitimacy, with the apparent answer being that such
modes of acquiring subjects fail to obtain the consent of the governed. However, this explanation
suggests that what grounds legitimacy is consent, with the absence of consent implying the
illegitimacy of the purported authority. Thus, close examination of the intuitive aversion to rule by
conquest seems to yield an endorsement of the consent theory of legitimacy.
Of course, this is just a quick sketch of argument, and it is not Simmons’ primary positive
defense of the consent theory of legitimacy. His main argument for consent theory appears across
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Both John Simmons (1979; 2001) and Michael Huemer (2013) employ a negative strategy of the kind described
here.
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a number of works and attempts to show that political obligations are a particular kind of moral
requirement where all members of this kind have consent as a necessary condition (this argument
is reconstructed in detail in chapter five).36 However, the argument sketched in the previous
paragraph helps to illustrate what a positive approach to defending the consent theory of legitimacy
might look like.
This chapter seeks to introduce and defend an original positive argument for the consent
theory of legitimacy to supplement those provided by Simmons. Specifically, it notes that there is
a family of arguments that raise skepticism about the possibility of non-consensual obligation
imposition. Typically, these arguments are made in the context of debates over the possibility of
unilateral initial appropriation of unowned resources, with the claim being that such appropriation
unacceptably involves the non-consensual imposition of obligations. However, this chapter will
argue that this same concern applies even more directly to claims of legitimacy, as a legitimate
authority is an agent with the power to impose obligations on others. It will, thus, attempt to
repurpose one variety of argument against non-consensual obligation imposition so as to deny the
possibility of legitimacy without consent.
To effectively repurpose arguments against the unilateral imposition of obligations,
however, it is necessary to address a common species of criticism that has been leveled against
such arguments. Specifically, a number of libertarian philosophers have argued that there is
nothing problematic about the power to impose obligations, as such a power is entailed by a whole
variety of non-consensual but also pedestrian activities that are clearly unobjectionable (e.g.,
occupying some location or growing out one’s hair). Thus, they conclude that, insofar as one does

The reason for holding off on the discussion of Simmons’ argument is that the argument of chapter five requires
going through Simmons’ argument in some detail to show that it also supports the contention that a slightly modified
notion of legitimacy has consent as its necessary condition. Thus, for the sake of avoiding repetition, the presentation
of that argument does not appear here.
36
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not think the pedestrian activities require consent, one cannot demand that the power to appropriate
resources (or, more relevant for these purposes, the power of a legitimate authority) has consent
as its necessary condition.
In response to this species of argument, this chapter will argue that the pedestrian activities
cited as unproblematic by those who see no problem with duty imposition are only unproblematic
because they do not, in fact, impose obligations on others. By contrast, it will argue that the
political obligations generated by a legitimate authority are imposed obligations. Thus, the chapter
will conclude that the posited argument for a consent theory of legitimacy can be preserved.

II. The Moral Equality Argument
As noted above, arguments against the possibility of non-consensual obligation imposition often
take place in the context of debates over the possibility of unilateral appropriation of private
property. Some of these arguments take the form of a general puzzlement about how duties can be
imposed without consent. For example, Leif Wenar notes the implausibility of some person being
able “to impose potentially burdensome ‘contractual’ duties on another person for one’s own
advantage (say, a duty to perform at dinner-times, or to get out of Dodge)” (1998, 807).37 Wenar
argues that the non-consensual imposition of such obligations seems “almost impossible to
justify,” with this skepticism applying even more directly to the initial appropriation of private
property given that such appropriation imposes burdensome obligations on all other people as
opposed to just one person (1998, 807). Here, however, the primary object of inquiry is a different

While Wenar isn’t explicit about this, I take him to put “contractual” in quotes because the duties he has in mind
resemble those that are typically established by the signing of contracts except, in this case, the obliged party never
signs on to having the duty in question. Thus, he uses “scare quotes” to suggest that the duties in question resemble
contractual duties, but differ in a respect that makes it inappropriate to actually refer to them as “contractual duties.”
(I have also taken the liberty of correcting a typographical error: “contractual” is misspelled as “contractaul” in the
quoted paper).
37
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sort of argument against the imposition of duties that appeals to the moral equality of persons as
its starting premise. Specifically, this sort of argument generally takes the following schematic
form:
1. People are moral equals.
2. If people are moral equals, then they do not have the power to impose obligations on one
another without consent.
3. The power to unilaterally appropriate is a power to impose obligations on others without
their consent, as they are now obligated to refrain from using the appropriated thing.
4. Thus, people lack the power to unilaterally appropriate.
This argument—or some variant thereof—has been advanced by a number of philosophers,
typically as part of broader account of the conditions under which such appropriation would be
possible.38 However, curiously, this argument from moral equality is only rarely deployed against
a more obvious target than unilateral initial appropriation, namely, non-consensual legitimacy.39
This fact is puzzling because— bracketing the question of whether converting unowned natural
resources into owned private property imposes obligations on others (i.e., whether premise three
of the argument above is true)—a legitimate authority is one who seemingly, by definition, imposes
obligations on others. For, if she issues an edict that some subject must carry out some action, her
legitimacy implies that the subject is obligated to carry out that action as a result of the edict. Given
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Bas van der Vossen helpfully catalogues a number of such proponents—primarily Kantians—including Alan
Gibbard (1976), Arthur Ripstein (2009, 272), and Jeremy Waldron (1988; 265–67, 280) (1996, 1557). He also
identifies the many philosophers who have taken Kant to be making this argument including Katrin Flikschuh (2000;
228, 136, 141) and Anna Stilz (2000; 45, 55). A similar argument is made by Leif Wenar (1998, 806–807), though he
does not lean as heavily on the moral equality premise.
39
D. A. Lloyd Thomas (1995) has advanced an argument roughly along these lines. Additionally, in his Stanford
Encyclopedia entry on libertarianism van der Vossen argues that libertarians “are highly skeptical of political authority
and state legitimacy. Since people are, quite simply, independent and equal beings, with none naturally subordinated
to any other, states (like all other agents) ought to respect the moral rights of individuals, including their rights over
their persons and their legitimate possessions. For this reason, libertarians typically require something like voluntary
consent or acceptance for legitimate state authority” (2019). While there are various ways to interpret this claim, one
plausible construal is that van der Vossen is advancing something like the moral equality argument presented
immediately below. (That said, as will be discussed at length below, van der Vossen is a prominent critic of the moral
equality argument in the context of initial appropriation; thus, he perhaps should not be interpreted as advancing a
similar argument in the context of debates over state legitimacy). Beyond these two examples, I am unaware of any
other authors who apply the moral equality argument to the question of legitimacy.
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this feature of legitimacy, one might tailor the argument from moral equality to give it the
following form:
1. People are moral equals.
2. If people are moral equals, then they do not have the power to impose obligations on one
another without consent.
3. Legitimate authorities have the power to impose obligations on one’s subjects, as those
others are obligated to comply with any edicts the authority issues.
4. Thus, legitimacy has consent as its necessary condition.
While premise three seems to be a definitional point, the first two premises can benefit from
additional elaboration and defense. What does it mean for people to be morally equal? And, why
does this preclude the imposition of obligations? While proponents of the argument above tend to
construe the notion of moral equality in a Kantian way, this chapter will attempt to present a
somewhat more minimal notion that hopefully avoids some of the worries people have about the
Kantian conception of agents and equality. Thus, rather than lean on the Kantian conception, here
the use of “moral equality” refers strictly to persons having symmetrical rights, obligations, and
powers with respect to one another as a default, with any differences demanding special
justification. For example, if person P has the right not to be killed by person Q, then they are
moral equals only if Q has the same right not to be killed by P absent special justification. By
contrast, if P is obligated to call Q “my liege,” but Q has no such obligation with respect to P,
then, absent special justification, the two would not be moral equals. And, if P has the power to
waive her right to not be touched, then she and Q are moral equals only if Q has that same right
(again, unless special justification can be given for this difference), etc. In other words, the moral
equality thesis asserts that there is a strong presumption that people have symmetrical rights,
obligations, and powers, with asymmetries emerging only under special circumstances.
Of course, not all things are going to have equal moral status in the above sense, as there
is a widely-accepted view that (most) human beings are moral persons that gives them a status
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distinct from non-persons such as rocks and rabbits. Unfortunately, what counts as a person is a
difficult question that cannot be answered here. For these purposes, it will merely be maintained
that once a thing or agent has been assigned a sufficiently broad set of rights, it qualifies as a moral
person, with the claim then being that all such persons are moral equals in the sense described
immediately above. For example, the threshold for moral personhood might be having a right to
exclude others from one’s body, with the moral equality claim then implying that all who have this
right also presumptively have the same set of rights, duties, and powers.
While a full defense of the moral equality thesis exceeds the scope of this chapter, note that
a claim about moral equality is plausible given the widely-shared meta-normative rejection of
moral arbitrariness. Indeed, a staple of moral argument is to begin with observation that there is
some difference in our behavior with respect to two things or kinds of thing and demand some
justification for that differential treatment. When no apparent justification can be given, such
arguments then conclude that the behavior toward one of the things/kinds is morally arbitrary and,
thus, immoral. However, a commitment to this position of rejecting arbitrary moral difference
would seem to directly entail the presumption of the moral equality thesis, namely, that difference
in moral status (i.e., persons’ rights, obligations, and powers) demands justification. After all, the
presumption can be construed as a mere rejection of arbitrary differences in the assignment of
rights, powers, and obligations.
While the moral equality thesis’ presumption of symmetric moral status is reasonably
uncontroversial, it raises the difficult question of what kind of justification suffices to overcome
that presumption. Again, a fully convincing answer to this question would demand more argument
than can be given here, but the speculative proposal of this chapter is that only the consent of the
party with a more limited right or power and/or a more extensive obligation can ground an

51

asymmetry in moral status.40 To briefly sketch a defense of this claim, note, first, that differential
treatment of persons seems to provide those eligible for worse treatment a basis for complaint in
virtue of the fact they are so uniquely eligible. However, there would be no such basis for
complaint if they had some lesser moral status (i.e., a more limited set of rights) that entailed the
permissibility of their treatment. And, conversely, the recipient of worse treatment lacks such a
complaint only if she had lesser moral status that rendered that treatment permissible (because, if
she had the same moral status, she would have basis for complaint in virtue of the fact she was
treated impermissibly). In other words, differential moral status (of the kind that the moral equality
thesis declares in need of justification) obtains just in case those with lesser status have no basis
for complaint about the associated worse treatment. But what could remove this basis for
complaint? One popular suggestion is that consent—at least, so long as it is reasonably informed
and freely given—has the function of nullifying any complaint on the part of the consenter. For
example, in describing the appeal of consent theory, John Simmons cites Locke’s view that there
is nothing more “ridiculous” than a person objecting to an arrangement to which she has agreed
(Simmons 1993, 73). While both Simmons and Locke take it to be self-evident that consent
nullifies compliant, the incompatibility of complaint and consent can be made more visible by
noting that complaint is an objection to some state of affairs obtaining while consent is a way of
endorsing some state of affairs via the affirmation that this state of affairs can obtain. Thus, if some
person consents to some treatment, she would then have no basis for complaint if she were treated
in the relevant way, and, thus, would have no right against that treatment.41 In this way, a justified
difference in moral status could arise.

This isn’t quite right. For reasons discussed in the subsequent footnote and chapter six, it is really a more general
category of assent that is taken here to ground asymmetries in moral status.
41
This explication also clarifies why consent must be informed if it is to nullify complaint, as to not be so informed
implies that there is some mismatch between the state of affairs one endorses via one’s consent-giving act and the
40
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Of course, this demonstrates only that the presumption of moral equality can be overridden
by (free and informed) consent—not that consent is the only thing that can justify moral status
difference. In defense of this point, one might consider some paradigmatic cases of property
differences that do not justify moral status difference and examine why it is that such property
differences fail to overcome the presumption of moral equality. Specifically, consider the
proponent of a caste system who maintains that some people, in virtue of being born to certain
parents, do not have the same rights as members of a higher caste. Or, alternatively, consider the
proponent of natural aristocracy who takes the fact that one person is much taller than another to
entail that the former has a broader set of rights than the latter. In both cases, the proposed
explanation of the difference in moral status seems unsuitable, and, importantly, the two
explanations seem inadequate for the same reason: they both appeal to some property difference
that arises as a matter of luck, where luck-based traits fail to ground differences in rights
assignments. However, if this is the correct explanation, then it follows that the only sort of
differences that could justify would be non-luck property differences, where the absence of luck
entails some sort of choice on the part of the agents with more limited moral status. Finally, one
might then demand a further explanation of why it is that choice is able to justify difference in
moral status while luck cannot, with one plausible answer appealing to the above observation that
certain sorts of choice are capable of nullifying complaint by functioning as an endorsement of the
moral status difference. In other words, in the process of trying to explain why certain property

state of affairs that actually arrives (e.g., if a person consents to a medical procedure she believes will be painless but
that procedure actually inflicts severe pain upon her). In this case, there is no contradiction between complaint and
consent, as the object of complaint is distinct from the object of endorsement.
It should also be noted that, while the chapter talks only of “consent,” it may be the case that other forms of agreement
or might suffice to nullify complaint in this way. Indeed, even merely holding the belief that some state of affairs is a
good one might nullify complaint. Thus, the proposed ground here leaves open the possibility of a general assent
theory of legitimacy, where such assent includes all these ways of endorsing states of affairs.
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differences do not justify differences in moral status (e.g., caste, height), one arrives at a positive
view about what is required to justify such differences, namely the nullification of complaint that
accompanies the consent of those with more limited moral status.
With this (quick) defense of the moral equality thesis in place, a defense of premise two of
the moral equality argument can be completed by showing that the moral equality thesis implies
that people cannot non-consensually impose obligations on one another. Two things can be said to
support this point. First, note that legitimate authority, at least as the notion is generally construed,
violates the presumption of moral equality, as it involves a power held by one party (the authority)
that is denied to others (the subjects).42 Given that such differences must be justified via appeal to
consent, it would follow that legitimacy would have consent as its necessary condition (at least, so
long as it isn’t the case that each individual has the power to oblige each other individual via the
issuing of edicts). Second, legitimacy allows for the possibility of violations of moral equality via
the imposition of asymmetric obligations. If P is legitimate with respect to Q, she can issue edicts
that give Q obligations that P does not have, thereby upsetting moral equality. Given that such a
disturbance can only be justified via appeal to consent, it then must be the case that P’s legitimacy
has Q’s consent as its necessary condition.
While this argument is rather speculative, it hopefully provides at least some indication of
how one might further defend an argument from moral equality of the kind that has proven so
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In theory, legitimacy could be symmetric in a way that avoids this claim, if all persons were able to impose political
obligations on all others. There are two ways to construe this suggestion. The first is that each individual person has
this power in the sense that she is able to issue her own unique set of edicts that all other persons are obligated to
obey—and they, in turn, can do the same to her (and everyone else). However, given that no defenders of legitimacy
hold this view, at least all actually-made claims that there are legitimate authorities run afoul of the moral equality
thesis. Alternatively, one might think that all persons are able to impose political obligations on all others in the sense
that they come together democratically to either directly enact obligation-imposing legislation or delegate this power
to representatives. However, given that it is only through a collective process that laws are enacted, it seems more
accurate to say that a single group agent has the power to impose obligations on each of the discrete individuals who
compose it, with those individuals lacking the symmetric power to obligate the group.
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popular in the context of debates over initial appropriation—with this argument then being
repurposed to defend consent theories of legitimacy. However, there is also a family of objections
that have been raised against arguments premised on the impossibility of imposing obligations
without consent, the argument from moral equality included. Specifically, these arguments
contend that purportedly problematic instances of non-consensual obligation imposition are of a
kind with entirely unproblematic actions such as the non-consensual occupation of space or the
growing of one’s hair. Thus, either (a) one cannot reject the possibility of the former without also
rejecting the latter, with this being an apparent reductio of the argument from moral equality or
(b) the reason that the latter are unproblematic applies equally to the supposedly problematic forms
of obligation imposition. Given the popularity of this style of objection, a proponent of the
argument from moral equality seems compelled to provide a reply that re-establishes that the nonconsensual imposition of obligations by a legitimate authority is problematic in a way that the nonconsensual occupation of space and growing of hair is not. Only then will the argument from
equality function to adequately bolster the consent theory of legitimacy presented above. It is this
task that the remainder of the chapter takes up.

III. Objections to the Moral Equality Argument
The most popular way of addressing concerns about the imposition of obligations is to argue that
such imposition is commonplace, with there being many entirely unproblematic instances of the
phenomenon. As with most of the proponents of the argument from moral equality, the prominent
critics of the argument generally present their respective objections in the context of debates over
initial appropriation, with their concern being to show that there is nothing problematic about such
appropriation’s imposition of obligations. However, as with the argument from moral equality, the
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results generalize such that they apply equally to the case of legitimate authorities and their ability
to impose obligations. Indeed, if these critics are correct that the initial appropriation’s imposition
of obligations is no more troubling than the obligations imposed on others by a person occupying
a particular physical space, the same would be true of the obligations imposed by a legitimate
authority. Thus, their arguments call into question the chapter’s claim that the argument from
moral equality can provide additional support for the consent theory of legitimacy.
To quickly canvas some of the defenses of imposing obligations, Gerald Gaus and Loren
Lomasky present the case of an outstanding professor whose excellent performance imposes an
obligation upon the head of her department to sign off on a merit-based pay raise (1990, 492). In
this case, Gaus and Lomasky suggest that there is nothing troubling about the professor imposing
an obligation on the department head, and, thus, the fact that initial appropriation (or, in this
context, one might say a legitimate authority) similarly imposes obligations provides no reason for
thinking that such appropriation (or authority) is unacceptable simply in virtue of the fact that it
imposes obligations in this way. However, as Simmons notes, the judgment that the merit case is
unproblematic seems to rest on the tacit assumption that the department head, by accepting the
position, has consented to carry out its various functions, including the awarding of merit-based
pay increases (2001, 219). Thus, the case fails to demonstrate that non-consensual obligation
imposition is unproblematic, which is what a genuine objection to the argument from moral
equality would have to show.
To correct for this deficiency, Simmons presents a series of alternative cases that he takes
to involve the non-problematic imposition of obligations on those who have not consented.
Specifically, he cites the case of a person who creates a living will and thereby imposes obligations
on others to treat her belongings in a certain way after her death; the person who patents an
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invention and thereby imposes the obligation on others to not sell their own versions of the
invention; the person who buys a rare stamp and thereby obliges others to not take or use it; the
person who leads a noisy group of hikers on a trail and thereby imposes upon people who want to
enjoy the quiet of the woods; and the person who occupies a tennis court and thereby obliges others
to not use the space (2001, 220). Given the fact that there is nothing strange or problematic about
the imposition of obligations in these cases, Simmons concludes that there is no basis for concern
about the fact that initial appropriation imposes obligations—and, similarly, one might conclude
that there is nothing problematic about non-consensual legitimacy in virtue of the fact that
legitimate authorities have the power to impose obligations.
However, there are a few problems with Simmons’ examples. First, in most of the cases he
presents, it does not seem that any obligation is imposed. For example, while the noisy hikers
intrude on the peace and quiet of other people in the park, this imposition would not be the
imposition of an obligation. Similarly, in the case of the stamp purchase, it was already the case
that all others were obligated to refrain from using/taking the stamp before it was purchased by the
collector, as the stamp was owned by the seller who had the right to exclude others from
using/taking the stamp; thus, the fact that others are obliged to not use/take the stamp after the
purchase would not represent the imposition of some new obligation. And, similar remarks apply
to the case of the living will, as it was already the case that other persons were obliged to respect
the wishes of the owner vis-à-vis her owned items.
By contrast, the patent case does seem to be a genuine case of obligation imposition.
However, it also seems to be highly problematic case in virtue of the fact that it imposes obligations
upon others. As Hugh Breakey notes, those who reject the imposition of obligation via the
acquisition of property are unlikely to be moved by appeals to the acquisition of intellectual
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property (2009, 622). Indeed, even among those untroubled by appropriation of material property,
there are many who deny that having and recording an idea can oblige others to refrain from
implementing that idea. Thus, of Simmons’ cases, it is only the tennis case that seems to be a
genuine case of unproblematic obligation imposition.
While Breakey criticizes Simmons’ patent case, he also presents his own list of seemingly
unproblematic cases of obligation imposition (2009, 622-23). Some of these do not seem to quite
fit the bill. For example, his suggestion that being told a secret imposes an obligation not to tell
others that fact only seems plausible if the recipient of the secret agreed to receive and not share
that secret. Indeed, if a tax cheat whispers that she is underreporting her income to another person,
and that person then passes that information onto a friend, it seems like the tax cheat has no basis
for complaining by asserting, “Hey, that was a secret!” After all, the other party didn’t even know
it was a secret and that she was not supposed to tell anyone else. Alternatively, suppose that right
after whispering the information, the tax cheat says, “Oh, and, by the way, that is a secret, so you
can’t tell anyone about it!” Is the other party now obliged to not pass this information along to her
friend? Seemingly not, as she might reasonably respond, “Sorry, but I never agreed to that,” with
the naturalness of this response suggesting that one is only obliged to keep a secret if she
voluntarily receives it. Indeed, it only seems plausible that the party has an obligation to keep a
secret if the case is modified such that the tax cheat prefaces her secret with something like, “Hey,
can I tell you a secret?” with the other party then responding in the affirmative. In such a case, it
seems that the offer to share a secret includes the tacit condition that the other party not share the
information with others (hence why the other party has to explicitly accept the offer). Thus, consent
appears to be a necessary condition of becoming obliged to keep a secret.
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Similarly, Breakey suggests that morally meritorious action might impose obligations on
others to act in respectful ways. However, a few quick objections can be made to this proposal.
First, it seems subject to intuitive counterexamples. Suppose that a passerby rescues a child from
a drowning pond. Is it really the case that others now wrong her if they fail to praise or congratulate
her for her efforts? While such displays of respect would perhaps be kind, phrasing the question
in terms of whether their absence wrongs the passerby suggests that such acts are supererogatory
rather than obligatory.
More plausibly, one might think that the passerby’s meritorious actions oblige others to cut
her some slack when she engages in small acts of bad behavior. For example, one might think that
if she cuts to the front of a queue, others are obliged to let the act slide or, at least, temper any
corrective they issue to her (after all, she is the town hero). The problem with this suggestion is
that, as has been argued above, a person is wronged just in case she has a basis for complaint; thus,
if the passerby’s meritorious action obliges others to cut her some slack, then she will have a basis
for complaint if they do not in virtue of those meritorious actions. However, it does not appear that
she has such a basis for complaint. Indeed, suppose that when someone chides her for cutting the
queue, she responds by saying, “Hey, you can’t talk to me that way! Remember, I saved the
drowning child last week!” Given the apparent inappropriateness of such a response, it does not
seem that her meritorious action gives her a basis for complaint about being chided, which, in turn,
entails that her action does not oblige others to cut her slack or give her special treatment.
What if the action is not merely meritorious, but is also to the purported obligor’s benefit?
The thought here would be that while meritorious acts do not impose desert-based obligations, acts
that aid others might impose reciprocity-based obligations upon those who benefit from those acts.
Indeed, this seems to be the thought that motivates Breakey’s case of the person who becomes
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obliged to pay compensation when someone else rescues her from disaster. However, there is
reason to reject this proposal. Specifically, one might think that the rescued person only acquires
this obligation if she knowingly accepts the assistance, where such acceptance qualifies as a form
of consent. To support this point, one might appeal to Nozick’s case of the community that invests
resources and labor in running a PA system that broadcasts entertaining content to all the residents
of a particular area (1974, 93-5). Nozick suggests that even if some person enjoys the benefits of
this effort throughout the year, if the community then comes to her and insists that she take a turn
managing the radio station, she is under no obligation do so. If he is right in thinking this, then the
mere receipt of benefits does not oblige a beneficiary to provide benefits in return. Indeed, even if
the radio listener actively accepts the benefits, say, by opening her window, Nozick suggests that
intuitively we take her not be obliged to contribute to the venture (1974, 93). Thus, contra Breakey,
he concludes that the beneficiary of an action is obliged to reciprocate only if she not only accepts
the benefits, but consents to reciprocate (1973, 95).43
Some of Breakey’s other cases suffer from the problem of begging the question against the
proposed arguments from equality. For example, he includes in his list the case where citizens are
obliged to obey commands of a new town official—i.e., the edicts of a legitimate political
authority—as well as the case where labor done on a public good obliges others to restrict their
usage of the thing (a case of imposed obligation that approximates a weak form of initial
appropriation). However, a number of his cases do seem like unproblematic cases of obligation
imposition namely: (a) the case where two people choose to have a child and thereby impose new
duties on all others to not interfere with the resultant person; (b) the case where someone occupies
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This point is a bit quick, but a similar point is discussed at length by Simmons (1979, 107-108; 118-36). It may be
objected that acceptance of a benefit is not genuine consent, in which case one may have to adopt an “assent theory”
of legitimacy rather than a consent theory, as noted in footnote 41 above.
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space and thereby imposes obligations on others not to invade that space; and (c) the case where a
person gains physical possession of an object and thereby obliges others not to interfere with that
object.
In addition to echoing Simmons’ tennis court case, Breakey’s occupation and possession
cases resemble two cases presented by Eric Mack (1995) who, similarly, seeks to show there is
nothing troubling about the non-consensual imposition of obligations. Specifically, he introduces,
first, the case of Adam who runs in between Zelda and her archery target, and, second, the case of
Eve who picks an apple that Zelda was eyeing from a tree and clutches it to her breast (1995, 205).
In both of these cases, Mack claims that Zelda becomes bound by a new obligation, as she becomes
required to not shoot at her target in the first case and not grab the apple in the second—actions
which she previously was at liberty to do (i.e., she had no requirement to refrain from these actions)
(1995, 206). And, like the other philosophers discussed in this section, Mack’s conclusion is that
there is nothing problematic about either Adam or Eve’s actions, meaning that the non-consensual
imposition of obligations is not necessarily problematic.
Finally, Bas van der Vossen (2015) has recently raised a closely-related objection wherein
he contends that seemingly problematic sorts of obligation imposition are of a kind with nonproblematic activities like growing out one’s hair. However, unlike the other authors, he contends
that neither sort of activity imposes obligations. Thus, he provides an explanation for the claims
made by Gaus and Lomasky, Simmons, Breakey, and Mack that there is nothing problematic about
initial appropriation—and, by extension, the edicts of legitimate authorities—namely that, like the
pedestrian activities listed above, appropriation (and the issuing of edicts) does not impose
obligations at all.
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This claim might seem puzzling at first glance. How could an agent with the power to
impose “political obligations” not, in fact, impose obligations when she issues edicts? In order to
answer this question, the following sections present an extended critical examination of van der
Vossen’s (fairly technical) argument. However, this focus on van der Vossen’s claims will yield a
general account of when people problematically impose obligations vs. when they impose no such
obligations—with it then being shown that all of the above cases fall under the latter category
while the edicts of legitimate authorities fall under the former. In other words, by seeing where
van der Vossen goes wrong, it becomes possible to posit a principled difference between the
pedestrian activities described above and the activities of a legitimate authority, where this
difference would ground the rejection of only non-consensual legitimacy as unacceptably
problematic.

IV. The Duty Alteration Objection
To begin, it will be helpful to introduce the basic ontology that van der Vossen uses in the
construction of his objection to the second premise. Specifically, he draws a distinction between
obligations and their associated requirements, where the former are expressed by general
normative propositions—e.g., “Q is obligated not to touch P’s body without P’s permission”—
while the latter are expressed by action-specific normative propositions whose truth values are a
function of both certain obligations and certain facts about the world. In other words, suppose that
“x” is a variable ranging over particular actions, “a” refers to some arbitrary particular action such
as P sitting in her armchair at midnight, “K” is a one-place predicate denoting “is an act of -ing”
where -ing is any arbitrary action kind such as killing, and “OB” is the deontic operator that has
a truth value of “true” just in case it is obligatory that the proposition that is its argument obtains.
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Given these stipulations, “x(Kx → OB~x)” would express an obligation while “OB(~a)” would
express a requirement with the latter being derivable from the former if the empirical premise Ka
obtains (i.e., the truth of “OB~a” is a function of the general obligation-expressing proposition
“x(Kx → OB~x)” and the empirical proposition “Ka.”) Alternatively, to give a more concrete
example, if (a) Q has an obligation not to touch P’s body and (b) P has hair, then Q has the practical
requirement that she not touch P’s hair. By contrast, if P does not have hair, then Q has no such
requirement, even as her obligation remains constant.
Given that one’s practical requirements are a function of both one’s obligations and certain
empirical facts, it follows that there are two ways that one might modify those requirements,
namely, by changing some normative fact(s) about one’s obligations or by changing the relevant
empirical facts (van der Vossen 2015, 69). What van der Vossen calls duty-creation, then, are acts
that change some person’s practical requirements by generating new obligations for her (or,
perhaps, changing the content of her existing obligations); by contrast, acts of duty-alteration
change practical requirements by changing relevant empirical fact(s) (2015, 70). However, for
these purposes it will be helpful to talk of duty-creation and duty-alteration as powers to alter
obligations and requirements. Thus, when P grows out her hair, she is exercising her power of
duty-alteration rather than duty-creation, as she changes Q’s requirements (Q becomes required to
not touch P’s hair) without changing Q’s obligations (Q remains obligated to not touch P’s body).
With this distinction in place, premise one of the argument from moral equality—which
denies that people have the power to impose obligations on one another—can now be understood
as a denial that people have the power of duty-creation. And, van der Vossen is happy to concede
this point, as his view is seemingly that no one has such a power. However, this commitment also
leads him to reject arguments that cite the unacceptability of duty-creation as the reason that a
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particular moral power does not obtain. Thus, while many have objected to initial appropriation
on the grounds that such appropriation imposes new obligations upon others, van der Vossen
argues that initial appropriation is merely an exercise of the power of duty-alteration, as he posits
that people have the following natural conditional right to appropriate:
For all persons P and Q at times t1 and t2, P has a right against Q that [Q respect P as the
rightful owner of O at t2 on the condition that P performs appropriative act A on object O
under conditions C at t1].44 (2015, 74)
The right that P has in this case is that the bracketed conditional obtains—with Q then having a
correlative obligation to make the bracketed conditional obtain. More specifically, this obligation
entails that Q act in the way specified by the consequent (respect P as the rightful owner) when
the antecedent obtains (P performs A on O).
Van der Vossen’s contention is that, given that Q has this natural obligation, P’s
performance of A implies duty-alteration rather than duty-creation. Just as P growing out her hair
changes the practical requirements of Q’s obligation to not touch P—but does so without adding
to or modifying Q’s existing obligations—P doing A changes the practical requirements of Q’s
natural conditional obligation via the alteration of an empirical fact. Thus, acts of initial
appropriation do not entail the prohibited power to impose obligations.
While van der Vossen does not apply this argument to legitimacy, one can easily create an
analogous objection that rejects the second premise of the argument of the previous section. While
that premise claimed that legitimate authorities have the power of duty-creation, an objection
modeled after van der Vossen’s would posit that such authorities do not have the power of dutycreation, but, rather, the mere power of duty-alteration, as legitimate authorities have the following
conditional right to legislate:
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For stylistic consistency, some of the variables used by van der Vossen have been replaced with ones that match the
examples used above.
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For any legitimate authority P and subject Q at times t1 and t2, P has a right against Q that
[Q  at t2 on the condition that P, at t1, issues the edict that Q must  at t2].

Given such a right, Q would have a correlative obligation to make the bracketed conditional obtain.
However, this means that when P issues an edict commanding Q to , she does not impose a new
obligation for Q, but, rather, changes an empirical fact that interacts with Q’s pre-existing
conditional obligation to generate a novel practical requirement. Thus, just as with hair-growing,
P’s issuing of a morally-binding command entails only the power of duty-alteration rather than
duty-creation. Thus, the third premise of the argument from moral equality—that legitimate
authorities have the power to impose obligations on others—fails.45
Now, van der Vossen would most likely deny that that any purported legitimate authority
has the conditional right to legislate posited above. However, his contention would then be that
there are no such authorities in virtue of the fact that no one has this conditional right.46 Thus, the
argument from moral equality goes wrong, not in its conclusion, but its diagnosis of why there
cannot be a legitimate authority without consent. The problem is not that legitimate authorities
change moral facts in ways that run contrary to moral equality; rather, it is that they lack the
relevant conditional right to legislate, where this absence follows from one’s preferred theory
regarding what grounds rights. For example, van der Vossen argues that the conditional right to
appropriate follows from an interest theory of rights because people have a morally important
interest in being able to convert natural resources into private property (along with certain other
conditions being met) (2015, 76–7).47 Thus, he would maintain that any denial of the conditional
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Indeed, Niko Kolodny seems to make just such an argument in defense of political obligation, citing van der
Vossen’s duty-alteration objection (2016, 40).
46
While this claim does not appear in van der Vossen’s paper, he has affirmed something along these lines in personal
correspondence.
47
Specifically, van der Vossen cites the necessity of property for the pursuit of projects and preservation of welfare,
with a conditional right to appropriate enabling people to acquire such property (2015, 77-9). He also suggests that
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right to legislate would require showing that the right bearer has no sufficiently morally important
interest in having others comply with her edicts. There is no available shortcut whereby the issuing
of binding edicts can be ruled out because it entails duty-creation, as duty-creation is impossible;
any purported instance of duty-creation is actually an instance of duty-alteration involving a
conditional right and correlative conditional obligation.48

V. Possession and Occupation
The central claim of the duty-alteration objection is that there are two types of moral powers, one
problematic and one unproblematic, with legitimacy falling into the latter category. It, thus, is
similar in kind to the arguments discussed in section III, each of which attempts to show that
purportedly problematic acts such as initial appropriation or the issuing of edicts by a political
authority is of a kind with non-problematic activities such as (a) the occupation of space, (b) the
physical possession of objects, (c) the having of children, or (d) the growing of hair. However van
der Vossen’s argument advances the discussion by proposing an explanation of why there is
nothing problematic about any of the aforementioned activities, namely that they are all instances
of duty-alteration rather than duty-creation.
Thus, to rescue the moral equality argument, it must be shown that—contra van der
Vossen’s claim that just like the activities listed immediately above, the issuing of binding edicts

his posited conditional right to appropriate must be constrained by some sort of Lockean proviso that ensures all others
are able to acquire property via initial appropriation (2015, 81). However, one might wonder why there isn’t some
further egalitarian (or, perhaps, sufficientarian) constraint insisting that people have a right to acquire the quantity of
resources necessary for them to live (equally) good lives. Or, alternatively, one might ask why people wouldn’t have
a direct right to some share of the resources rather than a mere right to appropriate those resources. Unfortunately, van
der Vossen does not address these questions in his paper.
48
Another way to state this disagreement is in terms of what happens if someone consents to another’s legitimate
authority. In that case, the proponent of the moral equality argument would contend that the authority does have the
power of duty-creation, but the subject’s consent means that this power does not violate the moral equality of persons.
By contrast, van der Vossen would maintain that such authorities still lack the power of duty-creation.
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implies only the power to change requirements (rather than a power to change obligations)—a
legitimate authority issuing an edict does something normatively different from these pedestrian
activities. Indeed, the thesis of moral equality is violated only if a legitimate authority has a special
sort of power to impose obligations that sets her apart from those who have the ability to grow out
their hair, have children, occupy space, etc. The remainder of the chapter argues that there is just
such a difference: while the edicts of a legitimate authority alter her subjects’ moral requirements,
the listed pedestrian activities involve no such requirement alteration (contrary to the assertions of
the philosophers presented in section III). It further contends that it is the non-consensual altering
of moral requirements that contradicts the moral equality of persons, with the ultimate conclusion
being that non-consensual legitimate authority is problematic in a way that the ability to grow
hair/procreate/possess items/occupy space is not.
To explain why the listed pedestrian activities do not alter others’ moral requirements, it
will be helpful to address, first, the occupation of space and physical possession of objects before
turning to the growing of hair and having of children in section VI. Specifically, it can be shown
that occupation and possession do not alter moral requirements by paying careful attention to the
individuation of actions. First, note that actions are events and, as such, are temporal entities. When
Q acts to touch P’s hair, for example, that action involves her body occupying a series of physical
spaces over a specific sequence of times. Thus, actions are best understood as individuated, in part,
on the basis of the time window they occupy such that two qualitatively identical motions
performed at different times would not be identical actions. 49 In addition to being fine-grained in
this temporal sense, note that actions can also be individuated on the basis of the physical parts
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Donald Davidson famously argues against the claim that having identical spatio-temporal properties is both a
necessary and sufficient condition for identity (1969, 306). However, his argument would not undermine the much
weaker claim being proposed here that having identical temporal properties is a necessary condition for identity.
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that compose them. For example, consider the case of P walking through an unoccupied doorway
versus P passing through that same doorway but trampling Q in the process. The suggestion here
is that these are two distinct actions, even though both might fall under the description of “P moves
through the doorway.” This is, in part, because P’s physical motion will differ across the two cases
(as she now shoves and/or steps on Q as part of her movement) and also because one action
includes Q in the way the other does not.50
One immediate consequence of this latter point is that occupation and possession do not,
in fact, alter others’ requirements. To see this, recall Eric Mack’s case of Adam who runs in
between Zelda and her archery target, and his case of Eve who picks an apple that Zelda was
eyeing from a tree and clutches it to her breast (1995, 205). In both of these cases, Mack claims
that Zelda is burdened with a new moral requirement, as she becomes required to not shoot at her
target in the first case and not grab the apple in the second—actions which she previously was at
liberty to do (i.e., she had no requirement to refrain from these actions) (1995, 206).51 However, a
more careful individuation of actions reveals that no such change occurs, as, in each case, there
are actually two distinct actions, each with its own deontic status. In the archery case, Adam’s
action does nothing to the truth value of the proposition that Zelda is at liberty to fire her arrow
through unoccupied space into the target. Indeed, this action remains permissible regardless of the
fact that Adam has positioned himself between Zelda and her target. Rather, what Adam has done
is rendered the action undoable for Zelda, replacing her option to carry out this action with the
impermissible option of firing her arrow through Adam and into the target. Similarly, Eve, by
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This second claim is more controversial and it will, admittedly, be challenging to provide an acceptable account of
the conditions under which something is included in an action vs. not included. For these purposes, the intuitive
distinction will suffice, as nothing of substance ultimately hangs on this point, with individuation based on distinct
physical motions sufficing for the argument below.
51
Cases of holding objects or occupying space are similarly cited by van der Vossen as imposing new requirements
on others (2015; 68, 71).
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clutching the apple, does not alter the permissibility of Zelda picking the apple from the tree;
rather, she makes that action undoable, leaving Zelda with only the option of ripping the apple
from Eve’s hands. Thus, a more appropriately fine-grained ontology of actions reveals an
important distinction between depriving people of opportunities and depriving them of (liberty)
rights—a distinction that Mack’s seemingly coarser-grained ontology obscures.52 In other words,
contrary to the claims of Mack, Simmons, and Breakey presented in section III, occupation and
physical possession have no effect on the moral status of particular actions, i.e., they impose no
new requirements on others.

VI. The Revised Moral Equality Argument
What about the other listed pedestrian activities, namely, the having of children and the
growing of hair? The central contention of the duty-alteration objection is that the issuing of edicts
by a legitimate authority is of a kind with these activities: all three actions alter others’
requirements but do so without imposing new obligations. Thus, there is no basis for maintaining
that legitimate authorities require consent when hair-growing and procreating do not. However,
this section will argue that, in fact, when P either grows out her hair or has a child , she changes
neither Q’s obligations nor Q’s requirements. By contrast, the legitimate P who issues an edict
does change Q’s requirements. Thus, the moral equality argument can sidestep the duty-alteration
objection by maintaining that it is the power to unilaterally impose new requirements that runs
contrary to the assumption of human moral equality. Given that legitimate authorities have this
power, they must have received the consent of others if moral equality is to be preserved.
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This distinction is explicitly posited by Allan Gibbard (1976, 78). In the context of presenting these cases, Mack
actually cites the passage where Gibbard draws the distinction, but, unfortunately, does not comment on how this
distinction interacts with his argument. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that a coarse-grained ontology of actions
obscured the tension between his position and Gibbard’s distinction.
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To begin, note that a foundational assumption of van der Vossen’s duty-alteration objection
is that, if P grows out her hair, then Q has a requirement that she would not have had if P hadn’t
grown out her hair, namely, the requirement to not touch P’s hair. But, why think that Q would
lack this requirement if P lacked hair? This crucial premise would seem to rest on the following
tacit argument:
1. P does not have hair.
2. If P does not have hair, then Q cannot touch P’s hair.
3. Q is required to  only if she can  [OIC: “ought” implies “can”].
4. Thus, when P has no hair, it is false that Q is required not to touch P’s hair (i.e., there
is no requirement that Q not touch P’s hair).
The problem with this argument, of course, is that it is invalid. To see this, note that OIC together
with the proposition that Q cannot touch P’s hair implies that it is not required that Q touch P’s
hair—not the asserted conclusion that Q is not forbidden from touching P’s hair (where Q is
forbidden from -ing just in case she is required not to ). To reach this conclusion via OIC, it
would have to be the case that Q is unable to avoid touching P’s hair; however, in the stipulated
case where P lacks hair, Q is fully able to avoid touching P’s hair. Thus, the conclusion that P is
not forbidden from touching P’s (nonexistent) hair does not follow from the argument’s premises.
Given the failure of this argument, the proponent of the moral equality argument could insist
that, just as Q is forbidden from touching P’s hair when P has hair, Q is equally forbidden from
touching P’s (nonexistent) hair when P does not have hair—and, thus, that P does not impose any
new requirement on Q by growing her hair. By contrast, the legitimate P who issues an edict that
Q  does impose new requirements upon Q, as Q was free not to  prior to the issuing of the edict
but becomes required to  as soon as P issues her edict. Thus, there is an important difference
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between hair-growing and the issuing of edicts by a legitimate authority: the latter imposes novel
requirements on others while the former does not.
Similar remarks apply to Breakey’s case of procreation. Specifically, Breakey assumes that,
if two parents have a child, then people become required to refrain from interfering with that
child—a requirement they did not previously have. But why think that there was no previous
requirement to refrain from interfering with the child? Again, the apparent answer is that, when
the child did not exist, others couldn’t interfere with the child, and “ought” implies “can.” However,
this analysis of the procreation case rests on the same invalid argument as does van der Vossen’s
claim that there is no requirement to refrain from touching non-existent hair. And, as with the hair
growing case, the suggestion here is that there is, in fact, no requirement change, as people were
required to not interfere with the particular child even before it was born. So, again, there is a
difference between procreation and legitimate edicts, namely that only the latter imposes novel
requirements on others.
This difference, in turn, allows for a restatement of the moral equality argument where what
is proscribed is not the power to unilaterally impose of novel obligations but, rather, the power to
unilaterally impose novel requirements (in the sense defined at the opening of section IV). While
there is no contradiction in morally equal people having the power to unilaterally grow out their
hair or have children, there is a contradiction between people being moral equals and their having
the power to unilaterally impose novel requirements on one another—or at least so the proponent
of the moral equality argument might maintain. Thus, she would be able to sidestep the dutyalteration objection, as she can insist that, contra van der Vossen’s claim, there is an important
moral difference between the legitimate authority who issues an edict and pedestrian activities like
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hair-growing or procreation, even while conceding his contention that none of these activities
impose novel obligations.

VII. The “Ought Not” Implies “Can” Objection
In response to this proposal, three objections might be raised. First, it might be objected that there
is an easy fix for the invalid argument presented in the previous section: simply replace premise 3
(Q is required to  only if she can  ) with the premise that Q is forbidden from -ing only if she
can . Given this premise, Q would not be forbidden from touching P’s hair when P has no hair,
with this action only becoming forbidden when P grows out her hair. Thus, hair-growing would
impose novel requirements on others, collapsing the proposed distinction between hair-growing
and the issuing of legitimate edicts.
However, while this replacement would render the argument valid, such a move would come
at the expense of the plausibility of the third premise. Note that OIC is already controversial, with
many arguments having been raised against it.53 However, even if one concedes that “ought”
implies “can,” there is little reason for thinking that “ought not” implies “can” (ONIC) as the
amended premise 3 contends. Indeed, a quick survey of the prominent arguments for OIC reveals
that none of the posited reasons for endorsing OIC can be appealed to in support of ONIC.54 For
example, David Copp argues that a moral theory that required a person to  when she cannot 
would be unfair—but moral theories cannot be unfair in this way.55 Thus, he concludes that one is

For some prominent arguments against this premise see Sinnott-Armstrong, “‘Ought’ Conversationally Implies
‘Can’”; Saka, “Ought Does Not Imply Can”; Ryan, “Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief”; Graham,
“‘Ought’ and Ability”; Waller, “Against Moral Responsibility,” 179–89; and Talbot, “The Best Argument for ‘Ought
Implies Can’ Is a Better Argument against ‘Ought Implies Can.’”
54
These arguments all use slightly different moral language, with some being concerned with “ought” while others
are concerned with obligations (typically “all things considered,” ultima facie obligations). However, these generally
seem to correspond to the way “requirement” is being used in this paper.
55
Copp, “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can,’ Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.”
53
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required to  only if one can . However, even if one grants this argument, there is nothing
seemingly unfair about a moral theory that forbids a person from doing something she cannot do.
Given the absence of such unfairness, it would then follow that Copp’s argument for OIC cannot
be repurposed to support ONIC.
Another popular line of argument for OIC is that this principle is needed to explain a number
of facts about moral reasoning. For example, Frances Howard-Snyder argues that, if OIC were
false, then we could not adequately explain (a) why an agent who cannot  (where she otherwise
ought to ) ought to do the “second-best” thing instead, (b) why an agent who ought to  also ought
to  when -ing is a necessary condition of her -ing, and (c) why there are prima facie obligations
that are overridden by other obligations (as opposed to the agent simply having both obligations
simultaneously).56 In each case, Howard-Snyder contends that the best explanation is that an agent
only ought to  if she can . However, again, one can fully concede this point while still denying
ONIC: even if it is true that OIC must be true to explain (a), (b), and (c), ONIC does not appear to
do any important explanatory work. Thus, this argument for OIC also cannot be generalized to
defend ONIC.
Finally, there is a popular strategy for defending OIC that appeals to reasons for actions. For
example, Peter Vranas argues that (1) an agent has an obligation to  only if she has reason to ,
(2) she has reason to  only if -ing is a potential option for her, and (3) -ing is a potential option
for her only if she can ; thus, she has an obligation to  only if she can .57 Similarly, Bart
Streumer argues that there cannot be a reason for an agent to  if she lacks the ability to , and
thus, she cannot have the most reason to  if she is unable to .58 He contends that this latter claim

Howard-Snyder, “‘Cannot’ Implies ‘Not Ought,’” 236–41.
Vranas, “I Ought, Therefore I Can,” 171–72.
58
Streumer, “Reasons and Impossibility,” 351–58.
56
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has the same truth conditions as the claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to  when
she is unable to  (i.e., OIC); thus, OIC is true.
Again, it does not appear that this argument can be repurposed to support ONIC. While it may
be true that one must be able to  if one is to have a reason to —with reason to  being a necessary
condition of being required to —it is not obvious that one must be able to  to have reason not to

. To see this, consider some of the supporting arguments Streumer gives for thinking that one
must be able to  if one is to have reason to . First, he argues that if one could have reason to 
without having the ability to , one could have “crazy” reasons like a reason to jump thirtythousand feet into the air to stop a plane from crashing.59 However, given that it is absurd to think
we have such reasons, he contends that reasons are ability constrained. However, being forbidden
from doing things one cannot do generates no such “crazy” reasons, as there seems to be nothing
“crazy” about having reason not to jump thirty-thousand feet into the air, for example.
Alternatively, Streumer argues that if agents can have reasons to do things they cannot do (i.e.,
OIC is false), then it will turn out that they will have most reason to do what they cannot (e.g., go
back in time and stop all the wars).60 Thus, they will have to try to spend their lives pointlessly
trying to do the impossible—an absurd conclusion that requires the rejection of the premise that
OIC is false.61 Again, though, this argument cannot be repurposed to establish ONIC, as being
forbidden from carrying out undoable actions will not demand any sort of pointless efforts on the
part of agents. Thus, arguments for OIC that appeal to the relationship between ability and reasons
cannot be employed to defend ONIC.

Streumer, “Reasons and Impossibility,” 358–59.
Streumer, “Reasons and Impossibility,” 365.
61
Streumer, “Reasons and Impossibility,” 365. Streumer also has an additional argument, but I take it to ultimately
collapse into the argument from crazy reasons for reasons that are too lengthy to present here.
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There is one argument for OIC that can be repurposed to defend ONIC. This argument
contends that the point of moral evaluation of actions is to aid in deliberation; however, given that
undoable actions are not objects of deliberation, it is inappropriate to assign the moral predicate of
“required” to such actions.62 Thus, one is only required to do actions that one can do (i.e., OIC)—
a conclusion that can be generalized to defend ONIC if one insists that it is inappropriate to assign
any moral predicates to actions that are not the objects of deliberation (i.e., undoable actions can
be neither required nor forbidden).
The problem with this argument is its contention that moral predicates can only be applied to
those actions that factor into deliberation. Suppose that some agent is a pacifist such that she would
not even consider harming another person. For such a person, the possible action of killing her
friend would never enter into her deliberation process. Thus, if one takes moral predication to be
constrained by deliberation, it would then follow that the pacifist is not required to refrain from
murdering her friend. However, this would seem to be a reductio of the premise that moral
predicates only apply to those actions that factor into deliberations.63 Given that this reductio
undermines the only apparent argument for ONIC, there would appear to be no basis for rejecting
the revised moral equality argument’s contention that Q is forbidden from touching P’s hair even
when P lacks hair.

Copp makes a point along these lines (“‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can,’ Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities,” 273–74).
63
Peter Graham makes a related point when arguing that we need not posit that “ought implies can” when explaining
our process of deliberation. He notes that we not only exclude undoable actions at the outset of our deliberation, but
also actions we have no intention of doing (“‘Ought’ and Ability,” 371–72).
62

75

VIII. The Eternalism Objection
While the first objection maintained that both hair-growing and legitimate edicts imposed new
requirements on others, this second objection contends that neither imposes such requirements.
Specifically this objection holds that a novel requirement is imposed just in case the truth value of
the proposition that expresses that requirement changes from false to true. However, there is a
popular metaphysical view that denies that propositions can have different truth values at different
times. Thus, the distinction between the issuing of legitimate edicts and hair-growing cannot be
stated in terms of requirement change, as requirements cannot change across time.
This objection assumes the popular position that propositions are eternal in the sense that their
truth value does not change over time, thanks in part to the fact that their content is temporally
indexed.64 For example, when a person in Chicago says, “It is raining” at 12:45 p.m. on December
20, 1989, she is really expressing the proposition that it is raining in Chicago at 12:45 p.m. on
December 20, 1989. Further, the eternalist claims that this proposition is true both at the time the
sentence is uttered and thirty years later when the speaker is in New York and the weather is clear
both there and in Chicago. Thus, in contrast to temporalist views, which hold that the sentence “It
is raining” expresses a proposition that is true when it is raining and false when it is not—i.e., a
proposition that changes truth values across time—the eternalist position holds that propositions
are timelessly true (or timelessly false).
Given an eternalist view of propositions, it would then follow that the truth values of
requirement-expressing propositions do not change across time—i.e., no new requirements could
be imposed. To see this, consider the case of the legitimate P who, at time t1 issues the edict that

While this is the dominant view, there are dissenters, including Prior, “Thank Goodness That’s Over”; and Brogaard,
Transient Truths.
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her subject Q must . Given that Q is obliged to comply with P’s edicts coupled with the empirical
fact that P issued her edict at t1, the following proposition would be true: Q is required to  at t2.
However, if this proposition is true, then, on the eternalist view, it is equally true at t0 when P had
yet to issue her edict as it is at t2 when P has issued the edict. Thus, contra the revised moral
equality argument, legitimate P’s edict does not generate a new requirement that Q  at t2.
The most straightforward reply to this objection is to simply concede the point and restate the
revised moral equality argument in terms that are compatible with eternalism. This twice-revised
argument would avoid talk of requirement change and, instead, put things in terms of the
counterfactual requirement differences associated with the issuing of legitimate edicts versus hairgrowing. Specifically, note that when legitimate P issues her edict that Q must , Q ends up with
a requirement that she would not have had if P had not issued the edict, namely, the requirement
that she . By contrast, Q is equally required not to touch P’s hair in the world where P grows out
her hair and in the world in which she keeps her head shaved. Indeed, the arguments above have
sought to demonstrate that P’s lack of hair does nothing to negate the proposition that Q is
forbidden from touching P’s hair. Thus, even granting the eternalist claim about propositions, there
is still an important difference between hair-growing and the issuing of legitimate edicts: the latter
generates a counterfactual requirement difference while the former does not. It is this power—the
power to unilaterally burden people with requirements they would not have otherwise had—that
is incompatible with moral equality. Or so the proponent of the moral equality argument could
maintain in the face of the duty-alteration and eternalism objections.
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IX. The False Positives Objection
The third possible objection to this account is that there are other paradigmatic cases of morally
unproblematic activities that non-consensually impose novel requirements (or, alternatively, imply
counterfactual requirement differences) and, thus, would be incorrectly judged to be problematic
by this account. Suppose, for example, that people have a duty to rescue those in need. Given such
a duty, if P were to fall into a lake and start to drown, Q would be required to save P. However,
had P not fallen in, then Q would not have had this requirement because, assuming OIC, she would
have been unable to rescue P. Given this counterfactual difference, it would follow that P’s falling
into a lake entails that she has the power to impose requirements; however, there seems to be
nothing problematic about her toppling into a lake. Thus, one might worry that the account in the
previous section delivers the wrong results in this case.
Three things can be said in response to this false positives objection. First, note that, in both
the hair-growing case and the drowning case, P acts in a way that renders some previouslyundoable action doable for Q. However, the two cases differ in the kind of requirement at issue. In
the hair-growing case, the requirement is a negative one where Q is required to refrain from
carrying out a particular action—with P having a correlative negative right that Q refrain from
carrying out that action. By contrast, the duty to rescue is a positive one where the action obtaining
is obligatory, as opposed to its negation. It is this difference that explains why, in the drowning
case, the relevant counterfactual requirement differences obtains (i.e., Q has a requirement in the
world where P acts that she lacks in the world where P does not act) while it does not obtain in the
hair-growing case. For, in the case of positive requirements, OIC means that the proposition
expressing the requirement does become false when the action to which it refers is undoable. By
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contrast, if what is required is that one refrain from carrying out some action, then it makes no
difference whether or not that action is doable for the reason presented in the previous section.
The general conclusion, then, is that seemingly benign actions like hair-growing or falling
into lakes will entail the power to impose requirements if they render doable some action which
another person has a positive duty to carry out. However, this means that the false positives
objection can be avoided if one denies that people have any positive natural duties.65 And, indeed,
many philosophers do reject the existence of such duties—particularly libertarian philosophers,
but also non-libertarian philosophers as well.66 While presenting the various arguments against
positive natural duties goes beyond the scope of this chapter, citing their existence serves to reveal
that the false positives objection rests upon a premise that is controversial, thereby identifying a
possible basis for its rejection.
The second reply to the false positives objection involves taking aim at the heretoforeconceded OIC premise. Note that, in both the hair-growing case and the drowning case, any
purported counterfactual requirement difference obtains in virtue of the fact that P makes it such
that Q is able to do some action that would be unavailable to her if P didn’t act/exist. In the former
case, P renders Q able to touch P’s hair by growing out said hair, while, in the latter case, P’s
falling into the lake renders Q able to rescue her. And, in both cases, the background assumption
is that this generates requirement change because one can only be required to do what one is able
to do, which is to say, it is assumed that OIC holds (though, as noted above, this assumption does
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One need not deny that people have any positive obligations. Indeed, few would dispute that agents can take on
such obligations via promise or consent. However, such voluntarily-adopted obligations contrast with natural duties
that exist independent of any sort of human action. It is only the existence of the latter that would open the door to
false positives, and, thus, must be denied by this particular reply to the false positives objection.
66
Some prominent libertarian opponents of positive rights include Murray Rothbard (1978), Aeon Skoble (1995), Jan
Narveson (2001), Eric Mack (2010), and Danny Frederick (2010), among many others. The most prominent nonlibertarian critic of positive rights is Onora O’Neill (2005; 2010), who raises concerns that the correlative obligations
problematically lack a determinate obligor.
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not actually imply counterfactual requirement difference in the hair-growing case). However, as
noted above this presupposition that “ought” implies “can” is controversial, with many
philosophers having presented arguments for rejecting this principle. As with the arguments
against positive natural duties, the details of these arguments will not be presented here. Instead,
it will merely be observed that if OIC is false—as, indeed, many take it to be—then there will be
no difference in requirement across the relevant possible worlds in the drowning case, as Q would
be required to rescue P irrespective of whether P falls into the lake or if there is even any P to
save. Thus, the drowning case would not qualify as an instance of requirement imposition, thereby
defusing the objection that the revised moral equality argument yields incorrect results.
Finally, even if one both admits the existence of positive natural duties and also accepts
OIC, there remains a fallback position to which the proponent of the moral equality argument can
retreat. Specifically, she might, again, revise her position to maintain that P’s action implies that
she has a normative power that, absent consent, would violate the moral equality premise just in
case:
1. The action results in Q having a requirement that she would have lacked had P not taken
that action.
2. P’s action does not affect Q’s ability to carry out the action that is required (or forbidden)
relative to the counterfactual world where P does not take that action.
While adding this second condition makes the account somewhat less parsimonious, it does allow
it to avoid the false positives objection even while conceding OIC and the existence of positive
natural duties. For, in both the hair-growing case and the drowning case, any purported
counterfactual requirement difference occurs only because P renders some action doable for Q that
would not have been doable otherwise. Thus, neither of these cases meets the second condition
presented above, meaning the fallback account correctly tracks pre-theoretical judgments about
which sorts of moral powers are problematic. By contrast, when a legitimate authority P issues the
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edict that Q must , Q has a requirement to  that she would not have otherwise had (assuming
that P is not ordering Q to do something she is already required to do) without this edict having
any bearing on Q’s ability to . Given that Q would be equally able to  either with or without P’s
edict, it follows that a legitimate P has a power that, absent consent, negates the premise of human
moral equality. Thus, the moral equality argument survives the false positives objection.67
In response to this proposed fallback position, one might worry that there is something ad
hoc about tacking on the second condition to sidestep the false positives objection. However, in
response to this worry, one could again appeal to the fact that van der Vossen takes there to be
something prima facie problematic about the power to change moral facts, while he sees nothing
similarly problematic about the power to change empirical facts that interact with those moral facts
in certain ways (2015, 69–71). And, as with the account posited in the previous section, one might
think that this intuitive distinction is captured by the fallback position presented above. After all,
if one grants OIC, then a natural explication of the difference between acting directly on the moral
facts and merely acting on the world is that the latter takes the form of modifying what it is that
people can do—with OIC then entailing an associated difference in the truth value of certain
normative propositions across counterfactuals—while the former generates variation in
requirement directly without having to change the physical world by rendering certain actions
undoable. Thus, the fallback account of what powers negate human moral equality seems to codify
the intuitive distinction between problematic and unproblematic normative powers, thereby
making it non-arbitrary. This, in turn, enables the proponent of the consent theory of legitimacy to
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Note that the same would also be true of the P who appropriates some previously unowned object O. In that world,
Q is required to not touch O while she is not so required in the nearest possible world where P does not appropriate
that object. However, she is equally capable of touching O in both cases. Thus, contra van der Vossen’s central
contention, the power to appropriate is a power to impose novel requirements upon others and is, thereby, vulnerable
to the moral equality argument.
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maintain that the power of legitimacy—when unaccompanied by consent—uniquely compromises
human equality, as it allows some people to impose novel requirements on others (without their
consent) in a way that is distinct from hair-growing, procreating, or falling in a lake.

X. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce—and provide a novel argument for—the consent
theory of legitimacy. Given that subsequent chapters attempt to demonstrate that this theory (in
tandem with the self-ownership thesis) entails that advantage should be distributed in accordance
with a luck egalitarian principle of justice, a convincing defense of the theory will help to establish
that this entailment relation might function as part of a modus ponens argument. Indeed, while the
argument of the thesis is primarily targeted toward libertarians who will often already be
sympathetic to the consent theory of legitimacy, providing an independent supporting argument
for this theory will help to make the thesis of interest to those outside of the libertarian camp.
There is also a second reason that the argument of this chapter is important for the broader
thesis and the argument presented below. While the focus of this chapter has been demonstrating
that to be a legitimate authority is to have the power of to impose requirements on others, the
footnotes (particularly note 67) have attempted to demonstrate that initial appropriation also entails
this power. Given the moral equality argument, it would then follow that, like legitimacy, such
appropriation has consent as its necessary condition. However, while this is the conclusion argued
for in chapter four, the argument presented there is distinct from the moral equality argument.
Indeed, the suggestion below is that initial appropriation has consent as its necessary condition
because property owners are legitimate authorities (meaning that, to become such an authority
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one must gain the consent of all the persons who one claims to govern). Thus, this chapter functions
as an auxiliary argument that independently reaches the conclusion defended in chapter four.
However, while these two arguments are independent in the sense that neither one needs
the other to succeed, they also provide mutual support for one another. First, if the argument of
chapter four succeeds in showing that initial appropriation entails legitimacy, given that legitimacy
is the power to impose novel requirements, that would explain why it is that initial appropriation
also implies this power. Similarly, if this chapter is correct in its claim that both initial
appropriation and legitimate authority imply the consent-requiring power to impose novel
requirements, the conclusion of chapter four then becomes more plausible, as it would help to
explain why it is that these two apparently distinct things amount to the same sort of (problematic)
moral power (i.e., the fact that both entail the power to impose requirements supports the claim
that property ownership is a form of legitimacy via something roughly like inference to the best
explanation). Thus, the argument of this chapter helps to bolster both the consent theory of
legitimacy and the conclusion below that this theory entails that property rights have consent as
their necessary condition.
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Chapter Four
Having introduced two principles central to libertarian thought, this chapter turns to presenting the
socialist principle that ultimately follows from these principles (as will be argued in chapters 5 and
6). Specifically, it introduces the luck egalitarian principle of distributive justice with an original
restatement of the position designed to enhance its plausibility. The purpose of this introduction is
twofold. First, the chapter aims to clarify the principle by giving a precise account of luck
egalitarianism with a particular focus on the distinctive luck egalitarian commitment to holding
people responsible (i.e., its incorporation of consequential responsibility). If the thesis is to
succeed in its effort to develop a coherent version of left-libertarianism, all of the principles that
constitute this left-libertarian position must have content that is fully determinate and precisely
stated. Thus, it must be made clear what, exactly, the libertarian principles presented in chapters
two and three are supposed to entail.
Second, as was true of the chapter on self-ownership, the goal here is not merely to
recapitulate how luck egalitarianism has been generally presented in the existing literature on the
subject but, rather, to provide a corrective account of luck egalitarianism and consequential
responsibility designed to resolve some of the prominent objections that have been raised against
the position. While it is not possible to reply to every objection that has been raised against luck
egalitarianism, the hope here is to solve three of the more glaring problems that might otherwise
suggest that the position ought to be rejected. This task is important because, as noted previously,
chapters 5 and 6 seek to demonstrate that the libertarian principles of chapters 2 and 3 imply luck
egalitarianism. However, if it turns out that luck egalitarianism is not acceptable, then this
conditional relationship will function as part of a modus tollens argument rather than the modus
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ponens argument that is supposed to demonstrate the coherence of the left-libertarian position.68
Indeed, the variety of left-libertarianism advanced here contends not only that the self-ownership
thesis and consent theory of legitimacy entail luck egalitarianism, but also that these principles are
all true. However, if luck egalitarianism is found to be unacceptable, then the arguments of
chapters 5 and 6 will show that either the self-ownership thesis or the consent theory will have to
be rejected, thereby eliminating all the normative parts that are supposed to compose the leftlibertarian position defended here. Thus, it is worth going through some effort to develop a variety
of luck egalitarianism that avoids at least some of the major problems that have plagued prior
formulations of the position.
So what is luck egalitarianism? It is an approach to distributive justice that is distinctive in
its incorporation of the notion of responsibility into an otherwise strictly egalitarian theory of
distributive justice. Strict egalitarian theories are, by definition, insensitive to responsibility; they
demand an equal distribution of advantage irrespective of the past actions of those whose
advantage is to be equalized (“advantage” here stands for whatever currency of egalitarian justice
one prefers). By contrast, luck egalitarians are willing to declare certain inequalities just if—and
only if—those inequalities correspond to some choice for which the worse-off are responsible.69
For example, G. A. Cohen provides a representative statement of the luck egalitarian position when

Some might object to the characterization of luck egalitarianism as a “socialist” normative commitment. Two quick
things can be said in response to this objection. First, the claim here is not that luck egalitarianism is the only principle
to which socialists subscribe, but one among many. This point hopefully helps to placate those concerned that placing
luck egalitarianism within the normative core of socialism qua political philosophy impoverishes the ideology.
Second, there is a strong tradition of self-described socialists taking luck egalitarianism to be a socialist principle (see,
e.g., Cohen (2009), Wright (2010), and Roemer (2017)). There is also, arguably, a hint of an embrace luck
egalitarianism in Marx’s “Critique of the Gotha Programme” wherein he argues that communism does away with the
inequality attending to the “natural privileges” of “unequal individual endowment” (1978, 529-30). Indeed, Pablo
Gilabert sees Marx’s principle that goods under communism will flow from ability to need as anticipating a sort of
luck egalitarianism, though he attempts to interpret the principle in a much broader way (Gilabert, 2015, 199).
69
A weaker statement of luck egalitarianism might hold that the relevant sort of choice is merely necessary for
inequality to be just rather than necessary and sufficient (see, e.g., Lippert-Rasmussen 2016, 1-4). However, any
account of luck egalitarianism that takes seriously the idea of holding people responsible—an idea discussed at length
below—will also maintain that certain choices are sufficient for inequality being just.
68
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he asserts that “an unequal distribution whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or
fault or desert on the part of (some of) the relevant affected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro
tanto, unjust” (2008, 7).70
As this statement indicates, a defining feature of a luck egalitarian principle of justice is
that it holds people responsible for bringing about certain outcomes by declaring that any agent
responsible for such an outcome ought to be left worse off relative to the share she would have
been assigned by the principle were she not responsible for such outcomes.71 However, for as much
as has been said about responsibility in the literature on luck egalitarianism, surprisingly little has
been said about (a) the kinds of outcomes for which luck egalitarianism holds agents responsible
in the sense defined above and (b) if an agent is held responsible, the extent to which her just share
of advantage is to be diminished.
This chapter seeks to remedy this oversight by providing a theory of cost and penalty where
an agent is held responsible for all and only those choices that impose costs, with the theory of
penalty dictating to what extent she is to be left worse off. Specifically, it will argue that an agent
imposes a cost to the extent that her choice can reasonably be expected to produce less
appropriately distributed advantage than some alternative choice she could have made (with the
notion of appropriately distributed advantage to be explicated below). It is then posited that an
agent who imposes such a cost ought to incur a penalty that amounts to the internalization of the
imposed cost. 72 Finally, the chapter will argue that this theory solves a number of problems
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Other representative statements of luck egalitarianism include those made by Arneson (2011a, 243), Cohen (2006,
440; 2009, 17-18; 2011, 13), Lippert-Rasmussen (2016, 1), Temkin (1993, 13), and Vallentyne (2008, 58), among
others.
71
The notion of responsibility at issue here, then, is what has been alternately called “consequential responsibility”
(Dworkin 2000, 287; Knight and Stemplowska 2011, 13), “substantive responsibility” (Scanlon 1999, 248), and
“holding people responsible” (Olsaretti 2009, 167-68). The idea is that the agent’s relation to some misdeed (or
morally good action) entails that she ought to be left worse off (or better off) than if she did not stand in that relation.
72
The discussion here will focus only on the actions of individuals, but most of what is said below can be equally
applied to the collective actions of group agents (if one is open to a social ontology that includes such things).
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discussed in the literature that have plagued standard accounts of luck egalitarianism. Thus, it seeks
to present a corrective luck egalitarian principle of justice that, because of its enhanced plausibility,
is able to support a left-libertarian position that endorses such a principle on the grounds that it
follows from the self-ownership thesis and the consent theory of legitimacy.

I. Costs and Penalties
The downside of building a notion of responsibility into an egalitarian principle of justice is that it
introduces many theoretical complications into the principle. For example, one must (eventually)
settle on an account of the conditions under which a person can be said to be responsible for some
action—a challenging philosophical task.73 However, while this point of elaboration has received
much attention in the literature, there is an equally important issue with luck egalitarianism that
has received much less discussion, namely: what theory of cost and penalty should be incorporated
into the theory? It is this question that this chapter will attempt to answer, thereby giving more
precise content to the principle—and, thus, to the left-libertarian position that it partially
constitutes.
To begin, note that the notion of holding people responsible for their choices carries with
it two additional pairs of interrelated notions, namely the notions of cost and penalty. The cost of
an action is the morally salient features of the resultant state of affairs for which the agent is held
responsible, while the penalty is equal to the absolute value of the difference between (a) how

Specifically, one can hold that groups impose costs to the extent that their actions can reasonably be expected to
produce less appropriately distributed advantage than some alternative choice that the group could have made. And it
can similarly be maintained that the group must incur the penalty of internalizing the cost that they impose. The only
added complication is that some theory must be presented regarding how that penalty is to be distributed among
members of the group. However, the account presented here can remain agnostic on that point with those who are
sympathetic to the idea of collective responsibility filling in the details in their preferred ways.
73
For more on this point, see Lippert Rasmussen on “thick luck” (2016, 59-62).
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much advantage the agent ought to have given her responsibility for the cost and (b) how much
advantage she ought to have in the nearest counterfactual world where she is not responsible for
that cost.
This description of cost and penalty is a bit abstract, but can be illustrated by considering
G. A. Cohen’s case of the ant who assiduously works all summer storing up food while a
neighboring grasshopper chirps the days away—a decision the latter makes even while recognizing
that this choice will result in her ending up worse off when winter comes (2009, 27-28). Cohen
posits that, given his luck egalitarian approach to distributive justice, the grasshopper should be
held responsible for her choice: no transfers should be made from the ant, even though this means
the grasshopper will be left worse off than the ant (i.e., inequality will obtain). Given this analysis,
the grasshopper would be said to have imposed a cost (on herself), because she left herself with
less advantage than she could have had. And, the associated penalty is that the grasshopper is to
be left with whatever quantity of advantage she is able to achieve in the absence of any
redistribution. It is this prescribed loss of advantage that is warranted by the cost imposed by the
grasshopper.

II. Olsaretti’s Challenge
In the ant-grasshopper case, there is a very tight relation between cost and penalty: the cost
imposed by the grasshopper—i.e., the state of affairs for which she is responsible—is her own lost
advantage, which can, at least in theory, be quantified. Additionally, the penalty she has to incur
is also a foregone quantity of advantage (this is definitionally true). And, in this case, those two
quantities are identical: because the grasshopper is responsible for the cost of her being x amount
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worse off than she could have been, justice now demands that she incur the penalty of being x
amount worse off than she would have been were she not so responsible.
However, this relation does not necessarily have to obtain given the way in which cost and
penalty have been defined. For example, while penalties are defined in terms of counterfactual
advantage differentials, costs need not be, and might, instead, be understood in terms of states of
affairs that are bad in ways that are unrelated to any person’s advantage. Thus, bringing about an
advantage-rich state of affairs via deception might still be counted as imposing a cost that warrants
a penalty, even though the cost has no magnitude that might equal that of the penalty. Or,
alternatively, the cost in question may be a quantifiable advantage differential, but that value might
be distinct from the value of the associated penalty. For example, the grasshopper’s penalty for
leaving herself without food for the winter might include not only going hungry, but also the ant
biting her repeatedly. In such a case, the advantage that the grasshopper must forego as a penalty
will exceed the foregone advantage for which she is responsible.
As Serena Olsaretti notes, most luck egalitarians assume, at least in part, a tacit
contextualist theory of penalty (or, to use her language, “stakes”) wherein it is maintained that a
culpable agent should forego however much advantage she does, in fact, forego given the
contingent social circumstance and choices that others make (2009, 180).74 For example, in Marc
Fleurbaey’s (1995) case of a reckless motorcyclist who crashes and is injured as a result of driving
too fast and not wearing a helmet, the penalty will vary depending upon whether or not a passerby
chooses to provide assistance—or, alternatively, whether that passerby chooses to confiscate the
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Olsaretti does not distinguish between cost and penalty, and focuses only on cases where agents impose costs upon
themselves. As a result, it is a bit unclear what she thinks the contextualist view implies about cases where costs are
imposed on others. Suppose P destroys some object belonging to Q. Is this a cost imposed by P that warrants some
penalty? Or, is this a cost incurred by Q whose past choices left her vulnerable to having her object destroyed in this
way? Given Olsaretti’s rejection of the view, the point is somewhat moot, but it is worth noting that an advantage of
the theory posited below is its ability to handle such cases.
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motorcycle (Olsaretti 2009, 175-76). However, as Olsaretti points out, it seems inappropriate for
penalties to hang on the arbitrary choices of individuals (2009, 176). Indeed, could it really be the
case that, simply because some person P will attack Q if Q imposes a cost, such actions by P
become permissible—or even obligatory—when Q imposes that cost? Permitting such penalties
would seem to amount to a form of moral tyranny whereby others are given undue power to
unilaterally limit an agent’s rights.
Olsaretti also raises a second objection to a contextualist theory of penalty, namely, that it
allows people to be stripped of rights and subjected to unacceptably “hierarchical systems of
privilege” if those are the contingent consequences imposed on those responsible for generating
costs (2009, 182). For example, if a passerby was known to enslave any injured motorcyclists
found stranded on the side of the road, the contextualist is seemingly committed to affirming that
such enslavement is the penalty dictated by justice. However, given the unacceptability of this
conclusion, some alternative theory of penalty that avoids this implication is required.

III. The Internalization Criterion
Fortunately, a solution to Olsaretti’s challenge can be deduced from the very premises presupposed
by luck egalitarianism. To begin, consider why luck egalitarians incorporate a responsibility
component into their principles of justice (i.e., to favor luck egalitarianism over a responsibilityinsensitive strict egalitarianism that demands equality regardless of the past actions of persons).
The apparent reason for this move is that strict egalitarianism’s insensitivity to responsibility
leaves it vulnerable to a certain species of reductio argument—a vulnerability that is eliminated
via the incorporation of responsibility.
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As a quick illustration of this point, consider how a principle demanding strict equality of
advantage would handle the case of a spiteful person who willfully destroys any advantage she
receives. Given such a case, the strict egalitarian would have to demand that advantage continually
be reallocated to this person such that her share remain as great as everyone else’s—a demand that
is maintained even as she destroys each bit of advantage transferred to her until, eventually,
everyone is left without any advantage at all. That strict egalitarian principles maintain that this is
what justice requires is an apparent reductio of such theories.
While this is an extreme case, other examples generally cited by luck egalitarians can be
substituted into the reductio to reach the same conclusion. Returning to Cohen’s ant-grasshopper
case, a strict egalitarian principle of justice would demand that the ant redistribute some of her
food to the grasshopper; however, there is something seemingly unfair about the ant having to
make do with less because of the grasshopper’s negligent choices. Thus, insofar as justice is
supposed to track fairness, strict egalitarian principles must be rejected lest they declare an unfair
outcome just.
The judgement that redistribution in these cases would be unfair points to a general
principle motivating the move to luck egalitarianism. Cohen has suggested that redistribution to
such negligent parties is unfair on egalitarian grounds, as it amounts to those parties exploiting the
non-negligent parties, where exploitation runs contrary to egalitarianism (Cohen 2011, 8).
However, as Michael Otsuka notes, it is unclear in what respect such exploitation can be
inegalitarian given that the redistribution is equalizing by definition (Otsuka 2010, 223). Rather,
Otsuka plausibly argues that what is unfair in cases of negligence is the externalization of costs
onto others such that they are forced to “pick up the tab” for the poor choices of the negligent agent
(2010, 229). Indeed, any principle of justice that allows agents to unilaterally leave others with
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less advantage than they might otherwise have had seems to unacceptably condone tyrannical
behavior, thereby yielding the judgment of unfairness.75 Thus, an acceptable theory of justice must
be structured to rule out such externalization. Call this preliminary statement of a constraint on
principles of justice the internalization criterion (where “internalization” is used to suggest that
costs are internalized rather than externalized onto others).76
The advantage of luck egalitarianism, then, is that it satisfies this criterion via its
incorporation of responsibility. For example, in the spite case, the agent is held responsible for
destroying her own advantage, thereby making the resulting inequality just. Thus, justice does not
demand redistribution and, as a result, other parties need not make do with less as a result of the
spiteful agent’s choices. Similarly, in the ant-grasshopper case, the grasshopper is held responsible
for her failure to work with no redistribution from the ant being required. This result insulates the
ant from having to “pick up the tab” for the grasshopper’s bad choice, again, ensuring that the
internalization criterion is satisfied. Thus, as both of these cases illustrate, the luck egalitarian
embrace of responsibility allows the position to simultaneously meet the internalization criterion
and sidestep the reductios that will plague any strict egalitarian account. It is this advantage over
such strict egalitarianism that seemingly led Cohen to claim that luck egalitarianism captures “the
most powerful idea in the arsenal of the antiegalitarian Right: the idea of choice and responsibility”
(Cohen 2011, 32).
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Notably, this objection to moral tyranny seems quite similar to the Olsarettian worry expressed above. In both cases,
the worry is that some person is able to arbitrarily shrink the distributive share of advantage assigned to another. Given
that the theory of cost and penalty (posited below) attempts to both resolve Olsaretti’s worry and adhere to the
internalization criterion, one might characterize it as strongly coherent in that it is motivated by a singular objection
to tyrannical advantage diminution.
76
As the use of the word “preliminary” suggests, this is only a first pass at articulating the criterion. One obvious
problem with the present statement is that militates against forms of redistribution that luck egalitarians would endorse.
Thus, a refined version is presented below in section VI, though only after the necessary groundwork has been laid.
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Returning to Olsaretti’s challenge, it can now be noted that the luck egalitarian
commitment to the internalization criterion constrains both what counts as a cost and the relation
between cost and penalty. First, if the luck egalitarian embrace of responsibility is motivated by
resistance to others having to “pick up the tab” for an agent’s choices, this suggests that costs
should be limited to foregone advantage imposed by the agent (as opposed to other sorts of moral
wrongdoing). While there may be independent reason to condemn lying or other forms of bad
behavior, such actions do not warrant criticism from a luck egalitarian point of view and, thus, do
not qualify as costs. Given this, any theory of cost will take such costs to involve the foregoing of
some quantity of advantage by either the agent or some other individual(s).
More importantly, the internalization criterion constrains how much penalty must be
incurred for any given cost. Specifically, if an agent imposes some cost, she should incur however
much penalty is necessary—either via redistribution or its absence—to ensure that others do not
end up with less advantage than they would have had absent the imposed cost. Thus, in the
motorcyclist case, the reckless biker imposes a cost of however much advantage she loses out on
when she crashes. Given this, her penalty is that she is not entitled to redistribution, because
precluding redistribution is both necessary and sufficient for ensuring that passersby are left no
worse off as a result of the motorcyclist’s choice. By contrast, a passerby confiscating the
motorcycle would be an inappropriate penalty, as this change in holdings is not necessary for
satisfying the internalization criterion.
Thus, by appealing to the internalization criterion, one is able to provide a theory of penalty
that avoids both of Olsaretti’s objections to the contextualist approach. First, penalties are no
longer anchored to the capricious choices of individuals but, rather, are determined by an
independent moral principle, namely the internalization criterion. Negligent parties like the
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motorcyclist or the grasshopper cannot be obliged to suffer whatever loss of advantage others have
decided to inflict upon them; rather, they should bear just that loss of advantage that is necessary
and sufficient for ensuring that no one else is left worse off as a result of their choices. Second,
this anchoring has the additional advantage of ruling out all of the penalties that Olsaretti deems
unacceptable. Enslaving someone, killing them, or condemning them to a lower caste will never,
in practice, be necessary for satisfying the internalization criterion.77 Given this, Olsaretti’s
challenge to posit a theory of penalty can seemingly be met using only those premises already
presupposed by luck egalitarians.

IV. The Challenge, Restated
In response to this proposed solution, one might present the following objection: while penalties
are now anchored to costs in a way that makes them non-discretionary given those costs, the costs
themselves remain unacceptably contingent on the arbitrary wills of others. Thus, while
motorcycle confiscation is ruled out as a penalty in the reckless biker case if the cost of her action
is stipulated to be the lost advantage due to physical injury, one might insist that one cannot make
such a stipulation, as there is no principled basis for limiting the lost advantage that counts as cost
in this way. Indeed, if a passerby chooses to confiscate the motorcycle, that choice, too, would
diminish the motorcyclist’s advantage in just the same way as would her injuries—with the total
loss of advantage being the apparent cost of the motorcyclist’s action. Or, alternatively, if a
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If it were for some reason necessary to impose the extreme penalties, the suggestion here is that this necessity would
count against the apparent unacceptability of those penalties. However, one might also posit additional principles that
further constrain what penalties must be incurred (e.g., a principle of full self-ownership) to necessarily preclude these
penalties. The drawback of such a move, though, is that such principles would then conflict with the internalization
criterion, as they would mandate that, in certain cases, others must pick up the tab for a culpable agent’s negligent
choice (namely, in all cases where the only way to avoid externalization is proscribed by one of the supplementary
principles).

94

passerby decides to rush to the motorcyclist’s aid, the motorcyclist’s injuries may end up being
less severe, thereby diminishing her foregone advantage and, thus, the cost of her action. Further,
given that penalties are yoked to costs in the way described above, it follows that the penalty an
agent must incur for any given choice is still unacceptably left to the discretion of others.
The more general point on which Olsaretti’s objection rests is that the consequences of an
agent’s choice are not merely a function of her choice, but of her choice in tandem with many other
people’s. Indeed, whether or not an agent’s choice culminates in some person(s) foregoing some
specified amount of advantage will depend on both the past and future choices of others. Thus, if
the quantity of advantage lost is counted as a cost for which the agent is fully responsible—and
penalty is tied to cost—then others gain inappropriate discretionary control over the penalties that
the agent must incur.
However, this problem can be dissolved if one has a theory of cost that is able to hold each
of the relevant parties partially responsible for the foregone advantage that resulted from their
combined choices. For example, in the motorcycle confiscation case, a theory that held that the
advantage the reckless motorcyclist foregoes when a passerby confiscates her motorcycle is a cost
imposed by the passerby rather than the motorcyclist herself would avoid Olsaretti’s objection.
More specifically, a theory that parcels out costs in this way precludes others from being able to
arbitrarily determine the magnitude of the penalty an agent must incur for a negligent choice.
Providing such an account of cost is the task that this chapter now sets out to accomplish.

V. A Theory of Cost
As noted above, the luck egalitarian is committed to the idea that an agent’s choices should not
leave others with less, and it is from this principle (the internalization criterion) that the theory of
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cost is derived. Specifically, the theory presented here will propose that an agent imposes a cost to
the extent that she acts in ways that she can reasonably expect will leave her and others with less
opportunity for advantage under an appropriately egalitarian distributive regime. The chapter
will first explicate this notion and then argue that this theory acceptably distributes costs and
penalties in a way that avoids Olsaretti’s worry as well as many other influential objections to luck
egalitarianism.
In order to simplify the presentation of the theory, it will be helpful to begin by taking a
particular position regarding the equilisandum of luck egalitarian justice. So far, the general
concept of advantage has been employed to preserve the neutrality of the account vis-à-vis debates
over what, exactly, it is to be equalized. And, while this position will generally be sustained, going
forward, it will be assumed that what is to be equalized is not the advantage persons possess at a
particular time, or even over some specified period, but, rather, their lifetime level of advantage.
Thus, there need be no injustice in an arrangement where one person gets a job right after
graduation while another takes off a few years to travel, so long as the former retires earlier than
the latter (specifically, early enough to make up for the time spent working rather than traveling).
While it is true that, if one checked in early-on, one might note that very different amounts of
advantage had so-far accrued, injustice does not yet obtain, and it will only obtain if things are not
adequately evened out in the future (e.g., because the traveler also retires early and makes no effort
to compensate the person who didn’t travel for the lost years of laboring).78
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This assumption helps to simplify things in the following way. In what follows, there will be much talk of how
advantage is distributed. And, if the equilisandum of the luck egalitarian principle is lifetime advantage, then there is
only one distribution to be assessed, namely, the lifetime levels of advantage everyone ends up with (in contrast with
alternative approaches wherein one might have to assess many distributions that obtain at different times or across
different specified time spans). Additionally, one can talk of a single set of possible, mutually-exclusive distributions
that might be actualized—as opposed to there being many such sets where the possible distributions pertaining to any
particular time are mutually-exclusive but are compatible with the distributions pertaining to any other time.
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With this assumption in place, it becomes possible to lay the mechanical groundwork
necessary for explicating the notion of foregone warranted expected distributed advantage
(WEDA). First, note that, at any point in time, there is a set of possible ultimate distributions that
could still arise given all preceding events, where the choices people make are a proper subset of
those events. So, for example, the ultimate distribution of advantage between P and Q will depend
on whether or not P contracts a serious disease, as well as whether Q throws P a surprise 50th
birthday party, with some possible distributions becoming unattainable as a result of these events
(e.g., the serious disease makes it such that the distribution where both P and Q have very high
levels of advantage cannot obtain).
Now, these listed events do not, by themselves, determine the ultimate distribution; rather,
it is a function of every event that transpires. However, because the concern here is the relationship
between ultimate distributions and those events that have occurred up through an agent’s choice,
a formal way of representing this relation is needed. Fortunately, this can be done by dividing the
set of distributions into subsets defined by the set of contributing events that all members of each
subset share. For example, in the above case, all of the possible distributions of advantage between
P and Q can be divided up into the subsets of (1) those distributions that arise when P contracts
the disease and Q throws her a surprise party; (2) those distributions that arise when P contracts
the disease but receives no party; (3) those distributions that arise when P does not contract the
disease and Q throws her a surprise party; and (4) those distributions that arise when P does not
contract the disease and Q does not throw her a party. These subsets could then be further
subdivided for every possible event that might occur, with subsets 1 through 4 each dividing into
the subset all those distributions that result when the event occurs (in addition to the alreadyspecified events that defined the original subset) and the subset of all those distributions that result
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when the event does not occur. One can then continue this process iteratively until one is left with
subsets defined in terms of every possible combination of events that could occur in tandem with
already-elapsed events, where each of these subsets will have only a single member, namely the
distribution that would result if all the events that define the subset were to occur.
This description allows for an explication of the relation between distributions and the
events that actually occur. Specifically, when some event occurs, it renders impossible all those
distributions that are both (i) members of subsets defined by possible events that are incompatible
with the actually-occurring event and (ii) not members of any subset defined, in part, by all past
events and the actually-occurring event. Thus, when Q throws P a surprise party, all distributions
in subsets defined (in part) by the absence of such a party that also do not appear in some subset
defined (in part) by the occurrence of such a party are rendered impossible, thereby reducing the
size of the set of possible distributions. Further, each additional event that transpires similarly
reduces the size of this set until, eventually, all the events leading up to the actual distribution have
occurred and the sole remaining distribution finally obtains.
Given that (a) events will generally narrow the set of possible distributions that might
obtain and (b) actions are events, it follows that many actions will have the effect of narrowing
this set. Further, note that each possible distribution has a particular aggregated quantity of
advantage that can be associated with it, e.g., the total advantage possessed by individuals under
that distribution. For any given action, then, one can (assuming, for the moment, knowledge of all
relevant facts) determine how much advantage is available across the remaining members of the
distribution set—and, more importantly, can compare this value to how much advantage would
have been left available had the agent acted differently.79 This comparison of opportunity for
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The reason for stipulating full knowledge is as follows. As noted in the next paragraph, the goal of this section is to
provide an account of the expected value of an action, where that value is a function of how advantage is distributed
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advantage can then serve as the basis for an account of cost grounded in the internalization
criterion: to not leave others with less (as the criterion demands) can be understood in terms of not
making choices that reduce others’ opportunity for advantage.
This very rough statement is in need of significant refinement. First, there is the question
of how to actually compare the opportunity for advantage associated with different rival choices.
As noted just above, one can calculate the total advantage associated with any single distribution
by summing up everyone’s level of advantage. But, given that the distribution set associated with
any particular choice can contain many distributions, one needs a way of identifying a single value
for the entire set. The natural way to do this is to calculate the expected advantage of the set—and,
thus, the action—by multiplying the probability of each distribution conditional on the action by
the total advantage of that distribution. Thus, one is able to compare choices based on how much
advantage they can be expected to bring about and calculate the difference in expected advantage
between various choices—with a preliminary statement of cost being that the cost of a choice is
the difference between its associated expected advantage and the greatest expected advantage
value of a rival choice.80
This statement of cost is merely preliminary because a significant revision must now be
made to the internalization criterion from which it is derived. This criterion has so far been
characterized as demanding that others not be left with less advantage than they would otherwise

across persons. To do this, it is helpful to, first, talk about how an ideal epistemic agent would calculate this expected
value. By positing such an agent, one is able to avoid having to think about how people might come to have knowledge
of the facts relevant to the calculation and focus, instead, on what those relevant facts are. Thus, when it is claimed
that a person must “determine how much advantage is available across the remaining members of the distribution set,”
the idea is not that an actual person will ever make this assessment; rather, the idea is that these are the relevant
considerations that an ideal person would take into account when calculating the expected value of her actions. Once
one has determined how an ideally epistemically situated person would calculate the relevant value, one can then ask
the important question of how people who lack all of the relevant knowledge (but have at least some relevant evidence)
are to go about making such calculations. This secondary question is answered at length at the end of section V, below.
80
This use of expected value has been embraced by a number of luck egalitarians including Richard Arneson (1989),
Carl Knight (2013), and Peter Vallentyne (2002; 2008).
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have had. However, upon reflection, it is clear that the luck egalitarian cannot affirm the criterion
as so stated. To see this, consider the case where P acts in such a way as to render it certain that
an egalitarian distribution would arise; however, there is a counterfactual action she could have
taken that would have generated greater total advantage, but where that advantage was very
unevenly distributed (perhaps entirely captured by a single person). Should P have to internalize
the cost of the foregone (expected) advantage resulting from her choice?
Given the initial statement of the internalization criterion, the answer to this question would
have to be “yes,” as P has left others (the wealthy) with less via her choice to redistribute. Indeed,
the expected advantage of her action is less than that of the rival action; thus, the preliminary
account of cost would hold that P has imposed a cost that she must internalize. However, given
that the distribution P brings about is superior to the counterfactual distribution from a luck
egalitarian perspective, there is no luck egalitarian basis for declaring the lost advantage a cost that
P must internalize. After all, internalization seems only appropriate insofar as P has acted wrongly
on luck egalitarian grounds, which, in this case, she has not.
This observation allows for a refinement of the internalization criterion. What the luck
egalitarian objects to is not an agent choosing to leave others with less, but rather, her leaving them
with less than they could have had under an appropriately equalized distribution of resources.
Specifically, the luck egalitarian gives lexical priority to establishing a distribution where the only
existing inequalities reflect the internalization of previously-imposed costs in accordance with the
relevant theory of penalty (discussed below). Secondarily, she demands that no one be left with
less than they might have had given such an appropriate distribution of advantage. This refined
statement of the internalization criterion is that which the luck egalitarian endorses and from which
the theory of cost must be derived.
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Given this revised internalization criterion, there are two ways in which an agent might
leave others with less in a way condemned by the criterion. First, she might act in a way that brings
about an appropriately equalized distribution, but where a rival action would have brought about
an appropriately equalized distribution with greater total advantage. In such a case, the cost
imposed by the agent is the difference between (a) the total advantage that would have obtained in
the optimal distribution she could have brought about and (b) the total advantage in the distribution
that she did bring about. Second, an agent might leave others with less by bringing about a
distribution where advantage is inappropriately distributed such that some persons end up with
less than they would have had were advantage distributed appropriately.
Given these two ways of leaving others with less, an account of cost can be formalized as
follows. Each possible distribution in the distribution set receives an advantage value. Those where
advantage is appropriately distributed receive an advantage value equal to the total advantage
present in the distribution (i.e., the sum of each person’s level of advantage). By contrast, to
calculate the advantage value of those distributions where advantage is inappropriately distributed,
one would first identify the distribution with the least total appropriately distributed advantage that
has a non-zero probability conditional on all past events obtaining. Second, one would identify all
those persons in the inappropriate distribution who have less advantage than they would have had
in this comparison distribution. Next, one would sum the differences between how much advantage
each such person has in the comparison distribution and in the distribution in question. Finally, the
advantage value of the distribution is calculated by subtracting this sum from the total value of the
comparison distribution.81
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One practical consequence of this procedure is that the advantage value of distributions where advantage is
inappropriately distributed will be equal to the total advantage present in that distribution just in case all persons have
less advantage than they would have in the lowest-value distribution where advantage is appropriately distributed.

101

The motivation for employing the lowest-value baseline is to ensure that no distribution
where advantage is inappropriately distributed is assigned a greater advantage value than a
realizable distribution where advantage is appropriately distributed. For, absent this restriction,
responsibility-sensitive equality would lose its lexical priority over advantage maximization,
abandoning the signature commitment of luck egalitarianism.82 However, beyond this constraint,
there is no apparent reason for additionally discounting the advantage values of those distributions
where advantage is inappropriately distributed but all parties are better-off than in the lowest-value
comparison distribution. Thus, additional discounting is done only to capture the advantage
foregone by individuals who end up with less advantage than they would have had in that
comparison distribution.
Once all distributions have been assigned an advantage value, one can then calculate the
expected distributed advantage value of each action by taking the set of distributions associated
with that action and multiplying the advantage value of each member by the probability that it
obtains conditional on the choice being made. The cost of an action, then, is the difference between
its expected distributed advantage value and that of its optimal alternative. This figure formally
quantifies the extent to which an action leaves others with less.
One final bit of elaboration is needed to complete the formal account of cost. So far, cost
has been defined in terms of expected distributed advantage, where this value is a function of
distribution’s advantage values and the probabilities of those distributions obtaining. However, the
inclusion of this latter input raises two questions about the adequacy of the account. First, one

82

Not everyone agrees that this is a necessary condition of a theory of justice being an example of luck egalitarianism.
Richard Arneson, for example, suggests at one point that luck egalitarianism can include a variety of “maximizing
functions” where these functions do not always privilege equality over increasing total advantage; indeed, he seems
to take both sufficientarianism and prioritarianism to be varieties of luck egalitarianism rather than rivals (2011b, 3638). However, this seemingly runs contrary to most statements of luck egalitarianism such as those listed in footnote
70.
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might ask whether the probabilities in question are supposed to be objective probabilities—i.e.,
values representing how likely it is in some metaphysical sense that any particular distribution will
arise—or subjective probabilities representing the agent’s beliefs about how probable it is that a
distribution will arise given her evidence. Second, one might ask why the costs of an action are
defined in terms of expected foregone advantage rather than how much advantage is actually
foregone as a result of the agent’s choice. After all, the internalization criterion demands that
agents not leave others with less; however, using expected value entails that there could be cases
where agents will do just that without it counting as a cost (e.g., if a very low-probability, lowadvantage value distribution ends up resulting from the action that had the greatest expected
distributed advantage value). Thus, one might worry that the reliance on expected value makes the
theory both ambiguous and inconsistent with its motivating principle.
Fortunately, these worries can be resolved simultaneously. First, regarding whether
probability should be understood in objective or subjective terms, the suggestion here is to adopt
Carl Knight’s suggestion that the proper account of probability to incorporate into luck egalitarian
calculations of expected value is warranted subjective probability adjusted for non-culpable
incapacity (2013, 1067). Briefly, Knight’s suggestion is that the relevant probability is that which
the agent should have assigned given the evidence available to her—at least, in those cases where
an agent is capable of assessing this evidence (2013, 1067). The reason for favoring this
evidentialist view, according to Knight, is that it prevents people from being differentially
penalized for unchosen epistemic states in the way that they would be if one calculated expected
value using either subjective or objective probability. With respect to the latter, he argues that
people might be unaware of the relevant objective probabilities “through no fault or choice of their
own” making it unfair that to penalize them for not acting in the optimal way (2013, 1066).
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Similarly, using subjective probabilities would be unfair because those who are overconfident will
have to incur less penalty than those who are underconfident despite these epistemic shortcomings
being unchosen (2013, 1066).
For these purposes, it is perhaps more helpful to frame things in terms of responsibility.
An agent cannot seemingly be responsible for what she could not know given the evidence
available to her. Further, even if she could know certain things, she may not be responsible for
failing to form the proper beliefs given certain extenuating circumstances. Thus, warranted
subjective probability adjusted for non-culpable incapacity seems to best capture intuitions about
responsibility.83 Given that cost has to track responsibility—i.e., an agent imposes a cost iff she is
responsible for that outcome—it, thus, follows that an account of cost resting on calculations of
expected value should adopt Knight’s notion of probability.84 Further, this discussion of
responsibility clarifies why agents can leave others with less without this qualifying as a cost,
namely, because their lack of evidence and/or non-culpable failure to assess that evidence makes
them not responsible for leaving others with less (even if there remains something unfortunate
about their choice vis-à-vis the internalization criterion). Thus, the imposition of cost should be
understood as a failure to maximize warranted expected distributed advantage (adjusted for nonculpable incapacity).
This qualification should help to ameliorate the potential worry that the theory of costs is
excessively epistemically demanding. Specifically, some might be tempted to reject the theory on
the grounds that it requires agents to assign conditional probabilities to outcomes despite the fact
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For more on this point, see Vallentyne (2002, 536).
One might slightly amend Knight’s account in the following way. Knight suggests that, in cases where an agent in
not culpable for her failure to assess the evidence, she should be treated as having not made a choice at all, and, thus,
imposed no cost (2013, 1068). However, one might alternatively think that, in cases where an agent is not responsible
for her incorrect beliefs about how likely various distributions are to obtain, she might still be responsible for making
a sub-optimal choice given those beliefs. Thus, one might calculate expected distributed value using subjective
probabilities in such cases.
84
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that no person could reasonably determine those probabilities. However, because the theory rests
on the notion of warranted expected advantage (as opposed to mere expected advantage), it only
insists that each agent retain her capacity to assess the evidence she possesses and then use that
capacity to assign each distribution the conditional probabilities suggested by that evidence. In
other words, she would only need to consider the evidence that she has already encountered; thus,
no super-human knowledge of future consequences is required, as the agent is only held
responsible for acting contrary to how her possessed evidence suggests she should act—with
further exceptions made if she is incapable of assessing the evidence through no fault of her own.85
What about the evidence that is not immediately possessed by agents in the sense described
just above, but is available in the sense that it could be uncovered through some choice on the part
of the agent? As noted just above, one advantage to defining “warranted” in terms of possessed
evidence is that it reduces both the demandingness and punitiveness of the theory of cost. Suppose
that a person’s possessed evidence suggests that -ing maximizes expected distributed advantage,
but doing more research would lead her to possess additional evidence that suggests that -ing
actually maximizes expected distributed advantage. Given that the theory of cost defines
“warranted” in terms of possessed evidence, it would maintain that she does not impose any cost
by -ing, as this is the action her possessed evidence recommends—even though additional
research would have uncovered evidence recommending that she  instead. Thus, this formulation
of what assignments of expected distributed advantage count as warranted prevents the theory
from holding people responsible for making decisions that run contrary to evidence that they do
not have on hand.
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This stipulation about what counts as “available” evidence will be discussed a few paragraphs below.
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However, some might worry that this makes the theory too permissive. After all, shouldn’t
people be held responsible for failing to do their research? On the one hand, one does not want a
theory that holds people responsible when they act in ways not recommended by all of the available
evidence, as that would seem to demand that they devote their lives to researching economic theory
if they are to avoid accidentally imposing costs (and being held responsible for those costs). But,
on the other hand, if a person need only read a few pages to discover that -ing maximizes
expected distributed advantage, it seems like a theory of cost should hold her responsible for -ing
on the basis of her possessed evidence.
In response to this worry, note that the person who -s rather than -ing actually makes
two choices: first she fails to do her research and then second she -s. The claim above is merely
that, when she -s, she does not impose costs on others because -ing maximizes expected
distributed advantage as warranted by her possessed evidence. However, her decision not to do
her research may well impose a cost because that decision makes it more likely that she makes
future choices that fail to maximize WEDA (e.g., her choice to ). For example, suppose a person
does not bother to read safety directions about how to use a climbing harness and breaks her leg
as a result due to not using it properly. On the present account, her decision to climb using the
harness would not impose a cost because her possessed evidence suggested it would be fun and
safe and, thus, would boost her level of advantage up to the appropriate level. However, her
possessed evidence also presumably suggests that not reading directions about how to use safety
gear often leads to dangerous decisions that result in accidents and, thus, fail to maximize WEDA.
Given this evidence, the climber’s choice not to read the safety directions did impose a cost for
which she would be held responsible under the theory, even though her subsequent choice to climb
did not impose such a cost.
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However, one might now worry that the theory is still overly demanding. For, while agents
aren’t held responsible for choices recommended by their possessed evidence but not the available
evidence, they can be held responsible for the choice not to seek out that available evidence. Thus,
one might think that the theory still demands that each person devote their life to researching how
to maximize WEDA—an absurd result that would count heavily against the theory. However, the
conclusion that each person must devote her life to research does not follow from the claim that
persons can impose costs by not seeking out available evidence and bringing it into their
possession. Note that any effort to gather evidence will also have opportunity costs, as time spent
researching trades off with time spent on other activities (e.g., producing goods or services for
oneself or others). In other words, each act of evidence gathering will have its own WEDA value
that can be compared to the WEDA values of alternative actions that will result in the agent
possessing less evidence that might inform her future WEDA calculations.
For example, one might note that reading a short safety guide has minimal opportunity cost
and could do much to prevent future choices that fail to maximize expected distributed advantage.
Thus the WEDA value of reading the guide would be higher than that of not reading it, meaning
that the choice to not read it imposes a cost for which the climber is held responsible. By contrast,
giving up productive activities and leisure to study welfare economics when one has no aptitude
for the subject would seem to fail to maximize WEDA, as there is no evidence suggesting that this
course of action would improve decision making enough to offset the foregone advantage
production and distribution that it precludes. Thus, the account seems to deliver the correct
intuitive results about evidence gathering, helping to draw a principled line between failures to
gather evidence that are negligent in the sense that they impose costs and ones that are appropriate
such that the contrary decision to gather evidence would, itself, impose costs. Additionally,
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because a choice to not acquire evidence is negligent only if the agent’s possessed evidence
suggests this choice fails to maximize expected distributed advantage, there need be no worry
about how everyday people are able to make such comparisons. Indeed, they need only consider
what the evidence on hand tells them to do and act accordingly if they want to avoid being held
responsible by the theory of cost. Thus, the theory seemingly avoids the worry that it is excessively
demanding or inapplicable by actually-existing (i.e., non-ideally epistemically-situated) agents.
Similar remarks apply to the suggestion above that the WEDA value should also be
adjusted for non-culpable incapacity, but not incapacity for which a person is relevantly
responsible. Specifically, just as a person might allocate more or less effort to gathering
information, she might also allocate more or less effort to refining her ability to assess the evidence
she possesses and draw the correct conclusions from it. Thus, one might worry that the theory
would incorrectly judge her to impose costs because she failed to spend all of her time developing
her evidential assessment capacities. After all, just as the choice to drink heavily might result in
an agent failing to adequately assess her available evidence when making a subsequent choice, so
too might the choice to become an artist rather than get a PhD in welfare economics lead an agent
to misinterpret the evidence available to her.
However, as was true of choices to gather evidence, any effort to develop and sustain one’s
capacities for evaluating evidence will also have opportunity costs, as time spent cultivating and
maintaining capacities trades off with time spent on other advantage-generating activities. In other
words, each act of capacity development will have its own WEDA value that can be estimated by
using one’s possessed evidence and then compared to the WEDA values of alternative actions that
will result in the agent having a comparatively diminished capacity to evaluate evidence. Given
the theory of cost’s insistence that agents select whatever action has the greatest WEDA value, it
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would then follow that an agent is culpable for some lack of capacity just in case that lack of
capacity resulted from an action that had a lower WEDA value than some rival action that could
have been taken in its stead. It is, thus, not the case that a person imposes costs because she does
not spend all of her time studying economics or logic, as there are many more productive ways
that she could spend her time from the perspective of maximizing distributed advantage. Of course,
she might misinterpret evidence as a result and fail to act in the way her possessed evidence
suggests she should; however, because this incapacity resulted from WEDA-maximizing choices,
she is not held responsible for imposing a cost by acting on her mistaken beliefs about the expected
distributed advantage values of her available options. Thus, the theory of cost neither assumes that
people have unrealistic knowledge about the consequences of their actions nor expects them to
devote their entire lives to epistemic capacity building. Rather, they are merely expected to
maximize distributed advantage as best they can given the evidence they possess, with culpable
incapacities only arising only when they fail in that task.
Finally, as noted above, this account of cost naturally leads to a theory of penalty by way
of the internalization criterion. Specifically, if the cost of a choice is the quantity of WEDA
foregone by that choice—and others should not have to forego advantage due to the choices of
others (the criterion)—then it follows that the penalty for imposing a cost should be the
internalization of that cost. Thus, whatever the appropriate distributive pattern was prior to the
agent’s choice, her position relative to others should now be worsened by a quantity equal to the
cost she has imposed.

VI. Applying the Theory
This fairly abstract description of the theory can be helpfully illustrated by applying it to the case
of the reckless motorcyclist. In this case, the motorcyclist has two choices: ride with a helmet or
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without one. Riding without a helmet is more fun and yields greater advantage than riding with a
helmet, absent a crash. Further, for simplicity, assume that the motorcyclist, in addition to being
reckless, is an egalitarian, and will, thus, redistribute half the added advantage she gets from riding
without a helmet to a passerby (the only other person in this scenario). However, there is a 30%
chance that she will crash and, if she does, the injury she suffers will be more severe—with her
ultimate advantage level being a function of the magnitude of this injury and whether she gets help
from the passerby. Specifically, in the event of a crash, there is an equal chance that the passerby
will (a) provide aid to the motorcyclist, thereby preventing her from ending up with very little
advantage (though the effort required will leave the passerby with less advantage than if she did
not help); (b) leave the motorcyclist to deal with her injuries unaided; or (c) both refuse aid and
confiscate the motorcycle, thereby leaving the motorcyclist even worse off but benefitting the
passerby (who now has a new motorcycle!).
Assuming these are all the possible actions that either person can take, there are a total of
eight distributions that might result from the motorcyclist’s choice, each corresponding to a unique
combination of all possible events. Beginning with stipulations about how much advantage the
motorcyclist and passerby end up with, one can then calculate the advantage value of each
distribution in the way described in the previous section. Specifically, for each distribution where
advantage is appropriately distributed—which, in this case, means that it is distributed equally (as
there are no outstanding penalties to be incurred)—one simply adds up the advantage possessed
by both the motorcyclist and the passerby. By contrast, for those distributions where advantage is
not equally distributed, one takes the lowest advantage value associated with an equal distribution
and subtracts from it however much less advantage each person has in the unequal distribution in
question.
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Finally, having determined the advantage value of each distribution, one can then calculate
the WEDA value of each choice (wearing a helmet vs. not wearing one) by, first, multiplying each
distribution’s advantage value by the probability that the distribution will obtain conditional on
the respective choice being made and, second, calculating the sum of those probability-adjusted
values. These calculations can be most clearly represented via the following two tables:

Table 4.1:
Event 1

Wears a Helmet

Event 2

Doesn't Crash

Crashes

Event 3

N/A

Assisted

Unassisted

Confiscation

Distributed Advantage

M = 500, P = 500

M = 485, P = 495

M = 360, P = 500

M = 350, P = 510

Advantage Value

1000

980

860

850

P(Distribution | Helmet)

0.7

0.1

0.1

0.1

P(Distribution | No Helmet)

0

0

0

0

Probability-Adjusted Advantage

700

98

86

85

969

WEDA

Table 4.2:
Event 1

Doesn't Wear a Helmet

Event 2

Doesn't Crash

Event 3

N/A

Assisted

Unassisted

Confiscation

Distributed Advantage

M = 510, P = 510

M = 100, P = 510

M = 90, P = 520

Advantage Value

1020

M = 460, P = 500
960

600

590

P(Distribution | Helmet)

0

0

0

0

P(Distribution | No Helmet)

0.7

0.1

0.1

0.1

Probability-Adjusted Advantage

714

96

60

59

WEDA

Crashes

929

Given these stipulated input values, it is now possible to see what the posited theory of cost
has to say about the choice to not wear a helmet. Specifically, the WEDA of not wearing a helmet
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is 929 as compared to 969 for wearing a helmet. Thus, the motorcyclist imposes a cost of 40 units
of advantage that she must internalize—which is to say that advantage is now appropriately
distributed iff the motorcyclist ends up 40 units of advantage worse off than the passerby.
For those who find the above tables a bit opaque, the mechanics can be further illustrated
by an explication of how the theory of cost is applied to the subsequent choice faced by the
passerby when she sees the reckless motorcyclist lying injured on the side of the road. As stipulated
above, she has three options available to her: aid the motorcyclist, leave her unaided, or confiscate
her motorcycle. Suppose that she opts for the last-mentioned choice. Just as the theory of cost was
applied to the motorcyclist’s choice not to wear a helmet, it can also be applied to the passerby’s
choice. Thus, one recalculates the advantage value of the three distributions via the procedure
discussed above, with the key step being re-identifying which lowest-value appropriatelyequalized distribution is to serve as the comparison distribution for assessing the advantage value
of distributions where advantage is not appropriately distributed. Prior to the motorcyclist’s choice
to not wear a helmet, the comparison distribution was the strictly equal distribution where both the
motorcyclist and the passerby end up with 500 units of advantage. However, given the penalty
assigned to the motorcyclist for her recklessness, the relevant distribution will now be the lowestvalue distribution where the passerby has 40 more units of advantage than the motorcyclist—
which, as it turns out, is the distribution the passerby would bring about if she provided aid to the
injured motorcyclist. Thus, the advantage value of each distribution where advantage is
inappropriately distributed is the total value of this baseline distribution (960) minus the amount
of advantage foregone by everyone who is worse off in the distribution under consideration relative
to the baseline.
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Beginning with the distribution resulting from the passerby’s choice not to aid the
motorcyclist, note that the passerby is actually better-off in this distribution than she would be
were advantage appropriately distributed. Thus, the only relevant advantage difference is that
between the advantage of the motorcyclist in the distribution under consideration (100 units) and
the advantage she has in the baseline (460 units). Subtracting this difference (360 units) from the
baseline total then yields an advantage value of 600 . One can likewise apply this procedure to the
distribution resulting from motorcycle confiscation, where the motorcyclist ends up with 370 fewer
units of advantage than in the baseline, with the resulting advantage value being 590.
The only other input that must be updated in order to calculate the WEDA of the different
choices open to the passerby are the probabilities of the various distributions arising. Specifically,
in this simple case, it is assumed that the evidence makes it clear that there is only one possible
distribution that can arise from each choice (those values listed in Table 2). Thus, the warranted
expected distributed value of each choice ends up just being its advantage value.
Suppose, then, that the passerby decides not to aid the motorcyclist. Given that the WEDA
of not providing assistance is 600—while that of providing assistance is 960 units of advantage—
it follows that the cost of that choice is 360 units of advantage which the passerby must internalize.
Thus, following her choice, a just distribution will be one where the motorcyclist has 320 more
units of advantage than the passerby (the value of the penalty incurred by the passerby minus that
incurred by the motorcyclist). Alternatively, if the passerby decides to confiscate the motorcycle,
she will impose an even greater cost of 370 units, with justice demanding she be left 330 units
worse off than the motorcyclist.
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VII. Critical Evaluation
There are a few things to note about this result. First, given the stipulations of the case, the
prescribed costs and penalties seem to largely capture pre-theoretic intuitions about responsibility
in this case. Given the stipulated values—and most reasonable substitutes for those values—the
motorcyclist imposes only a minor cost via her recklessness, as not wearing a helmet does yield
advantage gains and the probability of catastrophe striking is reasonably low given this single
choice. Further, to the extent that this result generalizes to other recreational activities that generate
advantage but have some risks, this cost assessment is a favorable result for the theory, as one
might hope that luck egalitarianism would not excessively penalize hobbies with a similar risk
profile (e.g., skiing, rock climbing, swimming in the ocean, taking road trips, etc.). Granted, such
hobbies do risk destroying significant advantage if something goes wrong, both due to the harm
suffered by the agent as well as all of those who care about and/or derive benefits from the agent.
However, the risk is small with high odds of the agent deriving moderate benefits from these
activities.86 Indeed, a theory that declared these activities to impose high costs and, thus, warrant
heavy penalties would be unduly punitive and fail to recognize the intuitive reasonableness of
participating in such activities as those listed in the previous parentheses. Should a person be taxed
each time she swims in the ocean due to the risk of drowning? Seemingly not. By contrast a small
tax on riding without a helmet might be warranted, as one might think there is a high chance of a
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For example, a study of skiers/snowboarders in Norway from 1996 to 2012 found that their injury rate declined
from 1.47 to 1.27 injuries per 1000 days on the slopes, with an increasing share of those injuries occurring form more
risky activities like skiing/boarding in terrain parks (Ekeland, Rødven, and Heir 2017). An older study of rock climbing
in Grand Teton National Park found the accident rate for rock climbing was 5.6 per 10,000 climbing hours, though
roughly one in five of those accidents was fatal (Schussman et al. 1990). While it is harder to find evidence about
swimming at the beach, data recorded on beaches with lifeguards found that the odds drowning in 2019 were 1 in 18
million (United States Lifesaving Association 2019). And, in the United States in 2018, there were 1.13 deaths per
100 million vehicle miles traveled (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2019). Additionally, the skiing
statistic is suggestive in that these activities are not homogenous and there are more and less risky ways to participate
in each, with the risk potentially being much lower if one takes adequate precautions.
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small advantage gain from riding without a helmet, but a very small risk of this choice destroying
a significant amount of advantage for the rider and those who go to help her—an evaluative
approach that aligns with the theory of cost proposed above.87
Additionally, the theory delivers appropriately punitive results when it comes to negligence
on the part of the passerby. Her choice not to aid is certain to leave much less advantage available
for responsibility-sensitive distribution. Given this negligence, it seems that a luck egalitarian
theory should maintain that the motorcyclist does not have to make do with less than if the passerby
had acted non-negligently—with such an outcome achieved by giving a smaller share of the
remaining available advantage to the passerby (i.e., prescribing that she incur a penalty). Even
though the motorcyclist declined to wear a helmet, it does not seem that her being left to suffer is
the just outcome; thus, it seems appropriate for the theory to penalize the passerby who simply
ignores the injured motorcyclist with that penalty being used to shore up the motorcyclist’s share
of advantage such that she only incurs the penalty proportionate to the cost imposed by her choice
to not wear the helmet (which, as suggested above, is equal to a much smaller loss of advantage
than the motorcyclist would incur if left to tend to her own injuries on the side of the road).
Most importantly, this result helps to clarify how the posited theory of cost resolves
Olsaretti’s worry as discussed in sections II and IV. For, what is now clear is that the luck
egalitarian does not have to say that the motorcyclist is on the hook for however much advantage
she loses due to the capricious choices of the passerby. Rather, both parties are recognized as being
responsible for a share of the foregone advantage with each having to incur an associated penalty.
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One need not agree with the specific prescriptions provided here. Indeed, one might think that a large tax on riding
without a helmet is appropriate, or perhaps a similarly large tax should be placed on swimming in the ocean. However,
all that this chapter must maintain is that the taxes that seem intuitively appropriate will correspond with tacit estimates
of the expected value of the taxed action and the difference between that value and the expected value of not taking
that action.
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It is, thus, not the case that the motorcyclist must simply bear whatever hardship is arbitrarily
imposed on her.
Granted, there is still a sense in which costs of the motorcyclist’s actions depend upon the
choices of the passerby, as the warranted expected advantage value of motorcycling without a
helmet will vary in accordance with how likely the passerby is to rescue her. However, the fact
that the costs of her action still depend upon the choices of others in this way is unobjectionable
for a few reasons. First, the passerby’s effect on the cost is now settled ex ante rather than ex post
and, thus, she cannot retroactively alter the cost (and associated penalty) of the motorcyclist’s
action. The suggestion here is that it is the ex post arbitrariness of imposed costs that Olsaretti finds
objectionable, with the associated power it gives others to surprise the agent with a variable cost.
Or, to put the point slightly differently, what is truly objectionable is the passerby being able to
choose in such a way as to determine the cost of the motorcyclist’s already-made choice. However,
the theory presented here strips this power from the passerby, as the cost of the motorcyclist’s
choice is now settled prior to the passerby’s decision to help the motorcyclist/leave her
unaided/confiscate her motorcycle. Indeed, according to the theory, it is not the choice of the
passerby that determines the cost of motorcyclist’s action, but, rather, the passerby’s disposition
to act in certain ways.
Second, if the passerby does end up acting in the ways that lower the warranted expected
value of the motorcyclist’s choice, she will, herself, impose a cost for which she must incur a
penalty. Thus, while the passerby’s dispositions may place moral constraints on the motorcyclist,
they will similarly constrain the passerby insofar as they manifest themselves in advantagereducing action. Thus, while the motorcyclist may impose a greater cost (on herself) due to the
passerby’s disposition to not help those in need, the realization of latter’s disposition will also
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entail that the passerby should incur some penalty. This feature of the theory might help to further
alleviate Olsaretti’s worry, as others face moral consequences for shaping the costs of an agent’s
actions—thereby further reducing the extent to which others exert a form of moral tyranny over
the agent.
Finally, the fact that this theory of cost holds agents responsible for acting in ways likely
to result in others acting sub-optimally from the point of view of maximizing distributive
advantage is, in fact, a strength of the theory rather than a weakness. Consider, for example, an
agent who provides a weapon to a violent person knowing that there is a good chance the latter
will use it to harm others. An adequate theory of cost should count this choice as imposing a cost,
even though the agent’s decision imposes such a cost only in virtue of the disposition of another
to destroy advantage. Thus, one does not want a theory of cost that is entirely insensitive to the
dispositions of others to act in advantage-destroying ways. Rather, an acceptable theory will count
actions that destructively interact with malignant dispositions as imposing costs while also
counting the choices emerging from those dispositions as imposing such costs. Given that the
posited theory makes just such a judgment, it appears to adequately resolve Olsaretti’s worry.

VIII. Additional Advantages
In addition to resolving Olsaretti’s worry, the proposed theory of cost also solves a number of other
problems that have historically plagued luck egalitarianism, two of which will be discussed here.
First, consider Richard Arneson’s objection that luck egalitarianism delivers incorrect results in
cases of charitable action. For, example, in the case of a Mother Teresa figure who impoverishes
herself assisting the poor, he contends that, given (certain versions of) luck egalitarianism, it
follows that she is responsible for her worsened predicament due to her acting imprudently, and,
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thus, is to be denied any sort of compensatory redistribution as a penalty for her actions; however,
this is the wrong result with luck egalitarianism then being rejected as part of a modus tollens
argument (See, Arneson 2011a, 244; 2011b, 33-34).88
However, assuming that the poor are in their position due to bad luck rather than incurred
penalty, the posited theory would deny that Mother Teresa imposes any cost via her actions. For,
presuming a minimal degree of charitable competence on her part, Mother Teresa is acting in ways
that make it more likely that advantage will be appropriately distributed—while the alternative
choice of not helping the poor makes it more likely that advantage will be inappropriately
distributed such that many people are much worse off than if advantage were appropriately
distributed. Given this, it follows that the WEDA value of Mother Teresa’s charitable actions will
almost certainly be higher than that of rival non-charitable actions. Thus, according to the theory
presented here, her charitable actions would not qualify as imposing a cost. While she would be
making herself worse-off in the absence of redistribution, this would not qualify as the sort of cost
for which she should be held responsible under a luck egalitarian theory of justice. Further, given
that she imposes no cost, she should incur no penalty, with a luck egalitarian principle of justice
thereby demanding that resources be redistributed to Mother Teresa such that she ends up with as
much advantage as all other persons who have not had to incur some penalty.89
Alternatively, suppose that the poor who are aided by Mother Teresa are poor in virtue of
the fact that they have been made to internalize the prior costs they have imposed. In that case, the
analysis immediately above would be reversed, with Mother Teresa making it more likely that a
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An alternative version of this argument is presented by Larry Temkin who presents the case of a good Samaritan
who rescues a drowning child from a pond but injures herself in the process (2011, 63). Here, again, it is maintained
that her failure to act prudently means she is responsible for this personal cost and is to be denied compensation as a
penalty.
89
One might further contend that not only does Mother Teresa not impose costs via her charitable activity, people
who fail to engage in charity in an unequal world impose costs for which they should incur penalties
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distribution arises where advantage is inappropriately distributed and some people have less than
they would were advantage appropriately distributed (namely, Mother Teresa ends up with less
than her appropriate share while the poor end up with more than their appropriate share). In such
a case, she would impose a cost and would have to incur a penalty. However, this result does not
seem objectionable given that, while Mother Teresa’s action may be beneficent, it runs contrary
to justice. Thus, insofar as she is committed to charitable activity, it seems only fair that she pay
for the transfers she makes out of pocket, without others having to make do with less as a result of
redistributive transfers that compensate her for her losses due to charitable giving. Indeed, such
transfers would seemingly run afoul of the internalization criterion, as discussed above.
Second, the theory solves what Susan Hurley has called luck egalitarianism’s “boring
problem.” Briefly, Hurley argues that, while people may be responsible for their particular levels
of advantage, they are not obviously responsible for the relation between their level of advantage
and that possessed by others, as the relation is partly a function of the advantage levels of others
for which those others are responsible (2003, 160-161).90 However, given that the relata of the
responsibility relation are persons and their holdings rather than persons and the comparative
relations between advantage levels, it is unclear how responsibility can justify inequality given
that inequality is a comparative relation (Hurley 2003, 160). Fortunately, the posited account
neatly solves this problem by declaring individuals to be responsible not for their individual level
of advantage (as these, too, are the function of the choices of numerous individuals), but, rather,
for bringing about—or, really, changing the likelihood of—various distributions. Thus, costs are
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There is some reason to doubt the premise that individuals are not responsible for the relations that obtain between
them. Very briefly, responsibility is often thought to track control, where one has control over an outcome just in case
she could have acted in a way that would have made that outcome not obtain. Thus, it seems a person is responsible
for a relation iff she could have acted in such a way that the relation would not have obtained.
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defined in terms of the distributional relations between people in just the way Hurley believes
would be necessary for responsibility to justify distributional penalties.

IX. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to present an original theory of cost and penalty grounded in the tacit
principles that motivate a luck egalitarian theory of justice. To this end it introduced the notion of
the internalization criterion, and attempted to use this criterion to build a theory of cost and penalty
built around the notion of warranted expected distributed value. It then argued that this theory
solves two problems that have caused significant trouble for luck egalitarianism.
It should be emphasized that there are many variants of this theory that might be posited,
with these variants modifying technical details of the theory to avoid certain problems/capture
certain advantages. For example, one might make the theory more egalitarian by further
discounting the advantage value of distributions where advantage is inappropriately distributed.
One might, for example, (a) identify the advantage value of the closest possible world where
distribution is appropriately distributed; (b) take the absolute value of difference between the
advantage each person has in that distribution and the distribution under consideration and sum
them; and (c) subtract this sum from the advantage value of the comparison distribution. This
procedure for calculating advantage values is similar to the one posited above, but will, in many
cases, yield lower values for unequal distributions relative to the procedure used by the proposed
theory. Alternatively, one could simply set the advantage value of all distributions where
advantage is inappropriately distributed equal to zero, thereby heavily penalizing choices that
make such distributions more likely relative to appropriately egalitarian ones.
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Alternatively, one could make the theory less egalitarian and more welfarist by making the
comparison baseline distribution used to value distributions where advantage is inappropriately
distributed the distribution that obtains in the closest possible world where advantage is
appropriately distributed (as opposed the lowest-value distribution where advantage is
appropriately distributed). Or, one could simply make the advantage value of all distributions equal
to their total value, thereby removing any discounting of such distributions.
Another potential locus that might be modified is the posited relation between cost and
penalty, with potential variants holding that the penalty to be incurred should not strictly equal the
imposed cost. Or, if one is unpersuaded by the arguments of section VII and, thus, is concerned
that the theory still leaves costs too dependent upon the choices and dispositions of others, it might
be adjusted to make costs entirely insensitive to such choices and dispositions (for example, by
having costs result from a failure to maximize warranted expected distributed value on the
assumption that the probability of all others acting to maximize warranted expected distributed
value is 1). And, the list goes on.
Each of these listed variants will have certain advantages that will recommend it, but also
serious drawbacks—with these drawbacks having been judged severe enough that the variants
have been discarded in favor of the theory actually endorsed above. 91 However, this need not be
the final word on the subject and a more thorough exploration of the advantages and disadvantages
of various alternative choices that could be made when constructing a theory of cost would be
welcomed. Indeed, the ultimate purpose of this chapter has not been to present a definitive account
of cost, but, rather, a theory that is detailed and plausible enough to serve as a proof of concept of
the possibility of constructing a theory that can solve both Olsaretti’s worry and some of the other
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For the sake of brevity, a thorough discussion of these drawbacks has not been attempted here.
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difficulties plaguing luck egalitarianism. Further, by attempting to actually work out the details of
such a theory, the chapter hopes to have brought additional clarity to the subject via the concepts
it has developed in the process of theory construction.
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Chapter Five
The previous chapters have attempted to introduce—and defend the plausibility of—some of the
core normative principles that compose the libertarian and socialist philosophical positions. The
next two chapters seek to show that a libertarian who is committed to both the thesis of selfownership and a consent theory of legitimacy must ultimately accept the socialist commitment to
luck egalitarianism. Specifically, this chapter will argue that those committed to a consent theory
of political obligation must abandon any entitlement theory of justice of the kind developed by
Robert Nozick (1974) and, instead, accept a non-entitlement theory of distributive justice. Chapter
6 will then argue that, of the various non-entitlement theories of justice, libertarians are committed
to some variety of luck egalitarianism such as the version defended in chapter four. In this way,
the dissertation will attempt to fully reconcile libertarianism and socialism, demonstrating that the
core commitments of the former entail those of the latter (where each of these commitments has
already been shown to be independently plausible).
Of course, natural rights libertarians uniformly reject any variety of egalitarianism because
they see it as conflicting with their endorsement of strong private property rights. Specifically,
among those libertarians who posit the existence of natural rights, almost all endorse an entitlement
theory of justice wherein the justice of some arrangement of holdings depends on what rights
people have vis-à-vis their respective holdings. Such a theory is then taken to be incompatible with
any non-entitlement principle of distributive justice, where “non-entitlement theories” is inclusive
of both what Robert Nozick calls “end-state” principles of justice (i.e., principles that make no
reference to historical events) and “patterned” principles of justice (i.e., principles that make
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justice a matter of how much people have relative to some relevant property they possess, such as
merit or their having contributed some quantity of labor in the generation of the social product)
(1974, 153-160). At the same time, many natural rights libertarians also embrace a consent theory
of legitimacy of the kind discussed in chapter three.92 However, this chapter will argue that such a
consent theory ultimately undermines the libertarian rejection of non-entitlement principles.
Further, the chapter will maintain that consent theory implies that holdings ought to be distributed
in accordance with the dictates of one’s preferred non-entitlement principle (where this principle
would otherwise have been rejected on entitlement grounds). The chapter, thus, argues for a form
of libertarian distributivism wherein the affirmation of libertarian premises regarding both justice
in holdings and state legitimacy is taken to entail a non-entitlement—and perhaps even
egalitarian—approach to distributive justice.
In defense of this conclusion, this chapter will argue that the embrace of an entitlement
theory need not imply the complete rejection of an otherwise-plausible non-entitlement theory.
Rather, the two sorts of theories can be reconciled via the adoption of either of two compatibilist
positions wherein entitlements “trump” the relevant non-entitlement principle in a way that leaves
entitlement theorists with no reason for rejecting the compatibilist positions in favor of a pure
entitlement theory (for example, it will be argued that the most prominent arguments against nonentitlement theories do not apply to either of the compatibilist positions). However, this concession
to the entitlement theorist proves short-lived, as the chapter then proceeds to argue that the

Indeed, as Bas van der Vossen notes, “libertarians are highly skeptical of political authority and state legitimacy.
Since people are, quite simply, independent and equal beings, with none naturally subordinated to any other, states
(like all other agents) ought to respect the moral rights of individuals, including their rights over their persons and
their legitimate possessions. For this reason, libertarians typically require something like voluntary consent or
acceptance for legitimate state authority” (2019). Additionally, chapter one argued that libertarians who believe that
there is something problematic about involuntary redistributive taxation have reason to accept a consent theory of
legitimacy, as other theories of legitimacy open the door to the state being able to impose upon its subjects special
obligations to redistribute their holdings.
92
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subordination of the non-entitlement theory to its entitlement counterpart is undercut by the
acceptance of a consent theory of legitimacy. Specifically, the chapter will argue that the
entitlements established via initial appropriation grant their possessor(s) a normative power that is
identical to the normative power possessed by legitimate states (a power that will be called
“territorial legitimacy” and described in detail in section V). Thus, if one accepts the consent theory
of legitimacy’s claim that the latter power has consent as its necessary condition, it follows that
initial appropriation has consent as its necessary condition as well. However, given that no one has
ever actually consented to others appropriating natural resources, it follows that there are no
existing entitlements—a fact, which, on either of the proposed compatibilist positions, entails that
the distribution of holdings ought to conform to the dictates of some otherwise-plausible nonentitlement principle of justice.

I. Entitlement Theories of Justice
To begin, it will be helpful to sketch out the kind of entitlement theory of justice that is generally
taken to imply the negation of non-entitlement principles of justice. While there are many ways of
formulating such an entitlement theory, most variants approximate Robert Nozick’s paradigm
account wherein the justice of some set of holdings is determined by whether people are entitled
to the holdings they possess (1974).93 Specifically, Nozick begins with an account of entitlement
whereby a person is entitled to some holding iff (a) it was unowned and she acquired it in
accordance with the relevant principle of justice in acquisition or (b) it was owned by some person
from whom she acquired it in accordance with the relevant principle of justice in transfer (1974,
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Some prominent proponents of entitlement theories of justice include Mack (1979), Rothbard (1978), Lomasky
(1987), Steiner (1994), Narveson (2001), Feser (2005), and van der Vossen (2009).
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151).94 Justice in holdings, then, obtains if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess (1974,
151).
Nozick, interestingly, makes people being entitled to their possessions only a sufficient
condition of justice as opposed to a necessary and sufficient one—with some commentators
suggesting that this may have been an oversight on his part (see, e.g., Vallentyne 2011, 151).
However, Nozick arguably had reason for opting for the mere sufficient condition, as it allows him
to sidestep some of the potential difficulties that would plague a more complete account where his
posited sufficient condition of justice was also a necessary one.
To see how Nozick’s account sidesteps one difficulty, begin by noting that his sufficient
condition can be translated as:
(1) xy(Pxy → Exy) → J

[Nozick’s account]

… where “Pxy” translates to “x possesses y”; “Exy” translates to “x is entitled to y”; and J translates
to “the distribution is just.” By contrast, if Nozick’s sufficient condition were also a necessary
condition of justice, his account would be translated as:
(2) xy(Pxy → Exy)  J [Vallentyne’s suggestion]

However, on this amended account, if someone possessed an unowned item, then the left side of
the biconditional would be false, as the possessor would not be entitled to the item. Given this, the
right side of the biconditional would also be false, meaning that the distribution would not be just.
For those who take justice and injustice to be exhaustive categories, this conclusion presents a
problem: if the possession of items is not just, then such possession is unjust, where injustice
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Nozick later revises this account to incorporate a principle pertaining to the rectification of injustice. This principle
holds that each person is entitled to the holdings they would have had absent all historical rights violations (Nozick
1974, 152-153). For a discussion of the shortcomings of both the original account and the revised version, see
Lawrence Davis (1976, 838-840).
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demands rectification. Most entitlement theorists, though, would reject the proposition that the
possession of unowned things demands rectification. Indeed, such theorists generally accept that,
prior to initial appropriation, people are free to use unowned natural resources without any
associated injustice requiring rectification.
Given this reductio, one can only accept the amended account represented by (2) by
maintaining that justice and injustice are not exhaustive categories such that there might be
distributions that are neither just nor unjust (e.g., those involving the possession of unowned
items). However, there are theoretical costs to such a move, as it multiplies normative categories
(which might be rejected on ontological parsimony grounds) and demands that one posit separate
accounts of justice and injustice—a demand that few existing theories of justice (including
Nozick’s) have met. Further, if other theories are going to be brought into conversation with an
entitlement theory that posits distinct accounts of justice and injustice, those theories may have to
be restated in similar terms such that they, too, are broken up into an account of the necessary and
sufficient conditions of justice and an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of
injustice.
Even if this does not seem like a serious hurdle, (2) faces apparent counterexamples that
(1) avoids. For example, (2) would declare the case where some person is borrowing some holding
from another with the latter’s permission to not be just, as it would not be the case that all persons
who possess some holding are entitled that holding. However, most entitlement theorists will
maintain that one justly possesses borrowed items, and that such holdings are therefore immune
from permissible redistribution. Thus, they would have to reject (2) to avoid this reductio
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argument. By contrast, adopting (1) would leave open the possibility that the borrowing case was
just, making it a more promising account of justice as entitlement.95
This problem for (2) is not necessarily insoluble, but it is suggestive of the further
difficulties that will confront an entitlement theory that posits both sufficient and necessary
conditions of justice. The suggestion here, then, is that such difficulties can be more easily
sidestepped by embracing Nozick’s original formulation of an entitlement theory of justice as
stated by (1). While this makes for a less complete account of justice, it is sufficient for achieving
Nozick’s primary purpose: showing that the rightful ownership of possessions precludes
redistribution. Indeed, this conclusion would follow from the fact that rightful ownership is
sufficient for rendering a distribution just because, if a distribution is just, then any egalitarian (or
other non-entitlement) claims that the distribution is unjust are false, and coercion may be
permissibly deployed to enforce the present distribution against attempts at redistribution.
Given that a mere sufficiency condition as stated by (1) allows Nozick to both avoid
significant problems and condemn egalitarian/patterned/etc. redistribution, one might reasonably
deny that his assertion of (1) rather than (2) was an oversight. More directly, for these purposes it
will be assumed that entitlement theories take the form of (1) and otherwise generally mimic the
structure of Nozick’s account. Of course, various theories will posit their own distinct principles
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Eric Mack suggests that this counterexample might be avoided by positing that a person with a borrowed holding is
entitled to said holding (2018, personal correspondence). However, such a posit will require making significant
modifications to other parts of a Nozick-inspired entitlement theory. For example, while Nozick says little about his
principle of justice in transfer, presumably it includes any transaction where a holding is voluntarily given and
received. Thus, if a borrower is, in fact, entitled to the borrowed item—and, she then gives that item to a third party—
it would follow that the third party is now entitled to the item on Nozick’s account. However, this seems like a
conclusion most entitlement theorists would reject.
More generally, it seems that Nozick takes entitlement to amount to something very close to full ownership of the
holdings (with the caveat that certain exclusion and transfer rights are limited by his posited version of the Lockean
proviso according to which one person cannot acquire holdings or exclude others from holdings if doing so would
leave them worse off than the baseline where no appropriation occurred). However, as the above case suggests,
borrowers have fairly limited rights over borrowed items, as they lack rights to destroy, transfer, or exclude others
from said items. Thus, borrowers cannot be said to be entitled to borrowed items, at least as Nozick uses the term.
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of justice in acquisition, transfer, and rectification (and it is on this basis that they are individuated).
However, the argument that follows will be sufficiently general to pertain to any such entitlement
theory, so long as it follows (1) in maintaining that people’s entitlement to their holdings is a
sufficient condition of justice.96

II. The Incompatibilist Argument
Having introduced the notion of an entitlement theory of justice, it is now possible to consider the
entitlement theorist’s incompatibilist argument against non-entitlement principles of justice. This
argument begins by identifying a case where holdings are distributed contrary to the prescriptions
of the non-entitlement principle but, by hypothesis, all such holdings had been obtained via just
appropriation and transfer. In such a case, any act of non-consensual redistribution that brings
people’s holdings into alignment with the prescribed distribution of the non-entitlement principle
would, all else being equal, be permissible according to that principle but impermissible on an
entitlement theory, as it would infringe upon the rights of those whose holdings are being
redistributed. Thus, there is a contradiction: if one accepts both theories, one is committed to
declaring the same action to be both permissible and impermissible. Given this, a committed
entitlement theorist would appeal to whatever reasons she has for accepting the entitlement theory
as grounds for rejecting the conflicting non-entitlement theory.
For the purposes of this argument, an entitlement theory of justice will be granted (as such
a concession is a standard feature of left-libertarian theories of justice, with this dissertation
purporting to defend a theory of the latter variety). Thus, there are two paths open to the defender
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Insisting on (2) will cause some problems for the argument presented below. Specifically, such insistence will
foreclose one of the paths by which the argument reaches conclusion (what, below, is called the “assimilationist
approach”). However, this chapter will both present an alternate path to its conclusion that is compatible with the
adoption of (2) and, in section IV, provide additional arguments against the claim that an entitlement theory should
take the form of (2) rather than (1).
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of a non-entitlement theory of justice. First, she might argue that there is no incompatibility
between the two theories of justice, as the proposed case that gives rise to the contradiction cannot
obtain. For example, Otsuka, in defending a luck-egalitarian principle of equal opportunity for
welfare, argues that there can be no case where this principle is violated but all property rights are
respected, as the existence of any luck-based inequality implies that the better-off did not justly
acquire their property (1998). Specifically, he argues that an egalitarian proviso obtains such that
one can appropriate some natural resource only if everyone else is left an equally good share of
the natural resources—where two shares are “equally good” iff the holders of those shares have an
equal opportunity to attain welfare via the use and/or exchange of those shares. Given that luckbased inequality can obtain between two people only if they did not have equal opportunities to
obtain welfare, then it follows that luck-based inequality implies a violation of Otsuka’s egalitarian
proviso.97
While this strategy may succeed, it is vulnerable to various potentially devastating
objections. For example, Israel Kirzner (2000) argues that that the discovery of some resource
might actually qualify as the creation of said resource by the discoverer—and, thus, he denies that
there are any previously-unowned natural resources that must be justly appropriated as a necessary
condition of owning them (and the products into which they are incorporated). In other words,
Kirzner can concede that any appropriation must be constrained by Otsuka’s proviso; however, he
would maintain that almost all holdings could have been justly acquired without the owners having
had to appropriate anything. Given that Otsuka posits no egalitarian constraint limiting how much
people can justly acquire via non-appropriative methods (such as the creation of holdings), it would

Abstracting away from the details of Otsuka’s argument, the proponent of the first path will maintain that the
prescriptions of the most plausible entitlement theory will be coextensive with those of the most plausible nonentitlement theory. The extent to which this suggestion is, itself, plausible will depend on one’s preferred entitlement
and non-entitlement principles of justice.
97
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be possible for luck-based inequality to arise where all persons are entitled to their holdings. Thus,
the contradiction between a luck-egalitarian principle and an entitlement theory of justice would
reemerge, as they would yield contradictory judgments regarding the justice of redistribution in
such circumstances.
Alternatively, as Risse notes, anti-egalitarian libertarians might simply reject Otsuka’s
egalitarian proviso on the grounds that they reject the fairness considerations that ground it (2004,
354-355). Notably, Otsuka defends his proviso by suggesting that it would be unfair if the first
people to encounter a natural resource were able to acquire it, even if that precluded later arrivals
from attaining the well-being they would have had had they had arrived first and appropriated that
resource (1998, 78). However, to this complaint, an anti-egalitarian libertarian might simply deny
that fairness is of any moral concern, at least as far as justice is concerned. Thus, she would deny
the proviso, thereby readmitting the possibility of cases where non-entitlement and entitlement
theories yield incompatible claims about justice.98

III. The Pluralist Approach
While the egalitarian proviso-based compatibilist argument presented in the previous section might
be salvaged from such attacks, here a different path will be pursued with the intention of showing
that holdings should be allocated in accordance with a non-entitlement principle of justice—where
this conclusion follows specifically from a libertarian commitment to a consent theory of
legitimacy. Specifically, the first move is to present two hybrid positions that include both the
entitlement theory of justice and some non-entitlement principle of justice (such as luck

Some of what is said below in chapter six might bolster Otsuka’s proviso against this casual rejection of fairness.
However, the purpose of this chapter is to present a libertarian case for distributing holdings in accordance with nonentitlement principles of justice rather than pursuing the standard left-libertarian line of defending egalitarian
entitlement theories of justice.
98
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egalitarianism). Specifically, these positions make the non-entitlement theory subordinate to the
entitlement theory such that, whenever the two conflict, the prescriptions of the hybrid position
are identical to what the entitlement theory alone would prescribe. It will then be argued that
libertarians have no apparent reason for rejecting either of these positions, as the most prominent
arguments against pure non-entitlement theories do not apply to these positions.99 This will then
set up the second move wherein it is argued that there simply are no property rights, leaving
libertarians with only the weaker non-entitlement principle that they have been pressed to adopt in
addition to their accepted entitlement principle.
There are two ways of weakening a non-entitlement principle such that it avoids being
incompatible with an entitlement theory of justice. First, there is the pluralist approach wherein
non-entitlement principles and entitlement theories of justice are understood as analyzing distinct
virtues of distributive arrangements. Thus, while the non-entitlement principle gives the necessary
and sufficient conditions of justice, the entitlement theory provides an account of a different
virtue—a virtue that, while sometimes going by the name “justice,” is, in fact, a different moral
quality than that referred to by non-entitlement principles.
Consider, as a forerunner to this move, Cohen’s effort to carve up the justice of luck
egalitarianism into two distinct distributive virtues of justice and legitimacy (2011a). Typically,
luck egalitarianism has been framed as making claims about a single distributive virtue, namely,
justice, where this virtue obtains if either there is no inequality or there is inequality, but it is the
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In fact, it will suggest that libertarians have additional positive reasons to accept these positions, particularly the
pluralist approach, as the pluralist approach actually helps to articulate a common libertarian sentiment that there is
something morally bad about inequality, but where this badness does not justify involuntary redistribution.
Additionally, the subsequent claim that there are no existing entitlements gives libertarians additional reason to adopt
the hybrid principles, as, otherwise, their pure entitlement theory would entail that there is simply no moral basis for
any coercive control over resources—a result that most libertarians would likely want to reject in favor of the hybrid
positions’ claims that at least some such control is justified (albeit only that which accords with the prescriptions of a
non-entitlement theory of justice).
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result of morally-culpable choice (roughly). However, Cohen suggests a kind of value pluralism
whereby a distribution is just iff there is no inequality while it is legitimate when no one has a right
to complain about the distribution (e.g., when that distribution is unjust but all people freely and
explicitly consented to it) (2011a, 128). Thus, while inequality due to morally-culpable choice by
the worse-off would be legitimate, Cohen is still able to suggest that there is something
objectionable about it, namely that it is unjust. Now, this distributive vice happens to be trumped
by legitimacy: one cannot permissibly begin with an unjust-but-legitimate distribution and
coercively redistribute so as to make a just outcome obtain (Cohen 2011a, 133). However, one is
still able to declare an equal distribution to be morally superior in at least one respect to a
distribution where choice-based inequality obtains—something that is not possible if there is only
a single distributive virtue of justice that applies uniformly to both equal distributions and unequal
distributions resulting from morally culpable choice (Cohen 2011a, 141).
Similarly, the pluralist move would declare distributions that align with the non-entitlement
principle in question to have the virtue of justice; by contrast, distributions that meet the sufficient
conditions of justice posited by an entitlement theory would be held to embody a distinct virtue
that might be given a different name such as rights-respecting. And, sustaining the analogy with
Cohen’s move, the latter virtue can then be taken to “trump” the former such that one cannot
permissibly begin with an unjust-but-rights-respecting distribution and coercively redistribute so
as to render the distribution of holdings just. Thus, while the pluralist move would allow that there
is something morally deficient about distributions that run contrary to the dictates of the nonentitlement principle, the entitlement theorist would still carry the day in the sense that the allthings-considered moral judgment regarding the permissibility of redistribution would be a
function of whether or not people had rights over the holdings currently in their possession.
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Given that acceptance of some entitlement theory of justice is being conceded for the sake
of argument, the pluralist move should appeal to the proponent of a non-entitlement principle of
justice (such as the luck egalitarian principle presented in chapter four). For, as noted just above,
such value pluralism allows her to at least maintain that there is something of moral value about
her preferred distribution, even if this normative consideration isn’t strong enough to justify
involuntary redistribution from those entitled to their property. Given this, she would still have a
normative basis for exhorting property owners to redistribute their goods, even if she could not
permissibly force them to redistribute if they rejected her arguments.
More importantly, the entitlement theorist has no obvious basis for rejecting the pluralist
position, as her core claim regarding the circumstances under which goods might be coercively
redistributed is still entirely conceded. Of course, she might reject the claim that there is anything
objectionable about a distribution that runs contrary to some specified non-entitlement principle
of justice. However, there is nothing in her entitlement theory that could ground such a claim, as
such a theory makes no pronouncement regarding whether there are subsidiary distributive virtues
beyond the kind with which entitlement theories are concerned. Thus, additional argument would
be required if she wishes to reject the pluralist proposal.100
Further, many entitlement theorists don’t want to limit the moral assessment of holdings to
a calculus that considers only justice-as-entitlement. For example, many libertarians want to
maintain that there is something morally commendable about charity even while rejecting that
charitable redistribution can be imposed on people who do not wish to give. However, such a view
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Note that adding in an additional non-entitlement basis for the assessment of holdings threatens to undermine the
coherence of the left-libertarian position. To preserve coherence in the sense described in chapter one, it must be the
case that the non-entitlement component of the pluralist position is either entailed by the principles discussed in
chapters two and three or entailed by the premises that ground those principles (again, as discussed in chapter one).
Chapter six argues that there is just such a principle of justice, namely the luck egalitarian position described in chapter
four. Thus, a left-libertarian view reached by way of a pluralist position that incorporated this luck egalitarian principle
would still be coherent in the sense demanded in chapter one.
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tacitly presupposes the pluralist approach, as it accepts that there are other moral considerations
governing how goods ought to be distributed beyond what property rights various people have.
Insofar as libertarians are willing to accept that there are at least some supplemental normative
considerations that bear upon the moral assessment of holdings, they should have no objection to
the pluralist approach.

IV. The Assimilationist Approach
As an alternative to the pluralist approach, there is also an assimilationist approach to rendering
non-entitlement principles compatible with a conceded entitlement theory of justice (the short term
goal being to show that libertarian entitlement theorists should adopt the compatibilist position—
with the long term goal being to leave them with the non-entitlement principle when it is shown
that no one is entitled to any land or object). Unlike the pluralist approach, the assimilationist
approach maintains that there is a single kind of consideration relevant to the moral status of a
particular set of holdings, namely whether or not those holdings are just. However, it still allows
one’s preferred non-entitlement theory to avoid the incompatibilist argument by taking the relevant
non-entitlement principle and (a) adding to its sufficient conditions of justice the same sufficient
condition of justice posited by the relevant entitlement theory and (b) making the original sufficient
conditions conjunctive, with the added conjunct positing that no one possesses a holding to which
someone else is entitled. To illustrate this, consider a luck egalitarian principle asserting that
holdings are just iff any existing inequality is the result of morally-culpable choice. Such a theory
would contradict an entitlement theory of justice, as the latter would declare luck-based inequality
that arises via the proper procedures to be just. However, such incompatibility could be avoided if
the luck egalitarian principle is modified to assert that holdings are just iff (i) any existing
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inequality is the result of morally-culpable choice and no one possesses a holding to which
someone else is entitled or (ii) the relevant holdings are possessed by those who are entitled to
them (where entitlement is defined by the favored entitlement theory).
By making conformance with the entitlement theory a sufficient condition of justice in this
way, one can ensure that there is no case where the hybrid principle declares some holdings to be
unjust when those holdings are simultaneously just according to an entitlement theory.
Additionally, by making the sufficient condition of the non-entitlement principle a conjunction in
the way specified above, one can ensure that there is no case where the hybrid principle declares
some holding to be just that an entitlement principle declares unjust. Specifically, this move
ensures that the hybrid principle doesn’t deliver an unacceptable result (for the libertarian) in cases
where all persons are entitled to their holdings but those holdings are then involuntarily
redistributed to make everyone’s share align with the prescriptions of the non-entitlement principle
of justice. Without the conjunctive procedure described by (b) (and illustrated by (i)), the hybrid
principle would entail that such redistribution moves things from a just state (because all are
entitled to their possessions) to a just state (because holdings are distributed appropriately). Thus,
one might conclude that such redistribution is permissible—a result that would be unacceptable
for libertarians committed to an entitlement theory of justice. However, by making the nonentitlement sufficient conditions conjunctive as per (b), one avoids this result because the postredistribution state would satisfy neither of the sufficient conditions of the hybrid principle.
Admittedly, a hybrid principle developed along these lines will avoid contradicting only
those entitlement theories where people being entitled to their possessions is merely a sufficient
condition of justice rather than a necessary one. If, by contrast, one also takes people being entitled
to their holdings to be a necessary condition of justice, then it will be much more difficult to
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produce a hybrid principle that allows for the assimilationist approach to succeed. Thus, an
entitlement theorist could, by insisting on making entitlement to holdings a necessary condition,
force a proponent of the argument presented here to pursue only the pluralist approach presented
above and, thereby, render the argument more vulnerable to potential objections.
However, it is also unclear what would justify an entitlement theorist rejecting the hybrid
theory in favor of a principle that makes entitlement a necessary condition of justice (or her original
non-hybrid entitlement theory), as the most prominent arguments used to defend entitlement
theories against non-entitlement theories will fail to recommend such a principle over the hybrid
theory. Consider, for example, Nozick’s influential Wilt Chamberlain argument against nonentitlement principles of justice. In this thought experiment, Nozick posits a case where everyone
has holdings such that the distribution is declared just by one’s preferred non-entitlement principle.
However, each person then voluntarily pays Wilt Chamberlain a small amount of money to watch
him play basketball, with the result being the emergence of a new distribution that is (by
hypothesis) unjust according to the non-entitlement principle.
While Nozick is not fully explicit regarding the structure of his argument, he can best be
understood as making two distinct reductio arguments against non-entitlement principles of
justice.101 The first begins with the observation that, if the post-transfer distribution of resources
is unjust according to the non-entitlement principle, then one would act permissibly if one enforced
the original distribution and thereby prevented the unjust distribution from arising. However,
Nozick argues that such enforcement must take the form of either (a) unacceptably interfering with
freedom by blocking capitalist acts between consenting adults, or (b) allowing such acts but then
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Different interpreters of Nozick tend to focus on only one of these reductios at the expense of the other (e.g., with
O’Neill (1981, 308) primarily addressing the first and Cohen (2011a, 127) and Mack (2002a, 81-84) treating Nozick
to be primarily positing the second. However, there seems to be no reason not to take Nozick to be making both
arguments.
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unacceptably redistributing the fruit of Chamberlain’s labor—an act which is unacceptable
because it is tantamount to slavery (1974; 163, 169–72). Thus, a non-entitlement theory will
declare the enforcement of the original distribution permissible when it is, in fact, impermissible,
from which it follows that any non-entitlement theory must be rejected to avoid contradiction.
The second reductio posits that if one has a just share according to a non-entitlement
principle of justice, then one has the right to dispose of that share as one wishes—with any resulting
state of affairs thereby qualifying as just (1974, 161). Thus, given that the starting state in the Wilt
Chamberlain case is just, it then follows that the state of affairs after people choose to give part of
their shares to Chamberlain is just. However, the resultant distribution is also unjust according to
that principle because it does not align with its prescribed pattern/end-state. Thus, there is, again,
a contradiction that emerges, necessitating the rejection of the assumed non-entitlement principle
of justice.
However, a hybrid principle will avoid both of these reductios, as, unlike its nonentitlement counterpart, it will declare the post-basketball game distribution to be just—at least,
when all are entitled to their shares (according to the relevant entitlement theory). 102 Given that
the hybrid principle admits that there should be no blocking of exchanges or redistribution when
all are entitled to their shares, and, similarly, affirms that the post-transfer distribution would be
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If people are not entitled to their shares, then the transfers will not necessarily render the resulting distribution just.
However, if people are not entitled to their shares then it is also less clear that Nozick’s reductios go through. For, it
is not clear that it is wrong to block transfers made by someone not entitled to a thing (e.g., if one person attempts to
bequeath an unowned thing to someone else) or that people have a right to dispose of their share as they see fit if they
are not entitled to that share. Indeed, the whole point of introducing the notion of entitlements is to establish a category
of possessions over which one has special control rights, including transfer rights. Thus, either (a) the hybrid principle
declares holdings just because the entitlement sufficient condition is met, in which case the post-transfer distribution
will be just and the reductios are avoided, or (b) the hybrid principle does not declare that the holdings just, but the
entitlement condition is also not met, in which case the premises that underpin Nozick’s reductios become implausible.
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just, it is not obvious what the Nozickian complaint would be against the proposed hybrid
principle.103
Similar remarks apply to a third argument against non-entitlement theories that Mack
attributes to Nozick (2002a, 82–3). This argument holds that, if some state is unjust, one must be
able to explain how it came to be unjust via appeal to some historical occurrence—i.e., one must
be able to identify the particular event responsible for the emergence of the injustice. However,
given that the post-transfer state in the Wilt Chamberlain case is reached via just steps from a just
pre-transfer state, there is no such (apparent) explanation. Thus, the post-transfer state cannot be
unjust, contra what a non-entitlement theory implies—and one must, therefore, reject the nonentitlement theory.
However, like the two reductios discussed immediately above, this argument similarly rests
on the premise that the non-entitlement theory declares the post-transfer state unjust. Since the
proposed hybrid principle does not make such a declaration, it thereby avoids this third argument,
as well. Thus, the Nozickian entitlement theorist is left with no apparent basis for insisting on a
pure entitlement theory in rejection of the proposed hybrid theory. The assimilationist approach,
then, should be acceptable to both entitlement theorist and non-entitlement theorist alike
(supposing the latter is attempting to avoid the incompatibilist argument presented in section II).

V. Territorial Legitimacy
So far, the above sections have sought to demonstrate that non-entitlement principles of justice can
be made compatible with entitlement theories of justice in such a way that (i) is acceptable to the

The suggestion, here, then, is that Nozick’s real complaint about the non-entitlement theories is that they fail to
respect the rights people sometimes acquire over objects, with the reductios intended to emphasize this point. Given
this, a hybrid theory that makes entitlement a sufficient condition of justice should be acceptable to the Nozickian.
103
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entitlement theorist and (ii) preserves some normative status for the non-entitlement principle. This
was done by positing that a relationship of priority obtains such that any deviation from the relevant
non-entitlement principle’s prescribed distribution is morally permissible just in case everyone is
entitled to their holdings. However, now it will be argued that, given the libertarian consent theory
of legitimacy, it follows that no one has any property rights over land. Specifically, it will be
argued that property rights bestow upon their holders a form of legitimate authority—and, thus,
require consent according to a consent theory of legitimacy. However, given that, as a matter of
contingent fact, no one has acquired the consent of all other persons prior to appropriating, it
follows that there has been no initial appropriation—and, thus, no private property—given a
consent theory of legitimacy.104 Thus, the permissibility of any given distribution of holdings
becomes a function of the relevant non-entitlement principle(s) of justice (as they have been
incorporated into either of the compatibilist positions described above).
Given that a consent theory of legitimacy has already been defended in chapter three, the
key step in the argument here is to show that anyone who has property rights over some bit of land
is a legitimate authority.105 For, if this is the case, then land ownership can only be established
with the consent of others—i.e., the initial appropriation of land has consent as its necessary
condition. To, begin, then, consider the following first pass at defining legitimacy: P is a legitimate
authority with respect to another agent Q when P has the power to determine what obligations Q
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It is, of course, metaphysically possible, that universal consent could be obtained (though the logistical difficulties
of doing so implies that there will be such consent only in quite distant possible worlds). Thus, this chapter adopts
what A. John Simmons calls “a posteriori anarchism” but applies it to the case of property rights. As Simmons presents
the distinction, the a priori anarchist holds that there are necessarily no legitimate states; by contrast, the a posteriori
anarchist holds that there are no existing legitimate states, but there could be one under different circumstances (2001,
105). Indeed, because Simmons endorses a consent theory of legitimacy, he holds that states would be legitimate in
the possible world where they obtained the consent of all their claimed subjects. However, given that no state has
gained such consent, no states are legitimate. Because the consent theory of legitimacy is now being applied to
property rights, the same stance can be adopted vis-à-vis such right: a person would have private property in land were
everyone to consent, but given the actual absence of such consent, no one does, in fact have such property rights.
105
For a defense of consent theory, see Simmons (1979; 1993; 1996; and 2001).
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has by the issuing of edicts. Of course, there are a few ways in which P might ‘determine’ Q’s
obligations in this way. On one account, the power a legitimate P possesses is the power to create
new obligations for Q that she did not previously have before.106 However, this chapter follows
Simmons, who suggests that P has the power to ‘specify the content of… already-created, but
unspecific, obligations’ (2016, 15). Thus, on this account, Q has some generic obligation to obey
P where P is then able to specify the exact content of that obligation by issuing edicts. More
specifically, it will here be maintained that P is legitimate with respect to Q just in case Q is
obligated to obey P’s edicts in virtue of P issuing those edicts, where “P’s edicts” designates nonrigidly.107 Thus, if a state (here taken to be a group agent) is legitimate with respect to person Q
and it has some law L on the books at time T where L mandates that Q , then Q is obligated to .
However, had the state instituted law M (rather than L) mandating that Q , then Q would have
been obligated to  rather than . Finally, on such an account, one’s political obligations are the
set of obligations imposed by a legitimate authority, with that set being subject to change by the
authority.
So far, legitimacy has been defined as an interpersonal relation that might obtain between
any two agents. Given this, one cannot simply assert that a state is legitimate tout court; rather, it
must be specified which person is subject to its legitimate authority. Notably, however, this picture
of legitimacy is very different from the kinds of claims actually-existing states make, which tend
to be territorial in nature. As Simmons notes, one of the primary rights claimed by states is the

For more on this notion of “duty-creation,” see van der Vossen (2015).
There is an additional question of what counts as an edict. Providing a complete answer to this question is not
possible here, but seemingly these edicts must be acts of communication done with the intention of changing the
beliefs others have about what the communicator is commanding. It need not necessarily be the case that the edict is
directly issued to the subject; rather, it might merely be posted in a public space where the authority reasonably
believes that the subject will encounter the edict. Already this quick suggestion indicates some of the complexities
that will emerge from a thorough account of the sorts of edicts at issue here. However, the argument that follows does
not rely on any particular account of what qualifies as an edict; thus, the chapter will remain neutral on this question.
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right to impose and coercively enforce laws upon all people within its claimed territory—a
jurisdictional control right over people within a particular space that is often complemented by
claimed ownership rights over the non-privately-owned resources in the territory (2016, 4-5).
Indeed, according to Simmons, the legitimacy of states should be understood as bounded by the
borders of their territory such that “only those persons within a state’s claimed territories are
claimed as subjects of that state’s authority, as bound by its laws” (2016, 31).
Note that this makes the actual power claimed by states to be both weaker and stronger
than legitimacy tout court. It is weaker because, while a pure legitimacy relation obtains
irrespective of the location of the person(s) subject to the legitimate authority, states typically
attempt only to regulate conduct within their territory—a self-imposed restriction that suggests
they take their territory to bound their moral power to specify obligations.108 However, the power
claimed by states is still quite strong in that they claim the power to specify the obligations of
anyone who is within their territory at the present moment. Indeed, an alien who, by hypothesis,
is not a person with respect to whom a state is legitimate at some time is, nonetheless, taken by the
state to be obligated to comply with its edicts when she, at a later time, enters its territory. Further,
note that the claim is that she is bound by even those edicts that were issued prior to her entering
territory. Thus, it is a bit misleading to put things, as Simmons does, in terms of states being
legitimate with respect to those within their territory, as this phrasing may suggest that a person is
bound by just those edicts issued while she is in a given state’s territory. Instead, the power claimed
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There is an exception to this claim, namely that states claim to have the power to oblige outsiders from entering
their territory. However, they do not claim the power to regulate outsiders’ behavior in other ways, thereby taking this
broader power to oblige to be bounded by territory. Thus, the power of territorial legitimacy is still weaker than
legitimacy tout court, as a legitimate authority in the sense defined above has the power to impose obligations
regulating all forms of behavior on its subjects. Importantly, the power to oblige outsiders to refrain from entering is
also a central power possessed by those with property rights, with the caveat presented in this footnote thereby
supporting the claim below that to possess property rights over some resource is to have the power of territorial
legitimacy.
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by states should be articulated in a way that makes it clear that people within a territory are
supposed to be bound by even those edicts issued prior to their arrival in the territory.
So how should the moral power claimed by states be understood? The suggestion here is
that states claim the power to specify the conditional obligations of others where such obligations
are those that obtain only on the condition that one is within a given state’s territory. This power
can be called territorial legitimacy, where some agent P is territorially legitimate with respect to
person Q just in case there is some bit of territory L such that, if P issues an edict of the form “if
Q is within L, then Q must ,” then Q is obligated to  if she is within L. Such a statement of
territorial legitimacy would then align with the claimed powers of states described above, with
states understood as claiming universal territorial legitimacy (i.e., that they are territorially
legitimate with respect to all people).109 It is this sort of legitimacy that the subsequent section will
contend has consent as its necessary condition, with section VII then arguing that having property
rights is equivalent to possessing territorial legitimacy—two claims that, together, entail that
property rights have consent as their necessary condition. Finally, section VIII will use this result
to reach the libertarian distributivist conclusion that land and resources ought to be distributed in
accordance with a non-entitlement principle of justice, at least, if one accepts either of the
compatibilist positions presented above (as, it has been argued, libertarians should).

VI. A Consent Theory of Territorial Legitimacy
The previous section has presented a notion of territorial legitimacy distinct from the concept of
legitimacy as it was introduced in chapter three. Specifically, the former is a weaker version of the
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Even this statement is still imperfect, as states do sometimes claim the power to impose certain obligations on
subjects outside its territory and refrain from imposing certain obligations on on-subjects within the territory
(conscription being the prime example). However, this divergence makes no difference to the remainder of the
argument, with the possible exception of the sub-argument advanced in the second paragraph of section VI.
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latter, as legitimacy tout court is a power to specify subjects’ unconditional obligations while
territorial legitimacy is the power to specify conditional obligations (where such obligations obtain
conditional on subjects’ location). Given this difference, a consent theory of legitimacy does not
necessarily entail a consent theory of territorial legitimacy. Indeed, one might simultaneously take
a person’s consent to be a necessary condition of another having the power to specify her
unconditional obligations while also holding that the weaker power to specify conditional
obligations does not require such consent. The question, then, is whether a person who holds a
consent theory of legitimacy should also hold a consent theory of territorial legitimacy.
There are a number of reasons to answer in the affirmative. First, from a purely dialectical
standpoint, proponents of consent theory generally take themselves to be commenting on the moral
standing of actually-existing de facto authorities, i.e., states. Thus, given that such states are, in
fact, claiming to have territorial legitimacy rather than legitimacy tout court, consent theorists will
likely want their normative claims to apply to territorial legitimacy, as well as legitimacy tout
court. Indeed, one imagines that few consent theorists would consider their arguments thwarted
by the self-declared monarch who insists that she is not claiming to be a legitimate authority with
respect to some subject, but, rather, just a territorially legitimate authority with respect to that
subject where her territory in question is the entire Milky Way galaxy. Unless the consent theorist
is willing to admit that her claims lose all traction once what is claimed is not “Q is obligated to 
when P says she must ,” but, rather, “Q is obligated to  if she is within the Milky Way and P
says she must  while in the Milky Way,” then the consent theorist should also take consent to be
a necessary condition of territorial legitimacy.
More importantly, the consent theorist would be justified in making such a move, as the
grounds for adopting a consent theory of legitimacy equally militate in favor of a consent theory
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of territorial legitimacy. To see this, consider Simmons’ prominent argument by elimination for a
consent theory of legitimacy (2001).110 Specifically, Simmons’ argument proceeds by introducing
three possible kinds of moral requirement under which political obligations might fall. First, there
are natural duties, which are “moral requirements which apply to all [persons] irrespective of
status or of acts performed” and are “owed by all persons to all others” (Simmons 1979, 13).
Additionally, given that the duties are owed to all others, the content must be general, making no
reference to particular persons or institutions (Simmons 2001, 47).111 These stand in contrast with
special obligations, which are owed by particular people to other particular people, and which
arise from the actions of individuals. So, for example, acts of promising are generally taken to be
the paradigmatic case where special obligations are generated, as (a) not everyone is obligated to
carry out the promised action, but, rather only a proper subset of people; (b) not everyone is owed
the obliged action, but, rather, only a proper subset of people are owed this action—where the
content of the obligation makes specific reference to these people—and (c) the moral requirement
to act did not previously exist, but, rather, came into existence via the actions of the involved
parties.
These special obligations are then further divided into two categories: those that are
voluntary and arise via intentional acts of consent (where promises, again, are a paradigm example
of how such obligations come about), and those that are still special but do not come about via
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Simmons makes this argument across a number of works, beginning—and at greater length—with his Moral
Principles and Political Obligations (1979). However, the cited 2001 text appears to be his attempt at a definitive and
condensed restatement of the argument. Thus, the following synopsis largely reconstructs the argument as it is
presented there, turning to the 1979 text only to supplement the argument and fill in some minor gaps.
111
Technically, Simmons claims that the content of duties must be general in this way because “duties are binding on
all persons” (2001, 47). However, this seems like a non-sequitur, as it seems possible that all persons might have a
requirement that specifies a particular person. Rather, it seems generality follows not from all having the duty, but the
fact that the duty is owed to all.
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voluntary action (e.g., parent-child relations) (Simmons 2001, 45).112 Simmons’ argument then
proceeds by elimination, arguing first, that political obligations cannot be natural duties, and then
arguing that they cannot be non-voluntary special obligations. From this it follows that political
obligations, if there are any, must be voluntary special obligations, i.e., they have consent as their
necessary condition.
In defense of the claim that political obligations are not natural duties, Simmons makes
two arguments. First, he argues that political obligations are particular in a way that natural duties
are not. Here, the idea is that political obligations are owed to only a subset of states—specifically
one state—where the content of one’s obligation specifically references that state (2001, 47). One
might have a natural duty to support states that are just or aid states in desperate need, but one will
owe this duty to any states that meet the relevant criteria. By contrast, the relevant requirement
associated with political obligations is to comply with the edicts of a particular authority specified
by the requirement. Thus, such requirements cannot be natural duties.
Second, Simmons argues that natural duties come in two varieties: negative (which are
requirements to refrain from acting in certain ways) and positive (which require positive action).
More specifically, he contends that while negative duties are perfect and, thus, allow for little to
no discretion in terms of how they are carried out, positive duties are imperfect and allow for a
degree of discretion in terms of how people carry them out (2001, 48). For example, typically
positive duties allow agents to refrain from carrying out those duties if doing so would impose a
significant cost on those agents (2001, 47). However, political obligations do not allow for such
discretion, even when they demand positive action on the part of individuals. Thus, they cannot be
natural duties and must, instead, be special obligations.
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Seemingly, Simmons still considers these non-voluntary obligations to arise via human action (e.g., acts of
procreation giving rise to familial obligations).
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But even if political obligations are special obligations, Simmons must still show that they
are of the voluntary variety as opposed to the involuntary variety. His strategy for demonstrating
this involves, again, an argument by elimination wherein he considers what he takes to be the
strongest candidate theories of involuntary special obligations and showing them to be lacking.
While the candidate theories—and Simmons’ arguments against them—are too numerous to
reconstruct here, he also provides the resources necessary for condensing his argument by
eliminating a whole class of theories without having to consider them individually.113 Specifically,
non-voluntary obligations can be grouped into those that are grounded in the provision of benefits,
or have the provision of benefits as their necessary condition, and those that are not (i.e., those that
can obtain even absent any benefits having been provided). Simmons, then, rejects the possibility
of the latter, as he suggests that it is implausible to hold that anyone might be obligated to an entity
to whom they receive no benefit (1979, 158).114 As a supporting example, he considers the case of
a fur trapper living in isolation so deep within the interior of a territory that the state is not able to
provide the trapper with any benefits such as security or defense (1979, 159). In such a situation,
Simmons contends that the trapper is not obligated to comply with the laws of the state (e.g., its
gun control laws) (1979, 159). And, if one accepts that the trapper has no such obligation because
the trapper does not receive any benefit from the state, then it follows that receipt of benefit is, at
least partially, a ground of having a (non-voluntary) special obligation.
The only remaining competitor to voluntary special obligations, then, is the class of nonvoluntary special obligations grounded in the provision of benefits. Here the idea is that the receipt
of benefits leaves the recipient indebted to the provider, where this indebtedness implies that she

For Simmons’ discussion of various specific proposals, see Simmons (1979, ch. 6), (1996), (2001, 50-55).
In the context where he advances this claim, Simmons speaks specifically of political obligations having receipt of
benefit as a necessary condition, but, presumably, this claim would generalize to all special obligations.
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has a special obligation to the provider. However, Simmons argues that the receipt of benefits fails
to ground special obligations in this way. First, he notes that the mere receipt of benefits (as
opposed to the acceptance of benefits) cannot ground obligations, as no one would think that a
person who explicitly refuses some benefit but has it forced upon her now has a special obligation
to the provider of that benefit (2001, 56). However, even when benefits have been accepted,
Simmons argues this acceptance still cannot ground special obligations. Specifically, he argues
that even insofar as an indebted person owes some return to her benefactor, she does not owe
whatever the benefactor demands (2001, 56). Rather, she merely owes some “fitting return” that
is adequately “responsive to the benefactor’s needs” (2001, 56). Thus, benefaction cannot ground
political obligations, as such obligations are “content-specific” and demand specific performances
over which the obligor has little-to-no discretion (2001, 56– 7). Given this, when it comes to
categorizing political obligations, the only remaining category of moral requirement is the class of
voluntary special obligations; thus, one must be a consent theorist about political
obligations/legitimacy.
Does this argument for a consent theory of legitimacy also commit its proponent to a
consent theory of territorial legitimacy? The answer to this question will depend on whether
replacing the political obligations of legitimacy with the conditional obligations of territorial
legitimacy undermines any of the moves described above. In other words, must such conditional
obligations also fall under the category of voluntary special obligations, or might they be natural
duties or involuntary special obligations? The answer to this question appears to vindicate a
consent theory of territorial legitimacy: quick consideration of each step of Simmons’ argument
suggests that conditional obligations equally can be of no other kind than a voluntary special
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obligation, and, thus, the argument by elimination will equally support that territorial legitimacy
has consent as its necessary condition.
Regarding whether conditional obligations can be natural duties, note that, like political
obligations, such obligations are still particular in the sense that they are owed only to some
person(s) rather than to all persons. Granted, consideration of conditional obligations requires a
slight divergence from Simmons’ framing, as he is concerned with the single political authority
corresponding to each person while the conditional obligations of compliance associated with
territorial legitimacy can be owed to multiple authorities, each corresponding to some distinct bit
of territory. However, as with political obligations, conditional obligations are (or, could be) owed
to a proper subset of people rather than being (necessarily) owed to all people.115 Thus, Simmons’
argument that the obligations associated with legitimacy tout court cannot be natural duties applies
equally to the conditional obligations associated with territorial legitimacy.
Similarly, the fact that the obligations associated with territorial legitimacy are conditional
fails to exempt them from second stage of Simmons’ argument (the elimination of special
obligations not grounded in the receipt of benefit), as receiving at least some benefit would still
seem to be a necessary condition of having any such obligation. Consider, again, Simmons’
example of a fur trapper embedded so deep within the heart of a territory that the state does not
and cannot provide the trapper with benefits. Simmons denies that such a state could be legitimate,
as he takes the trapper to have no obligation to comply with the laws of such a state. However,
now suppose that the state’s claim is merely that it is territorially legitimate such that the trapper
only must comply with its laws if they are within its territory. Such a weakening of the state’s
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The parentheticals are included because it is at least possible that all people might secede and form their own
microstates, at which point the obligations associated with territorial legitimacy would, as a matter of contingent fact,
be owed to all persons. However, to be a natural duty, the associated required action must be necessarily owed to all
persons. (A similar point is made by Diane Jeske (2014, fn1)).
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claim does nothing to make the claim more plausible given that lack of benefits received by the
trapper. Thus, territorial legitimacy and its associated obligations must also be at least partially
grounded in the receipt of benefits.
Finally, there is the original argument’s rejection of benefaction as a ground for political
obligation. Simmons suggests that benefaction cannot generate moral requirements that have
specific content of the sort that characterize political obligations. And, notably, the same would
seem true of conditional obligations: given that such obligations are requirements to act in the
specific way dictated by the territorially legitimate authority (when one is within her territory),
they could not be grounded in benefaction, which could give rise only to very general requirements
that allow for a great deal of discretion in how they are discharged. Thus, like standard political
obligations, the conditional obligations imposed by territorially legitimate authorities must be
special obligations of a voluntary kind—and, thus, any consent theorist who bases her view on
Simmons’ argument by elimination should also accept a consent theory of territorial legitimacy.116

VII. Property Rights and Legitimacy
The previous two sections have attempted to introduce the concept of territorial legitimacy and
argue that such legitimacy has the explicit consent of subjects as its necessary condition. However,
if one accepts these conclusions, then one is also committed to the view that the establishment of
property rights has consent as its necessary condition, as the holder of property rights in land is
territorially legitimate with respect to all others in the sense described in section V. To see this,
begin by noting that to have a private property right in some patch of land is to have a bundle of
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Indeed, Simmons appears to tacitly accept the arguments of the preceding section, as he takes control rights over
territory (which is roughly equivalent to the notion of territorial legitimacy) to be grounded in the legitimacy of the
governing authority (2016). Thus, given that he takes legitimacy to have consent as its necessary condition, it follows
that he also takes territorial legitimacy to have consent as its necessary condition.
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rights including the right to use the land, the right to the income generated by the land, the right to
transfer the land, and, most notably for these purposes, the right to exclude others from that land.117
This last right is notable because it also empowers the right holder to set terms of conditional use
of the land for non-right holders. If P has property rights over some patch of land, then P has a
fully discretionary right to exclude Q from that land: P is entitled to exclude Q for any reason
whatsoever. Thus, P is entitled to allow Q to occupy and/or use that land if and only if Q complies
with some edict issued by P. For example, P might decide that anyone who wishes to use the
land—where “use” includes standing/walking upon the land—must wear red. If Q then declines
to wear red, P can exercise her right to discretionary exclusion and mandate that Q leave the
territory.
This right to set conditions upon others’ permissible use a patch of land allows the property
owner to establish what amounts to a set of rules for those who are within the bounds of her
property. P has the right to impose whatever conditions on the use of her land that she likes, leaving
Q and others with the choice of either complying or exiting the territory. And, since this right
entails correlative obligations, it follows that Q is obligated to either comply with P’s edicts or exit
the land (at which point she is no longer so obligated)—i.e., when P issues the edict that Q must
where red if she is within P’s property, then Q is obligated to wear red if she is within P’s property.
However, note that this is the relation of territorial legitimacy as described in section V! Thus, it
turns out that property rights in land are a form of territorial legitimacy.
Given that territorial legitimacy has the consent of all claimed subjects as its necessary
condition, it then follows that property rights in land will also have the consent of all claimed
subjects (namely, all other people) as their necessary condition. In other words, because private
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The following discussion will focus exclusively upon land. However, it is suggested here that the argument
generalizes to all property, as argued in section X.
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property rights are established via acts of initial appropriation, any act of initial appropriation will
have the consent of all others as its necessary condition. Granted, this runs contrary to the
unilateralist theories of initial appropriation embraced by most libertarians whereby individuals
are deemed able to acquire private property rights over some bit of unowned land without the
consent of others.118 However, insofar as those libertarians are more fundamentally committed to
a consent theory of obligation, they will have to abandon unilateralist theories of initial
appropriation and accept that consent is a necessary condition of the initial appropriation of land.

VIII. Initial Appropriation and Obligation Imposition
One might, at this point, be wondering about the arguments presented in chapter three given that
they all sought to argue against the claim that initial appropriation requires consent. Specifically,
recall that this chapter introduced objections raised by Gaus and Lomasky (1990), Simmons
(2001), Breakey (2009) and van der Vossen (2015) against the argument that (a) initial
appropriation imposes obligations upon others and (b) one can only impose obligations on others
if they consent to being so obliged. While chapter three was primarily interested in the threat their
objections posed to an argument for the consent theory of legitimacy (namely, the argument from
moral equality), they were intended by their authors as defenses of non-consensual initial
appropriation. Thus, it might be reasonably asked how those arguments bear upon this chapter’s
contention that initial appropriation has consent as its necessary condition.
The first thing to note is that the argument of the latter half of chapter three attempted to
show that these arguments do not succeed. While this was done to defend the consent theory of
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See section 2 of Vallentyne and van der Vossen (2014). The number of libertarian philosophers committed to such
unilateralist theories of initial appropriation are too numerous to list here.
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legitimacy, the defeat of these arguments can now be seen to serve a dual function of also ensuring
that these arguments do not undermine this chapter’s claim that initial appropriation has consent
as its necessary condition.
However, even if chapter three’s reply to these objections does not succeed, the argument
of this chapter successfully avoids these objections in a way that allows its conclusion to be
sustained. To see why, first recall that Gaus and Lomasky, Simmons, and Breakey all objected to
(b) by arguing that there are many examples of non-consensual obligation imposition, with initial
appropriation thereby representing no special problem. For example, Gaus and Lomasky appeal to
the case of the outstanding professor whose excellent performance unproblematically imposes an
obligation upon the head of her department to sign off on a merit-based pay raise (1990, 492);
Simmons cites (among others) the case of people who make use of a tennis court and thereby nonconsensually—but unproblematically—oblige others to not use it (2001, 220); and Breakey
presents a number of seemingly unproblematic cases of duty imposition including (1) the case of
the person who tells another a secret and thereby obliges her not to tell anyone or (2) the case of
the person who occupies some bit of space and thereby imposes obligations on others not to invade
that space (2009, 622-3).
Alternatively, van der Vossen (2015) argued against (a) on the grounds that no one ever
imposes new obligations upon others, with acts like initial appropriation, instead, merely changing
the practical requirements of other people’s already-existing conditional obligations. To illustrate
this point, van der Vossen suggests that for any given agent A, the following conditional statement
would be obligatory (i.e., A is obliged to make the conditional statement true): if some other person
has hair, then A does not touch her hair without her permission. Given the existence of this
conditional obligation, it follows that the person who grows out her hair does not impose any new
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obligations on A; rather, she merely change the practical requirements of A’s pre-existing
conditional obligation, where these requirements follow from the conjunction of the obligation and
empirical facts about the world (van der Vossen 2015, 69-70). Similarly, van der Vossen contends
that agents have a conditional obligation to treat other people as property owners if those people
carry out acts of initial appropriation. Thus, when people engage in such acts, they do not
problematically impose new obligations on others but, rather, simply change the practical
requirements of that conditional obligation (2015, 74).
However, even if one concedes the objections to both (a) and (b), the argument of this
chapter still goes through. Importantly, recall from above that a (territorially) legitimate authority
is not merely a person who has the power to impose obligations, but a person who has the power
to specify the content of people’s obligations via the issuing of edicts. Thus, one who affirms the
above claim that legitimacy—and, thus, initial appropriation—requires consent need only maintain
that this particular method of obligation imposition has consent as its necessary condition, without
having to defend (b)’s much broader claim that all obligation imposition requires consent. Thus,
one might fully concede that playing tennis or telling people secrets imposes obligations upon
others without their consent while simultaneously maintaining that one cannot non-consensually
impose obligations on others via the issuing of edicts. Indeed, while perhaps a person’s choice to
play tennis obliges others to stay off the court, it seems highly implausible that she can oblige them
to stay off the court simply by ordering them to do so—unless, of course, they agree to comply
with her orders.
In other words, those who endorse a consent theory of legitimacy need not insist that the
generation of obligations always has consent as its necessary condition. Rather, they need only
affirm the more modest thesis that a certain sort of power to generate obligations has consent as
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its necessary condition, namely, the power to oblige others within a certain geographic space via
the issuing of edicts. Thus, even if the arguments against (b) succeed in showing that one can
impose obligations without consent, that does not negate the claim that the more specific power of
legitimacy—and, thus, the possession of property rights—has consent as its necessary condition.
Further, note that if these arguments did succeed in showing that initial appropriation did
not require consent, this result would, in turn, entail the falsity of consent theories of legitimacy.
As was argued in section VII, to possess property rights is simply to be a legitimate authority; thus,
if one can obtain property rights without consent, then one can also be a legitimate authority
without consent—i.e., the consent theory of legitimacy is false. However, if this is the conclusion
of Gaus et al.’s argument, one might worry that they have proved too much, as the falsity of consent
theory opens the door to the kind of involuntary taxation that these authors would all want to reject.
To see why, note that the subjects of a legitimate state are obliged to comply with its edicts,
including edicts mandating that they redistribute their holdings. Thus, if states can be legitimate
even in the absence of consent, then their subjects might be non-consensually bound by tax laws—
a result that Gaus et al. would be loath to accept. Indeed, as (briefly) noted in the introduction,
libertarians have strong reason to endorse a consent theory of legitimacy because it precludes the
possibility of people being obliged to transfer their holdings without their consent. Thus, even if
the above arguments by Gaus et al. succeeded, their victory would be Pyrrhic in that any
unilaterally acquired property rights could simply be snatched away by the state.119

Could it be argued that property rights trump the taxation laws of legitimate authorities? After all, don’t these rights
include an immunity from loss of just the kind that would entail that one cannot be obliged to transfer one’s property?
While one might take this line, it would seemingly render the notion of legitimate authority empty. After all, the exact
same thing could be said about self-ownership rights, namely that these rights include an immunity from loss that
trumps legislative edicts. Thus, the existence of self-ownership rights would entail the absence of non-consensual
legitimacy. However, given that property rights are, themselves, a form of legitimacy, it would then follow that there
are no property rights, either, as people’s self-ownership rights give them an immunity that precludes purported
property owners from obliging them. Additionally, self-ownership rights would also seem to trump the purported
obligations posited by Gaus et al. After all, wouldn’t these rights include an immunity from loss of, say, the liberty
119
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Similar remarks apply to van der Vossen’s objection to (a)’s contention that initial
appropriation imposes obligations on others. Suppose that one fully accepts his claim that people
do not ever impose new obligations and, instead, merely realize the antecedents of already-existing
conditional obligations. On this picture, P can be understood as legitimate with respect to Q iff,
for any given action  , Q has the conditional obligation to  if P issues the edict that Q must 
(relative to some territory). Indeed, this is how legitimacy was defined in section V. Thus, the
consent theory of legitimacy can be understood as insisting that consent is a necessary condition
of having this particular set of conditional obligations. Further, the contention has been that the
possession of property rights entails the same set of conditional obligations obtaining (relative to
some territory)—and, thus, that initial appropriation has consent as its necessary condition.
Given this description of the chapter’s argument, it now becomes clear that van der
Vossen’s argument cannot function as an objection to its conclusion. Even if he is correct in
claiming that initial appropriation does not impose any novel obligations, the claim being advanced
by the chapter is that the conditional obligations implied by initial appropriation obtain only if
consent has been given. Thus, consent would still be a necessary condition of initial appropriation
even if such appropriation imposes no new obligations.
To sum up, all of the existing objections to the claim that initial appropriation has consent
as its necessary condition have been made against the broader argument that initial appropriation
requires consent because such appropriation imposes obligations on others. However, these
objections do not apply to the narrower argument being advanced here. Indeed, the purpose of this
chapter has been to show that there is a new and previously-undiscussed reason for thinking that

right to tell others a secret that was told to you? Thus, there appears to be no sustainable position that (a) allows for
the unilateral imposition of obligations (including via initial appropriation) and (b) rejects the consent theory of
legitimacy, while also (c) denying that people cannot be obliged to transfer their holdings in virtue of their ownership
rights.
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initial appropriation requires consent, namely, that such appropriation gives people the power of
legitimacy which has consent as its necessary condition. Thus, the argument sidesteps the
libertarian defenses of initial appropriation described just above.

IX. The End of Entitlements
If these objections do not succeed and consent is, in fact, a necessary condition of initial
appropriation of land, then one might immediately note that practically no existing persons have
ever consented to any such appropriation.120 Thus, there have been no acts of initial appropriation,
which, in turn, implies that all originally unowned land is still unowned, with no person having
rights over any of it.121 Given this, when it comes to assessing the justice of any particular
distribution of holdings of land, any entitlement theory must largely fall silent, with its only
contribution being the proposition that no person has the right to whatever land she happens to
claim.
However, this does not mean that there is no basis for morally assessing land holdings.
Rather, if one accepts either the pluralist or assimilationist approach as described above, then the
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There are two possible exceptions to this claim. First, there may be some people who have, in fact, consented to
others having property. For example, it might be argued that the person who gives a gift to another is consenting to
that person having property rights over the gifted object. Second, there are likely some persons who have consented
to be governed by the state and, thus, are obliged to obey all of its laws, including its property laws. Thus, such persons
would have indirectly consented to other people having property and, like those who directly consented to others
having property, would have moral reason to respect the property claims of others and would not be wronged when
those claims were coercively enforced. However, note that the number of people who have genuinely consented will
be small in number given that most accounts of consent insist that fairly demanding necessary conditions have to be
met if the consent is to be genuine (see, e.g., Simmons 1979; Simmons 2010; and Kleinig 2010). Additionally, note
that all persons who have not consented in this way will not have any moral reason to respect others’ property claims
and would be wronged if coercion is used against them when those claims are enforced. Thus, the conclusions that
follow would still hold for a large share of the population, even if there are still a small number of people who are
morally bound to respect certain property claims.
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Note that appeal to the Lockean Proviso will not save the libertarian here. Even if “enough and as good” is left for
others, it is still the case that property rights are a form of territorial legitimacy, and, thus, have consent as their
necessary condition. Indeed, the argument for a consent theory of (territorial) legitimacy as discussed in section VI
goes through irrespective of whether or not the purported subjects of some authority are left with enough (and as good)
territory to occupy outside the borders of the authority’s claimed territory.
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absence of property rights would entail that the moral status of some set of holdings would be
determined by one’s preferred non-entitlement principle of justice. For, on the pluralist account,
no existing distribution of land would be rights-respecting, but that would not undermine the
distinct value of justice as articulated by the relevant non-entitlement principle. Further, when the
existing distribution of goods is contrary to that prescribed by the principle of justice, forcible
redistribution of holdings might be permissible given that the distribution was not rightsrespecting.
A helpful analogue to this suggestion can be found in the kind of pluralism defended by
Simmons (1999a). While Simmons does not frame his argument in quite this way, he can be
understood as defending his philosophical anarchism from a common argument raised against
anarchism, namely that, if no one is obligated to obey the law, then that opens the door to murder,
violence, and general malfeasance all being declared permissible. However, Simmons is able to
defuse this argument by introducing a distinction between legitimacy, justification, and just action
where these concepts represent pluralistic normative properties, each of which independently bears
upon all-things-considered judgments about the permissibility of actions.122 On Simmons’
account, a legitimate state is one that has the exclusive right to impose novel obligations upon its
subjects as a result of some sort of special relation that they stand in with respect to one another
(1999a, 746, 752).123 By contrast, a justified state is one that a person has reason not to undermine
(and perhaps even to support) because of its moral quality (1999a, 753). Unlike legitimacy, then,
a just state need not have any special, relation-based claim on those for whom its actions generate
moral requirements: because of its moral character, all persons are equally required not to

“Justified action” is my term, not Simmons’, but the concept is his.
This is not quite the view of legitimacy introduced above, as that notion involves the specification of obligations
rather than the introduction of novel obligations. However, the account of legitimacy defended above is also based
upon an account provided by Simmons, albeit a later one which appears to be his revised understanding of legitimacy.
122
123
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undermine/to support the state. Further, they are required not to undermine/to support all states of
a similar moral character—this in contrast to legitimacy whereby only certain persons are required
to comply with only their respective states (1999a, 753).
Finally, Simmons introduces the notion of justified action. Here the idea is that the moral
character of some specific action carried out by a state gives others reason to not interfere (and
possibly assist) with that action. Thus, even if a state is neither legitimate nor justified, one might
be morally required not to interfere with some moral action—for example the deployment of police
officers to prevent violence (Simmons 1999a, 770).
This distinction is particularly helpful now that land ownership has been recast as a form
of legitimacy, as the pluralist might now deny that a property rights claimant is legitimate while
still allowing that others might be morally required to respect her use and general control of certain
land/resources. Indeed, the notion of justified action seems particularly applicable here: there will
be certain uses of land where the moral quality of that use is such that it gives others reason not to
interfere with or undermine that use. Specifically, if a person attempts to use (or exclude others
from) resources in a way that accords with the relevant principle of distributive justice, others
would be morally required not to undermine those efforts—with this moral requirement existing
irrespective of the fact that the property “owner” lacks the sort of legitimacy established by
genuine, consent-based initial appropriation. So, for example, if a person claimed a share of
resources that would enhance her welfare but was small enough so as to leave each other person
an equally good share, the fact that she was fairly benefitting from those resources might give
others moral reason to not prevent her from using those resources—and, might even render her
efforts to forcibly exclude others from those resources permissible.124

124

This chapter has attempted to remain neutral about the exact nature of the relationship between the distinct moral
qualities posited by the pluralist position. Recall from above the suggestion that a distribution that meets the sufficient
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Alternatively, on the assimilationist approach, recall from section IV that the relevant nonentitlement principle of justice was modified by making entitlement to holdings to be a sufficient
condition of justice. So, for example, the assimilationist luck egalitarian theory declared holdings
to be just iff (i) any existing inequality is the result of morally-culpable choice and no one
possesses a holding to which someone else is entitled or (ii) the relevant holdings are possessed
by those who are entitled to them. However, given that this latter condition is not met—and the
second conjunct of the first condition is met—then whether or not justice obtains will depend
strictly on whether the distribution meets the necessary and sufficient condition(s) presented by
the unmodified non-entitlement principle. Thus, on either the pluralist or assimilationist approach,
the normative assessments made about the justice of holdings—and how the justice of holdings
bears upon all-things-considered judgments of moral permissibility—will be coextensive with
those made if one simply rejected entitlements theories of justice and endorsed an unmodified nonentitlement principle of distributive justice in their stead.

X. Appropriation of Land vs. Resources
Notably, the above argument has been somewhat narrowly stated in that it denies only that anyone
is entitled to land. As described above, the trouble for those who want to claim such entitlement is
that property in land amounts to a form of territorial legitimacy—and, thus, has the consent of

conditions of the entitlement theory of justice be called “rights-respecting” while a distribution that meets the sufficient
conditions of the non-entitlement theory of justice be called “just.” However, the chapter has avoided taking a position
on the question of whether there are additional differences between a distribution that is rights-respecting and one that
is just. One might think that there must be at least some such difference if the two moral qualities are to be genuinely
non-identical in a way that allows for each to have a distinct set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Further, one
might think that the most plausible candidate difference is that, while one can permissibly use force to prevent a
transfer that would change a rights-respecting distribution into a non-rights-respecting distribution, one cannot use
force to prevent a transfer that would change a just distribution into an unjust one (though, in both cases, there is moral
reason for people to not make such transfers). Alternatively, there might be some other difference between rightsrespecting distributions and just distributions. However, if one takes the pluralist route, one cannot simply assume that
coercion can be permissibly used to preserve just distributions.
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others as its necessary condition. However, what about property in other objects and resources
besides land? Are such entitlements also ruled out by the above argument? If not, then it will turn
out that the relevant non-entitlement principle(s), which the argument was intended to salvage,
will be limited in scope, governing only the distribution of land rather than possessions more
generally. And, while this is still no trivial conclusion, defenders of non-entitlement principles
who had grander ambitions might walk away disappointed. However, there are a few reasons for
thinking that a lack of property rights in land entails that all resources ought to be distributed in
accordance with the relevant non-entitlement principle of justice.
Most directly, one might hold that all property rights over objects amount to territorial
rights. To see this, recall that P has territorial rights over L just in case, when P issues the edict
that Q must  if she is within L, then Q is obligated to  if she is within L. However, now one
might ask about what counts as “being within L”? There are, in fact, two aspects to this question:
first, there is the question of what counts as some territory L and then there is the question of what
counts as being within that territory. These sub-questions will now be answered in turn.
With respect to the former sub-question, territory is generally thought of as being some bit
of physical space. However, this isn’t quite right—at least, insofar as a bit of physical space is
understood as being some fixed spatial region. For, consider a territory like that claimed by the
United States government: from a cosmic perspective, this territory is moving extremely rapidly
in a corkscrew like motion as the Earth simultaneously rotates and orbits the Sun (and spirals
around the center of the galaxy, etc.). Thus, a territory cannot be some fixed region of space, but,
rather, is better understood as being relative to some bit of mass such as a planet. Specifically, a
territory L is going to rest on the surface of some specified portion of a massive object. It may also
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extend above and/or below the surface, but this is more controversial; for these purposes one might
opt for the more minimal conception of territory as being the surface region of a bit of mass.
The answer to the question of what counts as being within a territory is a bit more
straightforward: to be within a territory is to be in contact with that territory. For example, when
one walks onto land claimed by the United States, one makes contact with the relevant surface
region of the Earth, thereby qualifying one as being within the territory. Of course, one might also
hold that those who tunnel under or fly above the surface are within the territory, but the suggestion
here is that to hold such a view is to presuppose that the region below and above the surface is part
of the territory as well. Thus, to remain neutral regarding whether one should hold this more
expansive notion of territory, one might say that Q is within some territory L if—but not
necessarily only if—she is contact with the relevant surface region of the relevant massive object.
Given this account of being within a territory, P is territorially legitimate with respect to Q
if, when P issues the edict that Q must  if she is in contact with the surface of some massive
object, then Q is obligated to  if she is making such contact.125 However, once being within a
territory has been recast in this way, then the apparent distinction between property rights in land
and property rights in objects dissolves. For, to have property rights over an object gives one the
right to issue conditional edicts of the form that others may only permissibly use the object—where
use includes all contact made with the object—if they . Given the issuance of such an edict,
anyone making contact with the object is obligated to , meaning that the property rights holder is
territorially legitimate with respect to all others.

125

The account of territorial legitimacy drops its original necessary condition here to leave open the possibility that P
might also be legitimate with respect to Q if Q is above or below the surface in addition to being in direct contact with
the surface.
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Put somewhat differently, the territorial legitimacy of the land owner (or state) is grounded
in the fact that she is able to issue conditional exclusion orders barring others from making
permissible non-compliant contact with some surface region of one of the very large objects that
we call planets. Similarly, the object owner is able to issue conditional exclusion orders barring
others from making permissible non-compliant contact with the surface region of the smaller
objects that rest on what we call planets. Of course, there is a size difference between large objects
(planets) and smaller objects resting on them, but, for these purposes, this difference does not seem
morally salient. One might think of objects as microplanets that differ in size—but not in kind—
from the macroplanets that we generally associate with territory.
Given this, all property rights can be understood as belonging to a single kind (as opposed
to their being distinct kinds of property rights pertaining to land vs. resources). They amount to
the right to conditionally exclude others from coming into contact with some bit of mass—and,
thus, bestow territorial legitimacy upon the rightholder. Therefore, the above conclusion that the
distribution of land should be governed by some distributive principle(s) of justice rather than an
entitlement theory applies equally to the distribution of other objects and resources as well.

XI. Conclusion
This chapter has argued that no person is entitled to the holdings that she possesses. Because such
entitlement is a form of territorial legitimacy, it can only obtain with others’ consent—consent that
has not and will not be given. Thus, someone committed to a strict entitlement theory of justice
will be forced to affirm that all present holdings are not just, meaning there is no moral reason to
sustain those holdings via the use of coercion or otherwise. However, it has also been argued that
no one should hold such a strict entitlement theory; rather, one ought to hold one of the hybrid
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theories discussed above where some otherwise-plausible non-entitlement principle of justice is
not rejected but, instead, subordinated to an entitlement principle of justice. Thus, when
entitlements fall away, one is not left in the unfortunate position of having to deny that there is any
moral reason for sustaining some particular distribution of holdings. Rather, in the absence of
entitlements, one, instead turns to one’s preferred non-entitlement theory of justice to settle how
holdings ought to be distributed.
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Chapter Six
The previous chapter attempted to show that the libertarian who accepts the consent theory of
legitimacy (as presented in chapter three) should also reject entitlement theories of distributive
justice in favor of some non-entitlement theory of distributive justice. However, it was left open
which non-entitlement theory of distributive justice she should accept. This chapter contends that
insofar as the libertarian is committed to either the consent theory of legitimacy or the selfownership thesis (presented in chapter two), she is also committed to a luck egalitarian theory of
distributive justice (of the kind presented in chapter four). Specifically, the chapter will argue that
each of the first two principles presupposes a meta-normative principle that is egalitarian and
sensitive to responsibility. It will argue that this meta-normative principle, when applied to the
question of what rights people have vis-à-vis natural resources, yields a luck egalitarian principle
of distributive justice. Thus, it will conclude that the left-libertarian position is coherent in the
sense described in chapter one: some of the most popular libertarian moral principles are not
merely compatible with the luck egalitarian principle defended by many socialists, but, when
coupled with some of their presuppositions, entail that principle.

I. Self-Ownership and the Difference-Difference Principle
Why does the self-ownership thesis presuppose an egalitarian meta-normative principle? To begin,
recall that chapter two followed G. A. Cohen in defining the self-ownership thesis in terms of
universality and maximality: each person has the strongest set of ownership rights compatible with
all others having these rights (1995: 213). Of particular importance for this chapter is the
universality of the thesis. One could, in theory, posit a non-universal self-ownership thesis that
grants special rights to some persons and not others; for example, one might posit a monarchical
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self-ownership thesis that assigns to a single person (the monarch) the strongest possible set of
ownership rights over her own body. According to this thesis, the monarch might be assigned both
inclusion rights and exercise rights over her body, with the latter entailing that she has no duty to
refrain from any action involving her body. Of course, this means that she has no duty to refrain
from punching others in the face—a fact that is incompatible with others having the right to
exclude the monarch from their bodies. However, this incompatibility poses no difficulty for the
monarchical self-ownership thesis, as it does not assign other persons any such rights. Rather, it
would take the incompatibility of the monarch’s exercise rights and others’ exclusion rights to
entail that all non-monarchs lack such exclusion rights. Alternatively, one might posit a castebased self-ownership thesis that assigns distinct rights to distinct groups of people (e.g., one group
lacks exclusion rights).
To most contemporary readers, these variations of the self-ownership thesis will seem
unattractive or absurd. Particularly for those attracted to the self-ownership thesis, any move to
strip the principle of its universality would have the effect of stripping the principle of its intuitive
plausibility. However, it is still useful to consider these non-universal variations because they help
reveal the tacit presumption of equal treatment assumed by proponents of the self-ownership
thesis. Indeed, while their choice to assign the same rights to everyone might seem obvious, it is a
choice, nonetheless, and one that ultimately has implications that help to resolve the question of
how resources ought to be distributed in the absence of property rights.
To see why the universalism of the self-ownership thesis has these implications, consider
how a proponent of the self-ownership thesis might justify her insistence on universalism to a
proponent of either the monarchical or caste-based self-ownership theses. Presumably she must
provide some sort of justification lest this theoretical choice seem unacceptably arbitrary—with
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the best sort of justification being an appeal to some meta-normative principle that is both
compatible with the self-ownership thesis and incompatible with its non-universal rivals.126 Such
a principle would place a constraint on the kinds of moral theories that qualify as adequate, thereby
providing a supporting reason for accepting the self-ownership thesis rather than the monarchical
or caste-based self-ownership theses. Specifically, the proponent of the self-ownership thesis
would want to affirm something like the following principle to rule out its non-universal rivals:
The Difference-Difference Principle (DDP1): For any two persons p and q and normative
property A (e.g., “has a right to exclude others from her body”), Ap & ~Aq obtains iff there
is some other relevant property B such that Bp & ~Bq.
In other words, the self-ownership proponent would maintain that it cannot be a brute moral fact
that some people have special rights that others lack, where some moral fact is brute just in case
there is no explanation of why that fact obtains. Rather, a normative theory can ascribe a moral
property to some person but not another only if that difference is grounded in some additional
difference in the relevant properties of the two persons.

II. Restating the DDP
The above statement of the DDP is only the first pass at articulating the theoretical grounding of
the self-ownership thesis. Indeed, if the principle is to have fully determinate content, there must
be some accompanying account of what property differences are “relevant” such that they might
ground a normative property difference. Specifically, if the DDP is to provide the required support
for the self-ownership thesis, this account of relevant property difference must render the DDP (a)
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Why not simply appeal to the intuition that the universal self-ownership thesis is superior to its non-universal
rivals? The problem with such an approach is that, while their numbers have dwindled, there are still people who
simply don’t see the intuitive appeal of the universal version of the thesis and do seem to find some variant of the
caste-based or monarchical self-ownership thesis attractive. Thus, if one is to fend off a non-universal challenge from
these individuals, one must go the theoretical route rather than appeal to intuitions.
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compatible with the self-ownership thesis, (b) incompatible with the non-universal versions of the
self-ownership thesis, and (c) independently plausible in the sense that it delivers the intuitively
correct results when applied to cases of purported normative property difference. To provide such
an account, it will be helpful to begin by considering the monarchist who contends that the
monarch possesses a uniquely expansive set of rights, not as a matter of brute moral fact, but,
rather, because the monarch has the political property of being the monarch, where a person having
this political property entails that she is recognized and treated by others as though she possesses
a special set of rights (e.g., the property of being a monarch is analyzed in terms of people obeying
her orders, bowing to her, calling her “my liege,” etc.). Or, similarly, suppose the proponent of the
caste-based self-ownership thesis suggests that members of a group with the larger set of rights
possess those rights because they have the special political property of being the high caste (where,
again, this property can be analyzed in terms of the beliefs and behavior of the population under
consideration). The proponent of the self-ownership would have to reject such a suggestion, as it
is incompatible with her universalism and compatible with the non-universal positions of her
rivals.
What about social properties that go beyond the status-based rights assignments
characterized as political properties above? These properties include all and only those properties
whose descriptions make reference to other persons but not to the voluntary choices of the
individuals whose rights purportedly differ. For example, suppose that the monarchist suggested
that there is a relevant property difference between the monarch and those with fewer rights,
namely that the monarch is a member of the Hapsburg family or was blessed by the Pope. Or,
suppose that the proponent of a caste-based self-ownership thesis cited the fact that one group
descended from the victors of a particular war as a relevant difference grounding the more
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expansive set of rights her theory assigns to members of that group. Again, the proponent of the
self-ownership thesis would have to reject such property differences as being relevant.
Finally, consider the suggestion that a difference in normative property might be grounded
by some difference in natural property, where such properties are analyzed without making any
reference to persons. For example, the monarchist might suggest that the monarch possesses more
rights than others because she is the smartest living person or because she was born on the day of
a total solar eclipse. Similarly, the caste proponent might suggest that the members of one group
have a more expansive set of rights because of the color of their skin or because of their aesthetic
response to certain artifacts. By contrast, the proponent of the self-ownership thesis would deny
that such properties are relevant in the sense posited by DDP1.
In short, the proponent of the self-ownership thesis, in order to sustain her rejection of nonuniversal variants of her thesis, must deny that differences in political, social, and natural
properties are relevant when it comes to the DDP’s insistence that differences in normative
property must be accompanied by some further relevant property difference. However, what is still
needed is a positive answer to the question of what kind of property is relevant when it comes to
grounding a normative property difference in the rights assigned to persons. And, here, the
proponent of the self-ownership thesis seems committed to a clear positive view: a difference in
assigned rights must be grounded in the free and informed choices made by the person posited to
have fewer rights.
Specifically, supporters of the self-ownership thesis generally maintain that there are two
sorts of choices a person might make that would ground her having fewer rights. First, there are
cases where a person waives a right via some voluntary agreement that includes either an
agreement to transfer the right or consent to an act that would otherwise infringe upon that right
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(where genuine consent is presumed to be both free and informed). For example, if a person
consents to another person holding her hand or agrees to give another person her kidney, those
who affirm the self-ownership thesis would take these choices to ground the fact that the agent
now lacks a right to exclude others from the use of her hand or kidney despite the fact that all other
persons still have these rights. Second, there are cases of rights forfeiture, with proponents of the
self-ownership thesis generally maintaining that the person who infringed on the self-ownership
rights of another loses some of her own self-ownership rights, thereby leaving her with a smaller
set of rights than others (with this being the only grounds on which she might forfeit her rights).127
Admittedly, this latter claim is not built into the thesis itself, which is compatible with multiple
views about what follows from the fact that one person has infringed upon another’s selfownership right(s). However, proponents of the self-ownership thesis are typically committed to a
broader position, where this position includes the view that these rights are forfeited by agents who
infringe upon the rights of others. Given the popularity of this broader position, the remainder of
this chapter will proceed on the assumption that rights forfeiture comes part and parcel with the
self-ownership thesis.128
Recall that the purpose of this section is to provide a precisfication of DDP1 that specifies
the kind of property B that grounds a difference in normative property such as one person having
fewer rights than another. The previous paragraph has now identified two such properties that
proponents of the self-ownership thesis consider relevant to normative property differences,
namely the waiving and forfeiture of rights. However, these properties must be described a bit
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For some articulations and defenses of rights forfeiture, see Goldman (1979), Simmons (1991), Wellman (2017).
Additionally, section IV will argue that there is an argument supporting the contention that an agent who infringes
upon another’s rights forfeits her rights. Thus, even if there are people tempted to accept the self-ownership thesis
while rejecting the broader self-ownership position (as it is being called here), section IV gives reason for thinking
that this is a mistake.
128
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more generally if they are to be incorporated into the DDP, as the DDP is a general meta-normative
principle that must be applicable to any moral principle, including those that do not make reference
to rights. Indeed, the DDP claims to be a general statement about how moral properties work, and
it is only in virtue of this generality that it can serve as an independent reason for favoring the selfownership thesis. Were it just a claim about the conditions under which one person has fewer selfownership rights than another, it would seem to be little more than a restatement of the broader
self-ownership position’s correlative claims about rights forfeiture. What is needed, then, is a more
general claim about moral properties that delivers the self-ownership position when applied to the
case of rights. Thus, the above-stated position that a person ends up with fewer rights just in case
she either consents or infringes upon another’s rights must be restated in a way that avoids mention
of “rights” so as to preserve the DDP’s generality.
In addition to this generality requirement, the restated DDP must be able to ground the selfownership position’s claim that one person can have more rights than another only if the person
with fewer rights is the one who did the consenting or infringing (as opposed to the less specific
necessary condition of an infringement having occurred). Further, a restatement of the DDP would
ideally also be able to ground a self-ownership position that contended that acts of consent or
infringement might also entail that a consenting/infringing party has special duties not possessed
by non-consenters/non-infringers (for example, a duty to rectify the infringement or at least
acknowledge the infringement and apologize for it). To provide such a restatement, it will be
helpful to elaborate on the details of the self-ownership position and introduce some additional
terminology.
To begin, note that the self-ownership position can be understood as making claims about
Hohfeldian incidents (see: Hohfeld 1913), where these incidents include liberties and their
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correlative no-claims (if P has a liberty to , Q has a no-claim against P -ing—i.e., Q is not
wronged by P -ing), claims and their correlative duties (if Q promises P that she will , P has a
claim that Q  while Q has a correlative duty to ), powers and their correlative liabilities (if P has
the power to impose new duties on Q, then Q has the liability of P imposing such duties), and
immunities and their correlative disabilities (if Q has an immunity against P removing her rights,
then P has the disability of not being able to remove Q’s rights). Importantly, this way of listing
the incidents suggests that they fall into two distinct categories. The first category includes
liberties, claims, powers, and immunities; these incidents are often called “advantages” to capture
the sense that there is something beneficial about possessing them. The second category includes
all the correlatives of those incidents, namely, no-claims, duties, liabilities, and disabilities, with
these incidents often labeled “disadvantages” to convey the sense that there is something
undesirable and onerous about possessing them.
However, there is reason to worry about the suggestion that advantages are beneficial to
their possessors while disadvantages are detrimental. Indeed, Hohfeld himself raises such a worry,
presenting the case of the person who has a power to abandon the watch she owns and thereby
return it to the commons (1913, 54n90). Given that this person has a power to alter her rights over
the watch, all other persons have a liability vis-à-vis her and her rights over the watch. However,
Hohfeld argues that everyone who has this liability is actually benefitted by it because it gives
them the privilege and power to claim the watch—two advantages they would have lacked had the
owner not possessed the correlative power to abandon the watch (1913, 54n90). Thus, Hohfeld
concludes that disadvantages are not always onerous or detrimental to their bearers.
Note that Hohfeld is not claiming that the incidents cannot be sorted into beneficial and
detrimental categories. In fact, it actually presupposes that there is something beneficial about both
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the privilege to use the watch and the power to acquire it, hence why the liability to acquire these
incidents is judged to be non-onerous. Additionally, Hohfeld notes that liabilities are “onerous or
unwelcome” when they are liabilities to acquire a duty (1913, 54n90). Thus, there is no reason to
reject the basic thought that there are detrimental incidents and beneficial incidents. Further, it
seems that the latter category would include all privileges, claims, and powers while the former
category would include all duties. By contrast, liabilities might fall under both categories.
Why group the incidents in this way? Granted, the distinction is intuitive, but a theoretical
answer can be given as well: there is something of normative value relative to which the incidents
stand, with some incidents promoting that thing while others undermine it. Note that the person
who has a Hohfeldian privilege can—though need not—realize the state licensed by that privilege
without wronging anyone. Additionally, if she has a claim against others, it follows that she is
wronged if the claimed state is not realized (though she may waive the claim). In each case, the
just-mentioned incidents might be understood as morally protecting the opportunity to realize
preferred states of affairs, where a person has such protection just in case she is either able to
realize those states without wronging others or is wronged by the non-realization of such states.
The thought is that there is something valuable about having the opportunity to realize one’s
preferred states; thus, a person is better off in direct proportion to the number of states she can
realize without wronging others or that others must realize if they wish to avoid wronging her.129
By contrast, the person who is under a duty to someone else wrongs the latter if she realizes any
state that is not co-realizable with the state she has a duty to bring about. Thus, the intuitive
distinction between beneficial and detrimental incidents tracks a theoretical distinction drawn
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This proposal fits most neatly with a will theory of rights. If, instead, one favors an interest theory of rights, then it
is even more apparent what the thing of value is that rights protect, namely, the posited interest that grounds those
rights.
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between those incidents that increase the extent to which a person’s realization of preferred states
is morally protected and those that diminish it.
To generalize a bit, call the realization of preferred states of affairs the preservandum of
any given Hohfeldian incident, with “the preservandum of incident i” denoting the thing of value
to which i either grants or denies moral protection.130 One can then understand the difference
between beneficial and detrimental incidents in terms of which incidents leave their bearers better
off/worse off with respect to the preservandum of those incidents. Additionally, note that any
normative property might have a preservandum, with the moral protection of this preservandum
either expanded or diminished by that property. Thus, one can describe normative properties as
leaving people “better off” or “worse off” relative to their preservandum depending on whether or
not they expand or diminish the moral protection thereof. Further, one can describe a person as
being in a better or worse normative position than another person relative to some preservandum—
a concept that allows for a restatement of the DDP that grounds the self-ownership position’s
claims regarding the waiving and forfeiture of rights (and acquisition of duties) while also being
sufficiently general such that it can be applied to normative properties beyond the realm of rights:
The Difference-Difference Principle (DDP2):
For any two persons p and q and normative property A such that (1) the preservandum of
A is x and (2) Ap & ~Aq entails that q is in a worse normative position than p with respect
to x:
Ap & ~Aq obtains iff there is some other property B such that (a) ~Bp & Bq and (b)
B is the property of having either (i) consented to the state of affairs of Ap & ~Aq
or (ii) acted in a way that failed to respect a normative property with preservandum
x
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There may be better ways of stating the preservandum of the Hohfeldian incidents given a will theory of rights.
For these purposes, all that matters is that there is something of value the moral protection of which is expanded by
some incidents and diminished by others.
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This restatement DDP is a bit technical, but the idea it expresses is fairly straightforward. People
begin with a presumption of having the same moral properties, where these properties leave them
either better or worse off relative to something of value. Two people can then come to differ with
respect to one of these properties if and only if the person who is worse off in virtue of that
difference relative to the thing of value—i.e., who occupies a worse normative position with
respect to that preservandum—either consented to that state of affairs (where genuine acts of
consent are both free and informed) or failed to respect a normative property with the same
preservandum as the property that she lacks. For example, a person who violates another’s selfownership right has failed to respect a normative property with a particular preservandum (namely
the opportunity to realize preferred states of affairs); thus, the DDP maintains that she would lack
a normative property with the same preservandum, e.g., one of her own self-ownership rights.
Crucially, as this example suggests, this restatement of the DDP is able to ground not only
the self-ownership thesis’ universality but also its claims about the waiving and forfeiture of rights.
With respect to the waiving of rights, the self-ownership position maintains that a person has fewer
rights than another if she consents to either transfer the right or waive the right. This contention is
then grounded by part (b.i) of the DDP, which, when applied to the case of rights, maintains that
a person consenting to having fewer rights—or more duties (when A is the property of not having
some duty)—than another person is a sufficient condition of having fewer rights and/or additional
duties. Additionally, part (b.ii) of the DDP grounds the self-ownership position’s contention that
the person who infringes upon another’s rights forfeits her own rights and/or acquires duties. Note
that such a person acts in a way that fails to respect a normative property that has as its
preservandum the opportunity to realize preferred states involving the body (or, whatever one
takes the preservandum of self-ownership rights to be). Thus, according to the DDP, such a person
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should be left worse off when it comes to the normative properties that protect her own opportunity
to realize preferred states involving her body—i.e., she should have fewer rights or more duties
than others. Given that this is just what the self-ownership position maintains, namely, that the
person who infringes upon the rights of others forfeits rights and acquires duties, the DDP
successfully grounds some of the core claims of the self-ownership position.131

III. Restating the DDP, Again
Unfortunately, the present statement of the DDP runs into difficulty when it is applied to cases
involving multiple rights infringements. Consider the case of P who gently touches R’s hand
without permission just before Q begins to strangle R. In this case, proponents of the selfownership position would generally maintain that, while P forfeits some right(s) in virtue of the
hand touch, Q forfeits additional rights in virtue of her more serious infringement upon R’s
rights—and, thus, Q has a smaller set of rights relative to P. However, the current statement of the
DDP would not yield this result, as condition (a) would not be met because both P and Q possess
property B due to the fact that both have acted in a way that failed to respect a self-ownership right
(as per subpart (b.ii) of the DDP).
In response to this worry, one might note that subpart (b.ii) of the DDP is actually
ambiguous: “a normative property” might refer to either a definite normative property that has
preservandum x or any indefinite normative property that has preservandum x. The previous
paragraph assumes the latter interpretation; thus, one might wonder if the former interpretation
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Note that the DDP does not ground all of the claims of the self-ownership position. Specifically, it does not ground
the particular rights posited (e.g., the right to exclude others from one’s body). Rather, those must be grounded by
some additional premises not presented here (e.g., that the rights protect some important interest or must be posited to
explain strong intuitions about certain cases). What the DDP grounds is the self-ownership position’s posited
distribution of rights. Specifically, it grounds the position’s claim that those rights are universal excluding cases where
persons have either waived or forfeited their rights.
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runs into similar problems. To see that it does, consider, again, the touching/strangling case, but
now take “a normative property” to refer to some single specific normative property. If one
individuates normative properties in a coarse-grained way, P and Q might be said to have failed to
respect the same normative property, namely, R’s having the right to exclude others from her body.
However, in that case, condition (a) would still not be met, as both P and Q would have property
B. Alternatively, one might take a more fine-grained approach to individuating normative
properties such that P fails to respect R’s right to exclude others from her hand while Q fails to
respect R’s right to exclude others from her throat, where the possession of each of these respective
rights is a distinct normative property. However, it would then follow that both P and Q meet
conditions (a) and (b.ii) of the DDP—and, thus, each would have met the sufficient condition for
having fewer rights than the other. Thus, interpreting “a normative property” as referring to a
particular property (as opposed to any property) yields either incorrect or contradictory results
depending on how coarsely one individuates normative properties.
To restate the DDP in a way that resolves this problem, one additional concept must be
introduced, namely, the concept of degrees of failure to respect normative properties with a
particular preservandum. To define this notion, note that one person might fail to respect a greater
number properties with a particular preservandum than another person. For example, if P nonconsensually touches R’s hand while Q non-consensually touches both R’s hand and S’s hand, Q
fails to respect a greater number of normative properties with a given preservandum. Alternatively
a person might fail to respect some normative property of greater weight than another person does,
where the weight of a property is proportionate to the degree to which it promotes its
preservandum. For example, in the touching/strangling case, the right against being strangled
better promotes its possessor’s opportunity to realize preferred states involving her body (the
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posited preservandum of self-ownership rights) than the right against not having one’s hand
touched.132 Thus, Q fails to respect a normative property of greater weight than the one that P fails
to respect. The degree to which a person has failed to respect some set of properties with a
particular preservandum will then be some function of the number of these properties she fails to
respect and the weight of the properties she fails to respect. The exact function will be complex
and difficult to define precisely, and a precise formulation need not be presented for these
purposes.133 Merely note that, all else being equal, the degree of failure will increase in direct
proportion to the number and weight of the properties she fails to respect.
Having introduced the notion of degrees of failure to respect normative properties, a final
restatement of the DDP can now be given that delivers the correct results in cases that involve
multiple rights infringements, such as the touching/strangling case presented above:
The Difference-Difference Principle (DDP3):
For any two persons p and q and normative property A such that (a) the preservandum of
A is x and (b) Ap & ~Aq entails that q is in a worse normative position than p with respect
to x:
Ap & ~Aq obtains iff:
(1) There is some other property B such that (a) ~Bp & Bq and (b) B is the property
of having either (i) consented to the state of affairs of Ap & ~Aq or (ii) acted in
a way that failed to some degree d to respect normative properties with
preservandum x.
and
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Given that this preservandum makes reference to persons’ preferred states, this claim may not be universally true
if, for example, a person did not care at all about breathing and cared immensely about having her hand not be touched.
However, for practically all actual preference sets, it is much more important to be able to breathe when it comes to
realizing preferred states.
133
Elsewhere I discuss some of the complexity that emerges when one attempts to develop ordinal rankings of sets of
actions based upon both the number of benevolent actions included in the set and the degree of benevolence of those
actions (Spafford 2019, 224-8). While that discussion is to lengthy to summarize here, the problem under consideration
is exactly analogous to the difficulty of developing a function that yields the degree to which different people have
failed to respect some set of normative properties when given the number and the weight of non-respected properties
as arguments.
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(2) If conditions (a) and (b.ii) obtain—but condition (b.i) does not—then it is not
the case that p has failed to some degree e to respect normative properties with
preservandum x, where e > d.

The first important difference here from the previous statement of the DDP is that (b.ii) has now
been changed to specify that the property-bearer does not merely act in a way that fails to respect
some normative property with preservandum x, but, rather, fails to respect all properties with
preservandum x to some specific degree. Second, while the DDP made the failure to respect a
normative property a sufficient condition of having a worse normative position than some other
person who did not fail to respect a normative property, the addition of (2) in the doubly-revised
DDP makes it such that the conjunction of (a) and (b.ii) is no longer sufficient in this way. Rather,
the proposed material conditional makes it such that these conditions are sufficient only in tandem
with the additional condition that the person with the superior normative position has failed to
respect normative properties with preservandum x to a lesser degree than the person occupying the
worse normative position.134
This addition allows the DDP to deliver the desired results in the touching/strangling case
presented above. Let the constant “q” (somewhat confusingly) refer to P and the constant “p” refer
to Q. Given this assignment of constants, the DDP states the individually necessary and jointly
sufficient conditions of P having a worse normative position than Q, which, in this case, means
having fewer rights and/or additional duties. One can further note that conditions (a) and (b.ii)—
and, thus, condition (1)—are met because P fails to respect rights to a degree that differs from the

The inclusion in (2) of the caveat that condition (b.i) does not obtain is to make it so that q’s consent is still sufficient
for her being left in a worse normative position than p, even if p has failed to respect normative properties with
preservandum x to a greater degree than q. In other words, it makes it such that consent trumps culpable choice when
it comes to determining whether one person occupies a worse normative position than another. However, one might
reasonably omit the caveat and thereby make it such that a person who has failed to respect normative properties with
preservandum x to a greater degree than another occupies a worse normative position, even if the other party has
consented to occupying a worse normative position. Nothing that follows hangs on the choice made here.
134
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degree to which Q fails to respect rights. However, necessary condition (2) is not met because it’s
antecedent is true while its consequent is false: the degree to which P has failed to respect rights
is less than the degree to which Q has failed to respect others’ rights. Thus, P does not forfeit more
rights than Q according to the revised DDP.
By contrast, consider the proposition that Q has fewer rights and/or additional duties
relative to P. For the DDP to give the necessary and sufficient conditions of this proposition, the
constants must be re-assigned such that “p” refers to P while “q” refers to Q. Under this assignment
not only are (a) and (b.ii)—and, thus, (1)—true (because Q infringes upon rights to a degree
distinct from the degree to which P infringes upon rights) but (2) is also true because its consequent
is true (the degree to which Q infringes on rights is greater than the degree to which P infringes
upon rights). Thus, the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of Q occupying a
worse normative position than P are met. In other words, DDP3 delivers the correct result when
applied to this case of rights forfeiture, namely, that Q forfeits additional rights/acquired additional
duties relative to P.
In light of these favorable results, this restatement of the DDP appears to achieve the goal
of providing a general meta-normative principle that entails, and thereby grounds, the selfownership position. Given that libertarian proponents of the self-ownership position require a
general meta-normative principle to fend off the non-universalist challenges described above, they
should accept the DDP as a foundational claim describing how morality functions.

IV. Consent Theory and the DDP
So far, this chapter has shown that proponents of the self-ownership position are committed to the
DDP. Now it will be argued that the same is true of proponents of the consent theory of legitimacy
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described in chapter three—at least, if they accept it in virtue of the argument from moral equality
presented there. Specifically, it will be argued that the argument from moral equality entails not
only the consent theory of legitimacy, but also the DDP. Thus, those who wish to defend consent
theory on this basis should also accept the DDP (with the argument also providing grounds for
accepting the DDP to even those not necessarily attracted to the consent theory of legitimacy).
This conclusion will then set the stage for the subsequent section of the chapter, which argues that
those who accept the DDP should also accept a luck egalitarian principle of the kind presented in
chapter four.
Recall that the argument from moral equality had the following premises:
The Moral Equality Argument:
1. People are moral equals.
2. If people are moral equals, then they do not have the power to impose obligations on
one another without consent.
3. Legitimate authorities have the power to impose obligations on one’s subjects, as those
others are obligated to comply with any edicts the authority issues.
4. Thus, legitimacy has consent as its necessary condition.
Importantly, the first two premises were also accompanied by supporting arguments—arguments
that also entail something quite proximate to the DDP. Begin with the supporting argument for the
first premise’s claim that persons are moral equals, where this equality entails that, all else being
equal, their rights and duties are symmetrical (e.g., if person P has some right against person Q,
then Q has that same right against person P). This claim about rights and duties was grounded in
a worry about moral arbitrariness: if relevantly similar people are assigned asymmetric rights and
duties, that normative property difference would seem to be inexplicable and, thus, unacceptably
arbitrary. However, this worry about arbitrariness would seemingly apply to not only a theory that
assigned rights and duties, but also to any moral theory that assigns divergent moral properties to
relevantly similar people. Thus, the supporting argument for the first premise of the moral equality
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argument would seemingly entail the DDP’s presumption that a difference in normative property
only obtains if there is some other relevant property difference to ground that difference in
normative property (the claim expressed by DDP1).
Further, the argument for premise 2 specified the kind of property difference that grounds
differences in normative property, namely, acts of consent, as consent nullifies complaint about
occupying a worse normative position via its affirmation of the state of affairs in question. To be
a bit more precise, it was suggested that consent might be part of a broader family of assenting
acts that function as some sort of endorsement of a particular state of affairs. Because the focus of
chapter three was consent, it was not discussed what else might qualify as the sort of assent that
nullifies complaint. However, the foregoing discussion of rights forfeiture suggests an additional
form of assent, namely acts that bring about a state of affairs relevantly similar to the state of affairs
that would otherwise serve as a basis for a complaint. For example, if a person turns off the heat
in her house, she would have no basis for complaining about her home being too cold, as she
brought about the very situation that would motivate the complaint. Moving from the self-reflexive
case to the symmetrical case, the person who maliciously lies to another person would seemingly
lack a basis for complaint when she is similarly lied to. And the same goes for the agent who acts
on the body of another without the latter’s consent: by non-consensually acting on a person’s body,
the agent seemingly nullifies any complaint she might have about others aggressing against her in
a relevantly similar way. Indeed, any objection she voiced would seem to fall immediately victim
to charges of hypocrisy that undermine whatever standing she had to complain. For example, were
she to complain that acting on her body wrongs her because it denies her control over her life,
others might ask her, “If you believe that denying people control of their lives is such a great
wrong, why did you commit this wrong yourself?” The lack of apparent answer to this question
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suggests that the person has nullified her basis for complaint with her actions.135 In each case, the
agent has assented to the state of affairs that would otherwise give her grounds for complaint
(though other people will not necessarily know that she has assented in this way).
This point can be made more precise using the language of “preservandum” introduced
above. The suggestion has been that a person assents to some state of affairs S if she has acted to
bring about some relevantly similar state of affairs S’, where “relevantly similar” has so far been
left as an intuitive notion illustrated by the examples above. However, it can now be noted that a
promising form of similarity would be when S involves having some preservandum she enjoys
diminished while S’ involves a failure by that person to respect a normative property with that
same preservandum. After all, the basis for the person’s complaint would seemingly be that others’
actions are denying her something of moral value. But how could she complain about such a denial
when she fails to respect the very normative properties that protect that thing of value?
Additionally, there would also seemingly have to be proportionality between the agent’s
assenting act and her diminished preservandum if the agent’s complaint about the latter is to be
nullified. If, for example, a person told a single small fib, she might have a basis for complaint
about another person either lying to her about something of great importance or lying to her
countless times over an extended period. By contrast, the person who lies all the time about things
of great importance would seemingly have no such complaint. To put this point more generally,
complaints are made in response to something of value being compromised to a particular degree.

The only apparent response she might make is to appeal to akrasia: “I thought that my actions were wrong as well,
but I simply couldn’t help but act in that way.” However, the person about whom she is complaining might then simply
respond, “Well, I, too, agree that what I am doing is wrong, but I similarly cannot help but act in this way.” And, here,
it seems that the person who acts wrongly has no further response available to her. Many philosophers have attempted
to provide additional grounds for why hypocrisy strips people of their standing to blame or to direct moral criticism
at others, including Scanlon (2008), Wallace (2010), Fritz and Miller (2018), and Rossi (2018), among others.
However, here the notion of complaint nullification is treated as primitive, with the purpose of the above hypothetical
dialogue being to demonstrate certain brute facts about how complaint nullification functions.
135
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However these complaints are nullified when the complaining agent has, herself, committed an act
or acts that fail to respect a normative property with this preservandum—but only when the degree
of that failure equals or exceeds the degree to which the agent’s preservandum is diminished.
This direct relationship between the degree of the agent’s failure and the nullification of
complaint, in turn, implies that the degree of failure determines which normative properties the
agent possesses. Note that a biconditional relationship exists between having a basis for complaint
and being wronged: a person has a basis for complaint about some state of affairs either obtaining
(or failing to obtain) if and only if she is wronged by that state obtaining (or failing to obtain).
Indeed, this would seem to be something of an analytic point about the nature of complaint, as
complaint articulates a wrong that has occurred. Further, recall from above that there is a
biconditional relationship between being wronged and the possession of normative properties that
are beneficial/detrimental with respect to a particular preservandum. Specifically, one possesses
such beneficial properties/lacks such detrimental properties to the extent that one is wronged when
certain states detrimental to the preservandum obtain (or states conducive to the preservandum fail
to obtain). Thus, given that the degree of an agent’s failure determines the scope of what she can
complain about—which, in turn, determines what wrongs her and, thus, what normative properties
she has—it follows that an agent’s normative properties relative to some preservandum are
determined by the degree to which she has failed to respect that preservandum. Specifically,
relative to some baseline, the extent to which a person lacks normative properties that are
beneficial/possesses normative properties that are detrimental with respect to some preservandum
will be directly proportional to the extent to which she has failed to respect normative properties
with that same preservandum.
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Importantly, this conclusion can be put in comparative terms. Suppose that P and Q both
fail to respect normative properties with preservandum x. As noted just above, this failure entails
that each person would now lack beneficial normative properties or possess detrimental normative
properties (relative to some arbitrary baseline) proportional to the degree of her failure. Thus, Q
will occupy a worse normative position than P relative to x iff, ceteris paribus, Q has failed to
respect normative properties with preservandum x to a greater degree than P.
Why add in the “ceteris paribus” qualification? Because the argument from complaint
would seemingly entail that consent “trumps” culpable choice in the sense that, even if P’s failure
is greater than Q’s, Q would still have no basis for complaint about occupying a worse normative
position if she consented to that state of affairs. Thus, failing to respect normative properties to a
greater degree than another would be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of occupying a
worse normative position relative to their preservandum. However, if one holds consent (and other
relevant differences) constant, then a differential degrees of failure to respect normative properties
with preservandum x would be necessary and sufficient for occupying a worse normative position
with respect to x.
This qualified claim raises one further question, namely, what else has to be held constant
for a failure to respect normative properties to be necessary and sufficient in this way? Or, to put
the question somewhat differently, are there any other considerations relevant to the nullification
of complaint besides consent and culpable choice (i.e., assent)? The suggestion here is that there
are not, as it is unclear what beyond assent would nullify complaint. Indeed, so long as one does
not affirm the state of affairs of occupying a worse moral position than someone else, one would
seem to have a complaint about being left in such a position. Admittedly, a full defense of this
point would require presenting an exhaustive list of all possible alternative grounds for complaint
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nullification and then demonstrating that each of these grounds fail to nullify complaint. However,
given the difficulty of identifying even a few plausible alternative candidates, it seems reasonable
to tentatively take assent to be both sufficient and necessary for complaint nullification. Thus, the
argument from assent would maintain that consent is always sufficient for occupying a worse
normative position and necessary just in case the worse-off party has not failed to respect
normative properties with some preservandum to a greater degree than the better-off party. And,
in the absence of her consent, an agent failing to respect normative properties to a greater degree
than some other person is both a necessary and sufficient for occupying a worse normative
position.
If all this is right, then the moral equality argument for the consent theory of legitimacy
entails the DDP. As already noted above, the argument for premise 1 of the moral equality
argument (that persons are moral equals) entails the DDP’s presumption that a difference in moral
property only obtains if there is some other relevant property difference to ground that difference
in moral property (where the relevant properties in question are those pertaining to assent, e.g., the
property of having consented). Additionally, the assent-based argument for premise 2 of the moral
equality argument seemingly entails the DDP’s more general claims about the necessary and
sufficient conditions of normative property difference. Recall that the DDP was articulated as
follows:
The Difference-Difference Principle (DDP3):
For any two persons p and q and normative property A such that (a) the preservandum of
A is x and (b) Ap & ~Aq entails that q is in a worse normative position than p with respect
to x:
Ap & ~Aq obtains iff:
(1) There is some other property B such that (a) ~Bp & Bq and (b) B is the property
of having either (i) consented to the state of affairs of Ap & ~Aq or (ii) acted in
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a way that failed to some degree d to respect normative properties with
preservandum x.
and
(2) If conditions (a) and (b.ii) obtain—but condition (b.i) does not—then it is not
the case that p has failed to some degree e to respect normative properties with
preservandum x, where e > d.

Note that conditions (1) and (2) of the DDP make consent a purely sufficient condition of
occupying a worse normative position: if consent has been given, then (a) and (b.i) obtain, making
both (1) true and (2) true (because its antecedent is false). Further, conditions (1) and (2) make it
such that, in the absence of consent—i.e., if (b.i) does not obtain—an agent failing to respect some
normative property to a greater degree than another person (i.e., conditions (a) and (b.ii) obtaining)
is both a necessary and sufficient condition for occupying a worse normative position. Finally, if
there is no such comparative failure—i.e., (2) obtains (because its antecedent is false) while (b.ii)
does not—then consent (i.e., (b.i)) becomes not only a sufficient condition of normative property
difference, but a necessary one as well, as the falsity of (b.ii) would render (1) false in addition to
(2) making it false there is some property difference between the agent and the other person in
question. In other words, the necessary and sufficient conditions of normative property difference
posited by DDP are identical to those that follow from the arguments for premises 1 and 2 of the
moral equality argument. Thus, those arguments from chapter three ultimately entail the DDP.

V. The DDP and Luck Egalitarianism
The preceding sections have attempted to show that libertarians are committed to the DDP for two
reasons. First, it was argued that libertarians must accept the DDP if they want to justify their
acceptance of the self-ownership position as opposed to various non-universal alternative theses.
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Second, it was argued that the supporting argument for the consent theory of legitimacy entails the
DDP. Thus, libertarians have two separate reasons for accepting the DDP, with each corresponding
to one of the commitments of libertarianism presented in chapters two and three, respectively. Now
it will be argued that the DDP, when applied to distributive justice, yields something quite close
to the socialist luck egalitarian principle presented in chapter four. Given that libertarians are
committed to the DDP and the DDP entails a luck egalitarian principle of justice, it follows that
libertarians ought to accept luck egalitarianism—a conclusion that causes no logical problems for
the libertarian given chapter five’s argument that libertarians ought to accept some principle of
distributive justice.
So, why does the DDP entail something close to the luck egalitarian principle of
distributive justice? Recall from chapter four that this principle maintains that inequality is just iff
(a) the worse-off party acted in a way that failed to maximize warranted expected distributed
advantage (WEDA) and (b) the inequality is equal to the difference between the WEDA value of
the optimal action she could have chosen and the WEDA value that she actually chose. In other
words, there is a presumption of equality such that, for any two people, justice assigns them equal
shares unless a particular sort of difference obtains between them, namely, that one has acted in a
way that fails to appropriately promote advantage in a way that the other has not.
This way of putting things helps to reveal the close logical connection between the
(restated) DDP and luck egalitarianism. Recall that the DDP makes a claim about any two persons,
at least one of whom occupies a worse normative position with respect to some preservandum. In
the case of luck egalitarianism, the relevant normative property is best stated as “has a just share
of y advantage,” where y stands for any arbitrary quantity of advantage. Additionally, note that the
preservandum of this property is the possession of advantage: advantage, as a matter of definition,
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is something of value, with a person being better-off in proportion to the quantity of advantage
that she can possess without wronging others and the non-realization of which would wrong her.
Given this property and its associated preservandum, the DDP makes a claim about the necessary
and sufficient conditions of one person being better off than another with respect to just shares of
advantage. Specifically, the DDP maintains that this property difference obtains iff the person who
is worse off has either consented to having a smaller just share or has failed to a greater degree to
respect a normative property that has the possession of advantage as its preservandum.
What does it mean to say someone fails to some degree to respect a normative property
that has advantage as its preservandum? Note that any property that has the possession of
advantage as its preservandum will have the form of “has z amount of advantage as her just share.”
Thus, a person fails to respect such a property iff she acts in a way that denies its possessor the
realization of z amount of advantage. Further, this failure would seemingly come in degrees, with
a greater failure occurring the greater the difference between z and amount of advantage persons
receive as a result of the agent’s actions. Indeed, it seems plausible to think that one could, in
theory, assign a numerical value to an agent’s degree of failure by simply adding up the total
advantage difference between all persons’ just shares and the amount that they actually receive as
a result of an agent’s actions. This valuation would then allow for comparisons to be made between
the degrees of failure of different agents to respect others’ just shares.136
In other words, when the DDP is applied to distributive justice it insists that there is a
presumption of equality that is overridden iff the worse-off party either consented to being worse
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This assumes one has all the knowledge needed to make these sorts of comparisons. As noted in chapter four, it is
useful to posit an ideally-positioned epistemic agent when theorizing, as doing so enables one to avoid having to think
about how people might come to have knowledge of the facts relevant to the calculation and focus, instead, on what
those relevant facts are. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the DDP entails that an ideal agent should assess
distributive justice in the way that the ideal agent posited in chapter four does. Once this has been established, one can
then ask how actual agents should act given their more limited knowledge—a topic that was addressed at the end of
section V of chapter four.
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off or denied others’ a greater portion of their just shares. Unfortunately, the DDP does not settle
the precise value of any given person’s just share; however, it does place a constraint on this value
by insisting that it cannot differ from the value of other people’s just shares—unless, of course,
those people have consented to having less and/or denied others a greater portion of their just
shares.137
Notably, these constraints imposed by the DDP on just holdings are quite close to the
prescriptions of the luck egalitarian principle presented in chapter four. Recall that the principle
insisted that a just distribution of advantage is one where advantage is appropriately distributed
such that each person has an equal share minus the penalties she has accrued as a result of culpable
choice. It further held that these penalties are accrued when persons act to bring about distributions
where holdings are inappropriately distributed—i.e., where some persons do not have their just
share of advantage. Thus, the luck egalitarian position comes quite close to affirming the DDP’s
contention that advantage must be distributed equally unless the worse-off party either consented
to having a lesser share of advantage or denied some other persons their just share to a greater
degree than the better-off party. That said, there are three ways in which the luck egalitarian
position diverges from the prescriptions of the DDP. These will be discussed in the next three
sections, with it being argued that each of these gaps can be closed via plausible amendments to
either the luck egalitarian principle or the DDP.

One might reasonably worry that there is a regress here: a person’s just share is determined by whether she has
denied others their just shares, which, in turn, are determined by whether they have denied others their just shares…
etc. However, the regress does eventually terminate. Note that the regress is extended each time one is asked to
determine the just share of a person who has previously acted in a way that affects the distribution of holdings (because
one must then determine whether each of the affected holdings is just). However, as one works one’s way back in
time, one will eventually reach a point for each person where she has not previously acted in a way that has affected
the distribution of holdings. At each of these points, the regress terminates, with the DDP declaring that the just share
for each of these people must be equal with all others who have similarly not yet failed to deny others their just shares
(without any further determinations having to be made about the just shares of those who have affected the
distribution).
137
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VI. Luck Egalitarianism and Consent
The first difference between the DDP and the luck egalitarian principle of justice is that, unlike
the DDP’s claim about distributive justice, the luck egalitarian position typically does not maintain
that consent is a sufficient condition for unequal shares being just. However, this would seem to
be a plausible addition to the luck egalitarian position described in chapter four, which merely
states that the imposition of costs is sufficient for a lesser share of advantage being just.
To quickly defend this claim, consider the case of a person who begins with just as much
advantage as someone else but then consents to the latter taking some of her resources such that
she is left with a smaller share of advantage than the other party.138 Is the resulting arrangement
unjust? Many egalitarians would likely say “no.” After all, there would seem to be little difference
between culpability of the consenting party and the culpability of individuals who engage in the
kind of negligent actions for which luck egalitarians generally want to hold people responsible.
Consider, for example, Cohen’s Aesopian case of the ant who ends up better off than the
grasshopper in virtue of having assiduously worked all summer while the latter relaxed (Cohen
2008b). The luck egalitarian assessment of this case is that the grasshopper should be held
responsible because she acted in a way that she could reasonably expect would lead to advantage
being distributed inappropriately. However, similar remarks would seem to apply had the
grasshopper worked hard but, due to an excessively altruistic disposition, then agreed to giving the
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There remains the question of what counts as consent. Given the significant debate that exists on this point in the
literature, the thesis will avoid taking a stance on this question. As noted above, it seems plausible that acts only
qualify as genuine consent if they are freely undertaken and reasonably informed (though both of these notions would
have to be given precise content). Additionally, some have suggested that consent must be an explicit act of
communication (Kleinig 2010). However, no particular view need be affirmed here; rather, the argument of this thesis
merely requires that there is some account of consent that makes the concept stand in the proper relation to complaint
nullification (i.e., makes it true that consent nullifies complaint), with all uses of “consent” referring to that concept.
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ant all of her product. Thus, acts of consent might be understood as a subset of the acts that can be
reasonably expected to result in an inappropriate distribution of advantage (i.e., a distribution that
departs from the standard of equal holdings adjusted to reflect the internalization of imposed costs),
bringing the luck egalitarian position fully into line with the prescriptions of the DDP when it
comes to the relationship between consent and culpable choice.
Alternatively, luck egalitarians might insist that consent is distinct from acts that
foreseeably result in advantage being distributed inappropriately. However, they might
nonetheless have reason to accept that consent renders inequalities just depending upon the
grounds they have for insisting that people be held responsible for culpable choices. While a
detailed discussion of this point would take things too far afield, note that the proponent of
consequential responsibility must maintain that it is both permissible to leave culpable parties with
less and also that it is impermissible to not leave them with less. But what would ground the former
permissibility claim? One plausible answer that the luck egalitarian might appeal to is the
aforementioned argument about complaint nullification: those who act in ways that leave others
without their just share of advantage have no basis to complain when they, themselves, are left
with less advantage, thereby making it permissible to enforce the distribution where they have less
(where the permissibility of such enforcement is a necessary and sufficient condition of a share
being just). However, if this is the argument that grounds the luck egalitarian acceptance of
consequential responsibility, then the luck egalitarian should equally accept that consent renders
unequal shares just, as consent similarly functions to nullify complaint for the reasons discussed
in section II of chapter three.139 Given such acceptance, the DDP as applied to distributive justice

Recall that this argument began by noting the intuitive appeal of the premise, appealing to Simmons’ citation of
Locke’s view that there is nothing more “ridiculous” than a person objecting to an arrangement to which she has
agreed (Simmons 1993, 73). However, for those who did not share Simmons’ and Locke’s view that it is self-evident
that consent nullifies compliant, it was argued that complaint is an objection to some state of affairs obtaining while
139
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would yield the luck egalitarian claim that there is a presumption of equality that is overridden iff
people either consent to having less or act in a way that denies others their just shares to a greater
degree (where consent trumps culpability). Thus, if libertarians accept the DDP—as it has been
argued above that they must—then they similarly should accept a luck egalitarian principle of
justice that holds that (1) consenting to having a smaller share is a sufficient condition of inequality
being just and (2) in the absence of consent, the agent denying others their just share to a greater
degree than the better-off parties is a necessary and sufficient condition of inequality being just.

VI. An Evidence-Based DDP
Even with this amendment, the DDP doesn’t force the libertarian all the way to the luck egalitarian
position advanced in chapter four. Specifically, there are two additional components built into the
luck egalitarian position (for the purposes of making it more plausible) that do not follow directly
from the DPP. However, this section and the subsequent one will argue that both of these additions
should be amenable to libertarians, though one would require revision of both the DDP and the
self-ownership position taken to follow from it.
Recall that the luck egalitarian position described in chapter four maintained that agents
are subjected to penalties not merely when they act in ways that result in an inappropriate
distribution of advantage but when—and only when—they act in ways that they can reasonably
expect to result in advantage being inappropriately distributed. This adjustment was made because
it seemed that people should not be held responsible for the effect of chance on the outcomes they
bring about. Rather, they should only be held responsible for acting in ways that are comparatively

consent is a way of endorsing some state of affairs via the affirmation that this state of affairs can obtain. Thus, if
some person consents to some treatment, she would then have no basis for complaint if she were treated in the relevant
way as there is a performative contradiction between simultaneously endorsing and objecting to some state of affairs.
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likely to result in advantage being inappropriately distributed (relative to other possible actions
they could take) given the evidence available to them. By contrast, the DDP, when applied to
distributive justice, merely maintains that people are to have smaller just shares (i.e., be held
responsible) if they act in a way that brings about an inappropriate distribution to a greater degree
than others, with no mention of reasonable expectations.
Given this contradiction between the luck egalitarian position’s incorporation of reasonable
expectations and the DDP’s omission of this adjustment, there are two ways the libertarian might
proceed. First, she might hold onto the DDP as it has been stated above and conclude that she is
stuck with a somewhat less plausible version of luck egalitarianism than the one presented in
chapter four. Alternatively, she might amend subpart (1.b.ii) of the DDP such that the sufficient
condition of the normative property difference (conditional on the absence of consent per (2)) is
not merely the worse-off party uniquely failing to respect a normative property with preservandum
x to a greater degree, but rather, her acting in a way that the available evidence suggests will result
in her failing to respect x to a greater degree. However, because the DDP grounds the selfownership position, this move would then entail that the latter must be amended such it reflects
the added evidential component of the DDP. Specifically, the libertarian could no longer maintain
that infringing upon a right entails right forfeiture but, rather, would have to maintain that it is
acting in a way that the available evidence suggests will result in a rights infringement. Thus, if
the evidence suggests that there is no chance that Q firing a bullet will hit anyone, but the bullet
ends up hitting P in the leg, the amended self-ownership position would not be able to maintain
that Q’s action results in her having any fewer rights than P or any additional duties, such as a duty
to provide recompense.
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This is not necessarily a theoretical cost; indeed, one might even be attracted to the
suggestion that people cannot forfeit rights and acquire duties due to bad luck. Indeed, if one is
sympathetic to a complaint-based argument for rights forfeiture such as that discussed above in
section IV, one might think that a person might still have a basis for complaint if she is treated in
a way that resembles an outcome she brought about for another but did not intend and could not
have reasonably foreseen. Thus, one might still think she is still wronged by such treatment and,
therefore, has a right against it despite her accidental infringement. On the other hand, one might
worry that this proposal raises difficult questions about what to say about cases where, for example,
a person carries out an action that has a fifty percent chance of infringing upon a right. Would such
a person forfeit a right in virtue of taking this action? An amended version of the self-ownership
position would have to answer tricky questions like this. Thus, a libertarian might have reason to
reject amending the DDP and insist on her original, evidence-insensitive self-ownership position.
However, as noted above, she would then be committed to an evidence-insensitive luck egalitarian
principle. On either path, though, the fact remains that she needs something quite similar to the
DDP to ground her claims about self-ownership, with that meta-principle then committing her to
something quite similar to the luck egalitarian position described in chapter four.

VII. The Maximization Principle
Finally, in addition to diverging from the DDP regarding the necessity of evidential support, the
proposed version of luck egalitarianism also extends its prescriptions by giving a more detailed
specification of people’s just shares. As noted above, the DDP entails that people’s just shares of
advantage must be equal unless someone consented or denied others’ their just shares to a greater
degree than others—which is just to say that the shares of advantage must be appropriately
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distributed if they are to be just. The proposed luck egalitarian position amends this view by
maintaining that, in addition to appropriate distribution being a necessary condition of justice,
maximality is as well, with each person having a claim to the largest possible share of advantage
compatible with advantage being appropriately distributed. Thus, it maintained that persons who
act in a way that fails to maximize WEDA are to be penalized in the sense that their just share is
reduced relative to others. Further, this penalty was to equal whatever quantity of foregone
advantage would allow others to attain their maximal just share.
Should libertarians accept this amendment to the distributive prescriptions of the DDP?
There are a few reasons to answer this question in the affirmative. First, given that libertarians are
committed to at least a basic form of luck egalitarianism, they should welcome an amendment that
enhances the plausibility of their newfound position. That said, because the goal of the dissertation
is to demonstrate the coherence of the left-libertarian position, it would be better to show that the
proposed amendment actually follows from libertarian commitments rather than being merely
compatible with those commitments. Fortunately, there are two additional reasons for thinking that
there are libertarian commitments (some that are not specific to natural rights libertarians, but some
that are) that also commit them to the maximization of advantage.
First, recall that the claim that agents wrong others when they fail to maximize WEDA was
grounded in the internalization criterion, which held that any acceptable theory of justice must be
structured to rule out people being forced to “pick up the tab” for the poor choices of negligent
others, to use Otsuka’s language (Otsuka 2010, 229). The suggestion here is that, while it was not
billed this way in chapter four, this criterion is, itself, a libertarian position, at least in the sense
that it is widely endorsed by libertarians who often (though not always) endorse the libertarian
principles presented in chapters two and three. Indeed, one can find many examples of libertarians
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objecting to distributive arrangements on the grounds that “others are being forced to pay the cost”
(Rothbard 1995, 53); objecting to social insurance for farmers on the grounds that “if they
blunder… the government forces the consumers, the taxpayers, and the mortgagees to foot the
bill,” (von Mises 1998, 583); and even objecting to police enforcement of law and order on the
grounds that it “is the industrious workman going home from a hard day's work… who is mulcted
of a percentage of his day's earnings to hire a policeman to save the drunkard from himself”
(Sumner 1918, 480). Thus, insofar as the luck egalitarian principle’s maximizing aspect follows
from the internalization criterion, the position presented here is coherent in the sense described in
chapter one: it is a fusion of libertarian and socialist principles where the latter logically follow
from (the conjunction of) the former.140
However, one need not even appeal to the internalization criterion to show that libertarians
ought to accept the amended version of luck egalitarianism, as this position can also be seen to
follow from a second grounding principle of the self-ownership thesis. Recall from chapter two
that the self-ownership thesis was defined in terms of both universality and maximality such that
people are assigned the greatest number of rights compatible with all others having those same
rights. Additionally, it was suggested that one motivation for defining self-ownership in this way
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While this is speculative, one might think that there is additional theoretical reason for libertarians who embrace
either a consent theory of legitimacy or the self-ownership thesis to also embrace the internalization criterion in a way
that renders the package of libertarian views coherent. Specifically, one might take both consent theory and the selfownership thesis to be partially grounded in a more basic principle that insists that persons not interfere with others’
opportunity to realize their preferred states of affairs. For example, when a person’s self-ownership rights are violated,
she loses such opportunity, as discussed above in section II. Similarly, when a person is subject to a legitimate
authority, the edicts of that authority can make it such that she wrongs that authority by realizing states contrary to
those edicts, which might count as a form of interference under the proposed principle. Further, one might take the
internalization criterion to similarly follow from this more basic principle, as being forced to pick up the tab for others’
choices prevents one from realizing one’s preferred states, meaning their actions count as a form of interference. This
is merely a sketch of an argument for coherence, as an entire additional thesis might be written spelling out its details
more precisely and addressing the many objections that might be raised. However, this sketch suggests that the fact
that self-identified libertarians have been consistently attracted to the self-ownership thesis, the consent theory of
legitimacy, and the internalization criterion is non-accidental, as there may be a more fundamental principle that
grounds all three of these principles.
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was because such ownership protects something of value, namely, control over one’s body—and,
thus, each person should be granted as much of that protection as possible within the constraints
of all others having this same protection. Or, to use the language that has now been introduced,
given that self-ownership rights have a preservandum, each person should be afforded whatever
set of those rights provide for the greatest moral protection of that preservandum compatible with
all other persons having that same degree of protection (and, presumably, with any other posited
normative properties). Or, to put this slightly more generally, one might say that, given some
preservandum x, an adequate moral theory should assign to each person the set of properties with
preservandum x that provides maximal moral protection of x compatible with (a) all other persons
having that same degree of moral protection and (b) all other normative properties and metanormative principles. Call this principle the maximization principle (MP).
Like the DDP, the MP is a general meta-normative principle that sets constraints upon what
normative properties people have, though it has been stated in a way that makes it subordinate to
the DDP. And, just as the DDP grounds the universality of the self-ownership thesis, the MP
grounds the maximality of the self-ownership thesis (while also affirming that the MP is
subordinate to the constraints imposed by the DDP). Thus, libertarians who embrace the selfownership thesis ought to accept the MP for the same reason they ought to accept the DDP: it
allows them to justify their acceptance of the self-ownership thesis as opposed to some rival variant
thesis. For example, one can imagine a possible alternative to the self-ownership thesis that
maintains that all persons only have exclusion rights against others on odd-numbered days, or one
that gives each person the liberty right to include her body in acts of reclining and walking, but not
acts of sitting. However, such positions can be ruled out via appeal to the MP: they are
unacceptable in virtue of the fact that they fail to assign normative properties that maximize the
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protection of those properties’ preservandum. Thus, proponents of the self-ownership thesis have
strong reason for accepting the MP in addition to the DDP.
Once the MP is accepted, however, one would then be committed to accepting the amended
version of luck egalitarianism. The MP contends that normative properties are assigned such that
their bearers have maximum moral protection with respect to the preservandum of those properties
(within the constraints set by the DDP and other posited normative principles). Thus, when this
meta-principle is applied to properties of the form “has z amount of advantage as her just share,”
it would entail that each person should be assigned the property that has the greatest possible value
in place of “z,” where the possession of that property is also compatible with other normative
principles and meta-normative principles such as the DDP (for example, the just share of a person
who acted in a way that denied others their just shares would not be the maximum possible value
compatible with all others having an equal share; rather, it would be less in accordance with the
DDP). In other words, the combination of the DDP and the MP—two principles that, together,
help to ground the self-ownership thesis—when applied to distributive justice, yield something
very close to the luck egalitarian position described in chapter four: each person has a just share
that is equal to the maximal value that it can be compatible with all other persons having their
appropriate share and the constraints of the DDP. Thus, the MP—when paired with the DDP—
affirms the theory of penalty presented in chapter four without any need to appeal to the
internalization criterion presented above.

VIII. Conclusion
With this conclusion established, the dissertation has completed what it set out to prove, namely
that libertarians ought to join the Analytical Marxists and embrace a (bolstered) luck egalitarian
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principle of distributive justice. It first introduced two principles central to the libertarian
normative position (namely, the self-ownership thesis and the consent theory of legitimacy) as
well as a luck egalitarian position that is universally rejected by libertarians but that has been
warmly received by many socialist philosophers. It then argued that all of these principles are both
independently plausible (when properly construed) and avoid some of the most worrying
objections that have been raised against them.
Having introduced and defended these principles, the thesis then attempted to show that
they are not only compatible with one another (as left-libertarians have typically argued) but also
logically connected such that those committed to the libertarian principles must accept the luck
egalitarian principle of justice. Specifically, it contended that libertarians should forego their
preferred entitlement theories of justice in favor of one of two compatibilist positions that included
some other principle of distributive justice in a subordinate role. However, it then argued that a
consent theory of legitimacy entails that no one is entitled to any land or objects because such an
entitlement amounts to a form of legitimacy to which no one has consented. Thus, on either
compatibilist position, the just distribution of resources is determined by the remaining nonentitlement part of the position.
Finally, this chapter argued that the non-entitlement principle that libertarians should
accept (and incorporate into their preferred compatibilist position) is the aforementioned luck
egalitarian principle of justice. Specifically, it argued that proponents of the self-ownership thesis
must accept the DDP to fend off challenges from non-universalist rivals. Additionally, it attempted
to show that a promising argument in support of the consent theory of legitimacy also entailed the
DDP, meaning that any libertarians who accept that argument to ground consent theory must also
accept the DDP. And, given that the DDP (with a bit of support from the MP) entails the luck
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egalitarian position when applied to distributive justice, libertarians who accept the DDP are
committed to luck egalitarianism as a correlate of their commitments to the self-ownership position
and consent theory.
Thus, the thesis has presented a left-libertarian position that is coherent in a way that other
prominent positions are not. While writers like Michael Otsuka and Peter Vallentyne have argued
persuasively that libertarian views about self-ownership are compatible with luck egalitarian
approaches to distributive justice, this dissertation has sought to show that luck egalitarianism
actually follows from libertarian commitments, including the self-ownership thesis. This gives the
position a distinct dialectical advantage over standard left-libertarian positions, as rightlibertarians cannot simply dismiss the position by raising the question that Fried (2004) raised in
her critique of left-libertarianism: even if one grants the left-libertarians that one can
simultaneously embrace libertarian and egalitarian commitments, is there any reason to think that
one should? However, what is hopefully now clear is that this question can be answered in the
affirmative. Anyone who embraces the libertarian principles presented in chapters two and three
has reason to embrace the egalitarian position favored by many socialists, as the latter logically
follows from the conjunction of the two principles and their supporting arguments. Thus, the leftlibertarian position has been shown to be coherent in just the way the thesis set out to prove.
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